The article covers the macro-regional context of case-oriented regional studies in political comparative studies. The case-study format is an in-depth study of a single case in order to understand a specific object or even a class of similar objects, and is a consideration of a specific object "in the moment". This type of research is characterized by obtaining detailed information on the parameters and characteristics of the phenomenon scrutinizing and is based on a non-experimental type of evidence based on observation. One of the effective formats of comparative research is countries comparison located within the same region (sometimes it is a macroregion, sometimes it is an entire continent), or comparison of the (macro)regions with similar entities. A variety of territorial configurations and a variety of interpretations of the concept of a macroregion in comparative political science, along with the above-mentioned interpretations, the division by continents/continents and the historical and cultural division by cardinal directions East-West, North-South also retain their importance. Elements of such a comparison are presented in this issue of “Comparative Politics”, which contains articles analyzing a number of aspects of Western, Latin American, and African politics.

The article seeks to answer the research question: to what extent is Russia's current policy in Latin and Caribbean America is a “return” (ibid est, a repetition of the past Soviet experience) and to what extent does it represent a qualitatively new foreign policy line. Exploring the main parameters of Russian policy in the region, the author focused on the changes taking place after the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022, which affected the scale and nature of cooperation between Moscow and Latin and Caribbean countries. An analysis of media pieces, official documents, and trade statistics made it possible to trace the evolution of the basic lines of Russian policy towards the Latin America and Caribbean before and after February 2022, to identify the current views of some governments and parties in the region about Russian policy, and generally determine how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict affected Moscow's contacts with Latin America and Caribbean.

The analysis shows that despite the continued interest of many Latin American and Caribbean nations in trade and economic cooperation with the Russian Federation, there are a number of objective and subjective obstacles to such cooperation, and political interaction is possible with a fairly limited group of countries, whilein general, the Russian model of relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries is not yet well-established.

The resource-rich Essequibo region, located in northeastern South America and occupying two-thirds of the territory of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, has long been disputed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. At the same time, the tensions have been escalating in recent years, making this conflict one of the most explosive in Latin America, which was declared a Zone of Peace in 2014, where any disputes must be resolved exclusively through negotiations, and the principle of national sovereignty is elevated to the absolute. The discovery of large offshore oil fields has significantly increased Guyana’s role in regional politics. The rapid economic growth of the Caribbean state is attracting increasing attention from experts to its history and the peculiarities of modern development. Given that, this article analyzes the territorial dispute over Essequibo from the perspective of the ruling elites of Guyana and traces the evolution of the state’s approaches to conflict resolution. Using historical and comparative as well as historical and genetic methods, the strategies of governments of the Cooperative Republic are studied – from the moment of gaining independence until present. As a result of the study, it was found that the finality of the 1899 arbitration award and the fact of its longterm recognition by Venezuela underlie the position of Guyana, which has not formally changed throughout the state’s independent existence. Nevertheless, in practice, it was accompanied by significant tactical adjustments to the negotiating strategy. An analysis of the speeches of Guyanese politicians and decisions made by presidential administrations has allowed to identify the key factors that led to the evolution of the state’s position on the territorial issue over the past 60 years. Firstly, the dynamics of Venezuela’s foreign policy course has played a significant role, as its governments have made claims on Essequibo with varying intensity at different periods. Secondly, the transformation of the international and regional order has had a significant impact, primarily due to the end of the ideological confrontation between the superpowers and their allies during the Cold War. Finally, the internal development of the Co-operative Republic has become a determining factor: economic crises, the beginning of oil production and the inter-party struggle have directly influenced the adjustment of the state’s approach. At the same time, the use of the border dispute as a tool to retain power can be traced throughout the entire political history of the Caribbean state.

The article examines the problem of the emergence of a criminal insurgency in a single country, the factor of which is the integration of local gangs into a transnational criminal network, created by highly developed gangs and cartels in countries where criminal insurgencies already take place. The process of the insurgency emergence is shown using the example of the involvement of Ecuadorian gangs in a transnational criminal network by criminal groups from Colombia and Mexico. The author assumes that the situation in these countries corresponds to the signs of an internal armed conflict. The aim of this paper is to show how highly developed criminal organizations involved in criminal insurgencies in Colombia and Mexico act as a factor of internal political destabilization in Ecuador in the form of criminal insurgency through the involvement of Ecuadorian gangs in a transnational criminal network. The research question is formulated as follows: why does the involvement of criminal organizations in transnational criminal networks contribute to the internal political destabilization of the state in the form of a criminal insurgency in the territory in which these groups appeared? The methodology of the study is based on the concept of criminal insurgency, according to which developed criminal organizations are considered as de facto political actors primarily due to their ability to establish territorial control and thereby challenge the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, creating a direct threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The study also uses the concept of «three-generation gangs» and social network analysis. A network of Colombian, Mexican, and Ecuadorian criminal organizations is identified, network metrics are determined. One subnetwork is detected. It is shown that the emergence of criminal insurgencies in Mexico and Colombia contributed to the emergence of criminal insurgency in Ecuador. It is concluded that social network analysis as applied to criminal networks can help identify the vulnerabilities of criminal networks and develop effective strategies to counter them. To improve the effectiveness of the fight against criminal networks special attention should be paid to neutralizing fixers between the groups included in these networks.

The article delves into American nuclear strategy and its implications for the U.S. arsenal and the U.S. current and future nuclear stance. The piece examines J. Biden administration’s key document in this field, namely Nuclear Posture Review, and other relevant American military and political documents. The article compares them with the analogous documents of the first D. Trump presidency and the preceding B. Obama administration, as well as with Trump’s early announcements and practical steps taken in this field after his return to the White House. The piece analyzes the new concept of Integrated Deterrence introduced in the Biden administration’s basic military posturing documents. This concept emphasizes closer correlation between nuclear and conventional weapons as well as intertwined cooperation with the U.S. allies and partners. The study shows that the reduced role for nuclear weapons in the American strategy, as stated by the Biden’s administration, did not fully manifest itself in its actions. Its alleged desire to focus on de-escalation measures, diplomacy and reinvigorated nuclear arms control did not live up to its potential and was consequently subjected to certain revision. Pro-military pundits in Washington give as a reason for this about-face the U.S. primary competitors’, China’s and Russia’s, allegedly aggressive behavior, their military build-up, and prospects for their possible collusion. All these are cited as causes for growing and modernizing the U.S. own nuclear arsenal, including each component of the U.S. strategic triad, as well as its other nuclear capabilities.

The article examines the evolution of Sweden and Finland’s military policy in the Arctic given global geopolitical, economic and climate transformations. The paper presents a comprehensive analysis of external and internal factors’ combined influence that determined the change of Sweden and Finland’s policy. The author highlights the key external factors, such as the restoration of Russia's role in the region, the NATO pressure, and the melting of the ice, which opens up the possibility of using new transportation routes and developing mineral extraction. Internal factors include the indoctrination of population to support alliance membership, defense sector lobbying, and the reorientation of political elites. Having analysed official documents on Arctic policy and sociological surveys, the author identifies the stages of transforming approaches to security in the Arctic. The article identifies the role of “hybrid threat” narratives as a tool to legitimize NATO membership, including the interpretation of the “unidentified submarine” incidents (2014) and cyberattacks on Finnish government institutions (2013-2016). The paper describes influence of the defense industrial complex on political decisions through lobbying for joint procurement and access to NATO markets. The study also focuses on the long-term consequences of militarization in the region, including escalating confrontation and transforming Arctic cooperation formats, and describes current NATO-Finnish-Swedish military cooperation relations. Special attention is paid to the relationship between domestic political processes in Finland and Sweden and the strategic interests of the alliance, which forms a new security architecture in the region. The paper contributes to a better understanding of the true reasons for Finland and Sweden joining NATO. The results of the study may help to predict further militarization of the Arctic, which might lead to the elimination of frozen cooperation formats and increased confrontation.

In the early 2020s, the countries of the “Sahel Trio” (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) experienced a series of military coups, bringing elite groups to power, including those utilizing anti-Western narratives. This created an opportunity for non-Western actors to expand their influence in the Sahel, which the Republic of Türkiye is most dynamically seeking to capitalize on. Ankara’s foreign policy “probing” of the African continent had begun as early as the 2000s, with the establishment of a diplomatic platform within the “Türkiye-Africa” summits. By the 2010s, Türkiye began to show a more focused interest in the Sahel, laying the legal and regulatory groundwork for future cooperation, which would serve as a springboard for deeper regional engagement in the early 2020s. It is worth noting that, during the 2010s, Ankara primarily emphasized mechanisms of public diplomacy and trade-economic cooperation, while also partially supporting initiatives led by Western powers, such as the “G5 Sahel”. At the same time, Türkiye promoted an anti-colonial discourse towards African states, highlighting that, unlike the European powers, the Ottoman Empire was not engaged in the colonial exploitation of the continent. By the late 2010s and early 2020s, Ankara gradually began positioning itself as an independent player capable of serving as an alternative security guarantor in the Sahel region. This was achieved through the supply of its own military products, promoting military-technical and scientific cooperation, and training local armed forces. Notably, Türkiye has developed its closest relations in the Sahel with Niger, followed by Mali and then Burkina Faso. Over the past few years, Türkiye has established its own model of foreign policy engagement in Africa, which also applies to the Sahel countries. Therefore, this study aims to examine Türkiye’s foreign policy toward Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso through the lens of the key discourses Ankara promotes on the continent. Additionally, it highlights the main priorities and challenges Türkiye may face in its engagement with the “Sahel Trio”.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the concept of “Francafrique” as a form of postcolonial discourse and a special model of Franco-African relations that emerged during the period of decolonization and continued to exist in the postcolonial era. The author's focus is to examine the transformation of the concept of “Françafrique” from a neologism that first emerged in the post-World War II period in a positive way to a critical discourse that reflects the hidden neocolonial logic of the relationship between France and African states, especially in the Sahel and Central African zone. The article examines the political and symbolic dimension of this phenomenon. The study analyzes the evolution of the public and intellectual perception of “Françafrique” from the period of the formation of the French Community in 1958 in the context of the Cold War to contemporary debates about the need to rethink Franco-African ties given the emergence of a multipolar world. The research assesses the contribution of the French human rights organization Survie, in deconstructing the official narrative and denouncing the mechanisms underlying the Franco-African partnership. The author also emphasizes the role of memory, language and political myths in the reproduction of neocolonial structures. The study is based on a critical discursive approach, drawing on historical sources such as official statements by French and African political figures. The article aims to identify the mechanisms of ideological and institutional reproduction of France's postcolonial influence in Africa.

The article explores Nigeria’s foreign policies in a range of international organizations with regard to the core interests that the country has pursued through multilateral engagement at the UN, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, OPEC, FAO, OIC since the return of civilian rule in 1999. The piece also highlights the shift in the country’s stance towards two informal institutions, BRICS and G20, that emerged after Bola Tinubu’s rise to the presidency. Although Nigeria’s approach to these fora can hardly be generalized, a search for the optimal balance between soliciting broad support for national development and flagging its role as a regional leader, capable of drawing global attention to Africa’s challenges and priorities, could be attributed as the main feature of the country’s vision of multilateralism. The UN remains instrumental to Nigeria’s multilateral diplomacy as the nation uses the venue to offer its own vision on a range of global issues, especially in matters of international security. At the same time, Nigeria’s multiple terms on the UN Security Council and the appointment of Nigerians to senior UN roles have contributed to enhancing its global stature. Nigeria’s recent partnership with BRICS and its growing interest in the G20 add symbolic weight to its ambition of being one of the leading voices for the Global South— pursuing broader collective interests alongside the national agenda. Economically, OPEC remains critical due to the structure of Nigeria’s resource-based economy, as does the Commonwealth’s initiatives on debt relief. BRICS, in the meantime, holds significant potential: Nigeria’s leadership is focused on major, particularly infrastructure-focused, projects in partnership with the New Development Bank and fellow BRICS partners.

The article is devoted to the factor of identity in the Moroccan foreign policy. It considers the main theoretical approaches to the study of identity, which were then used to analyse Morocco's foreign policy strategy. As a result, it was possible to identify three key “spaces” of the state's foreign policy: the space of proximity, including the Maghreb countries; the space of “cultural belonging,” encompassing the Arab-Muslim world, African countries (primarily the Sahara-Sahel zone) and some European countries; and the global space. The historical development of the Kingdom's territorial organization has contributed to the formation of a particularly acute perception of sovereignty and national integrity among Moroccan society and political elites. This, in turn, has led to theperception of Morocco’s closest neighbor – Algeria as a key foreign policy challenge. Due to Morocco's geographical location and historical circumstances, the state's ruling elite has long pursued a pragmatic foreign policy, balancing between different international players and adapting to changing conditions. However, this pragmatism is not relevant when it comes to the Western Sahara conflict. The territory, whose status remains uncertain, plays a central role in the process of shaping Moroccan national identity. It serves as a tool for strengthening the legitimacy of the authorities and consolidating society. It the reason why Morocco has significantly intensified its foreign policy activities in this area in recent years, making it possible to achieve significant progress in the international recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara.