The 2020s have witnessed increasing instability in energy security. The COVID-19 pandemic, which profoundly impacted the global economy and energy industry; the fierce confrontation between Russia and the West over the war in Ukraine, which has significantly disrupted global energy supplies; the ongoing tensions of tensions in the hydrocarbon-rich Middle East; and imbalances arising from the fourth energy transition are among the key factors destabilizing the global energy supply system, resulting in high volatility in energy prices. Countries’ approaches to energy security remain largely conventional, focusing on three core aspects: security of energy supply, energy independence, and security of energy demand.

This study comprehensively analyzes the current understanding of energy security by Russia, China, the USA, the EU, based on their fundamental doctrinal documents. The findings indicate that Russia, as a self-sufficient country and major energy exporter, views its energy security through the lenses of security of energy demand, security of energy supply, and energy independence. China prioritizes security of energy supply and strives for energy independence amid the energy transition, a natural approach given its critical dependence on hydrocarbon imports and status as the world’s largest source of greenhouse gases. The United States, despite becoming a net oil and gas exporter, continues to prioritize security of energy supply and energy independence, with an increasing emphasis on security of energy demand. The European Union, critically dependent on hydrocarbon imports, focuses primarily on security of energy supply and energy independence within the context of the energy transition.

While Russia, China, the US, and the EU predominantly view energy security defensively, the US and the EU also adopt an offensive stance. Unlike China, the US, the EU, and Russia politicize their understanding of energy security. Despite this, Russia and China demonstrate openness to international energy cooperation, whereas the US and the EU are more inclined to promote their energy sector interests through confrontation.

In recent years and especially after February 2022, there has been a sharp intensification of Brussels’ engagement with Central Asia. The growing interest in Central Asia is due to the EU’s desire to develop an alternative version of infrastructure development and connectivity in the region as opposed to the China’s Belt and Road Initiative, to use the resource potential of the region to reduce dependence on China for green and digital transition strategy, and the region’s transit potential for development transport and energy infrastructure bypassing Russia. The new geopolitical situation and the trends developing in Central Asia are regarded in Brussels as providing a “window of opportunity” to increase the EU’s presence. Moreover, the EU’s policy towards Central Asia starts to be driven by geopolitical interests. Containing Russia, limiting Russia’s and China’s influence in the region, reducing dependence on China are becoming the main goals of Brussels’ policy in the region. The “benevolent indifference” to the region that once characterized the EU is being replaced by Brussels’ desire to become a major geopolitical player in the region. The article provides a retrospective analysis of the EU policy towards Central Asia throughout the entire period of official interaction between the parties. The focus of the article is to trace the evolution of the goals, priorities and interests of the EU in the region, identify the driving forces that determined Brussels’ policy towards the region at different historical stages, and determine the tools used to achieve the goals. The article also describes the largest EU initiatives for the region. The author concludes that in the current geopolitical situation, Central Asia has no independent significance for Brussels: policy towards the region is built through the prism and in accordance with the logic of confrontation with Russia and hedging risks associated with China.

The study aims to identify the significance of the European Union factor in shaping the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the People’s Republic of China in the early 2020’s. The research question stems from the existing contradiction between the economic interests of German states and business corporations on the one hand and the policy of the German government, which is increasingly distancing itself from China, on the other. It is hypothesized that Berlin’s shift to a confrontational strategy towards Beijing is largely due to “Europeanization” – the strengthening of centralization elements in European Union governance and the related adaptation of national models to the pan-European one. In the context of the “Europeanization” of foreign policy, supporting the existing trends rather than developing an alternative scenario contributes to preserving the leading role of Germany in the formation and implementation of the EU’s policy towards China. Thus, the study, in a certain sense, is a case study of the limits of autonomy of foreign policy of the integration associations’ member–states. Based on the bottom-up approach existing within the concept of “Europeanization,” the article provides a periodization of Germany’s policy towards China, taking into account the changes in the state of the EU ties with the latter. Four phases of German – Chinese engagements are proposed, namely 1993–2016, 2016–2019, 2019–2023 and 2023 until present. The comparison of the national and supranational levels of decision–making during these periods allowed us to demonstrate the full cycle of the “Europeanization” of Germany’s political course and once again emphasize the importance of the European Union in the formation of the policy of the state under study. Initially Germany presented its own norms of interaction with China to the EU level in order to ensure the most favorable conditions of cooperation with the latter; now it is adopting pan-European standards, adapting its national position to that of the European Union. The author’s conclusions are supported by the results of qualitative analysis of textual materials of the leading think–tanks in 2020–2024. The results of the study allow predicting further solidarization of Germany with the pan-European position and deterioration of German – Chinese relations.

The escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022 marked a new series of challenges for all key actors in international relations, including the states of the European Union. The largest EU countries France and Germany faced with a set of external and internal crisis phenomena chose different ways to build a strategy to overcome them. The German leadership attempted to use the Ukrainian crisis as a reason for launching previously postponed reforms in Germany and as a source of explanation for economic and social difficulties. Rising inflation, a reduction in industrial production from expensive energy resources, difficulties in migration policy and other problems were explained by Berlin as part of the price for the necessary support for Ukraine. At the same time, the reform of the Bundeswehr, which initially received broad public approval against the backdrop of the start of the Special military operation, faced criticism due to the half-heartedness of the proposed measures. As a result, the German government faced an unprecedentedly low approval rating for its performance, which only exacerbated Germany’s overall state of crisis. On the contrary, the French leadership, faced with a series of internal crises, the central plot of which was pension reform, chose not to tie them to the foreign policy dimension and, in particular, to the events in Ukraine. As a result, the French domestic political discussion did not become dependent on the logic of the development of the situation in Ukraine and was not radicalized at the expense of external participants. The difference in the choice of anti-crisis strategy has strengthened the contradictions within the Franco-German tandem as the economic and political core of the European Union.

The participation of the state in the training of personnel of the armed forces (AF) of another country is a way to ensure a long-term strategic presence in it. But there are high image and practical risks connected with refusal of the recipient country from foreign military instructors, advisers. The article tries to explore the features of the usage of such instrument by Germany on the example of the training of land forces of Afghanistan, Mali and Ukraine. The cases are the missions ISAF (2002-2014) and Resolute Support (2015-2021), EUTM Mali (2013-2022), EUMAM (since December 2022). The author uses 25 criteria divided into 5 groups for the comparative analysis, using the theory of armed forces building.

The paper issues the historic features of the functioning of national armed forces at the territory of three countries, also strategic priorities of the Western democracies during the period of activity of the missions and attitude towards each one from Russia. The reasons of the choice of NATO or the EU for each mission is explained. Also, the author presents the quantitative parameters of the Bundeswehr usage in the cases, different numbers of the trained troops. The important parameters are the features of the organization of them, their composition, timings and schedules of the process, the tactics of combat usage. The research paper concludes about Germany`s desire for the compensation of the losses of former military training tracks by the launch of the new one.

The article discusses the use of development assistance as a foreign policy tool by the Benelux countries, namely Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The paper aims to answer the question whether the development assistance provided by the Benelux states corresponds to their political statements which cite this policy area as a soft power instrument, or the three approaches to development assistance rather reflect other goals, e.g. beneficial economic cooperation with developing countries. The article analyzes international statistical data, sociological surveys and official development assistance-related documents, using qualitative historical and descriptive as well as genealogical and historical methods to trace the evolution of the three countries’ approaches. The concepts of small and middle powers, to which the Benelux countries belong, and the concept of soft power constitute the theoretical and methodological framework of the research. The article concludes that the Benelux countries’ approaches to development assistance are different, complex and changeable. The pursuit of economic goals helps explain at least some of the three states’ geographic and functional priorities, which translate into defining countries where Benelux’ companies are situated as key partners or specializing in the development assistance areas where these companies can be involved. This pursuit is most clearly evident in the Dutch approach, while Luxembourg seems to value soft power function more as it enhances the country’s image as one of the most generous donors and a responsible member of the international community. Unlike Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium show a downward trend in the amount of assistance allocated (with the exception of 2015 and 2022), amid doubts about the effectiveness of development assistance and securitization of this area; however, the ongoing public debates keep relevant the use of development assistance as soft power  vis-à-vis the countries of the Global South.

The current cycle of interstate rivalry and crisis of European security raises the issues of civilizational identity of Russia and relations between the West and East of Europe. The analysis examines a broad range of political, historical and cultural problems that determine the modern place and role of Russia in Europe. The current features of interstate rivalry and its structure are revealed. An analysis of the causes and historical parallels of recent events, including those related to the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, is given. The strategic risks and opportunities of Russian foreign policy in Europe are outlined. It is underlined that the increasing aggressiveness of Western policy is dictated by the crisis of the neoliberal model of globalization. The European space of the EU and NATO increasingly finds itself in a situation where its ability to play a dominant role in the world is decreasing and it becomes necessary to adapt to the conditions of a polycentric world order. The inability of the West to keep pace with event produces the search for an external enemy, and the growing mentality of a besieged fortress. The West increasingly imports external risks by pedalling the Ukrainian crisis as well as the dogmatic course towards expanding the EU and NATO at the expense of Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. In the current circumstances, while making much-needed efforts to preserve and strengthen Russian identity, it is important not to leave the concept of Europe at the mercy of those who do not understand Russia or are hostile to it.