Introduction to the Special Issue of “Comparative Politics Russia” ‒ “Non-Western Transformations”. In Honor of the “Comparative Politics Russia” author Fred Eidlin. The text is compiled by fragments of a selected correspondence ‒ the exchange of views between professors Alexei D. Voskressesnki and Fred Eidlin while preparing methodological articles of F. Eidlin for publication in the journal “Comparative Politics Russia” and other books on Non-Western processes.

The article is devoted to one of the most urgent problems of regional studies – the definition of the object-subject field of a new discipline. This article discusses the object and subject of research in regional studies, the relationship between regional studies and regional studies. Interest in this problem is due to the formation of theoretical regional studies and regional studies proper as a new direction of science. The author proposes to consider the region as a concept that reflects the most important properties of all types of phenomena – regions, territories, countries, associations of countries and the world as a whole - as geosocial systems. Despite the independence of countries as actors on the global stage, they are all integral parts of the world-system, being closely associated with it, as well as within themselves, by countless transactions that are collectively constituting the essence of the region, which in reality is а territorially determined (sub)system of division of labor. All local subsystems are hierarchically integrated into the world-the system of which they are genuine parts. The world-system is of maximum size of the object in regional studies, depending on which are subordinated all the problems of regional studies.

The international transformations, which the Middle East faced in the 20th and early 21st centuries, virtually made it a region without any regional order. Polycentric structural organization, an intrinsic feature of the Middle East, has resulted in multiple visions of regional order generated by regional powers and global actors actively involved in the regional affairs. Paradoxically, however, none of these powers had enough military, political, cultural or ideological potential to implement its vision and impose it on others. Against this background Turkey’s foreign policy strategy had signifi cantly changed at the turn of the centuries. In the later 1990s Turkey was still a status quo power, dependent on its relations with the West and adherent to the principles of non-interference in the regional affairs. However, its rising involvement in global and regional affairs in the fi rst decade of this century made Ankara’s foreign policy much more liable to international and regional developments. In addition, the advent to power of the Justice and Development Party added a strong Islamic element to its domestic and foreign policy discourse. As a result during the fi rst decade of this century Turkey undertook an effort to propose its own version of regional order based on the convergence of liberal and Islamic values. The Arab Spring and a new wave of regional destabilization however seriously limited Turkey’s ability to do it. Reacting to the regional turbulence Turkey has reset its foreign policy appealing to the concept of “moral realism”, an intricate combination of humanitarianism and militarism being its core part.

The diachronic comparative analysis of the regional orders in Southeast Asia in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods presented in the article allows to demonstrate that despite their subordinate position in the international system Southeast Asian states not only managed to adopt themselves to the nation-state concept but also to develop their own regional instruments of raising their international profile. Alongside with this adaptation the indigenous (pre-colonial) perceptions of the regional order were becoming less relevant in terms of international relations and became the domain of socio-political and philosophical thought. The paper argues that the experience of collective action of Southeast Asian states united in ASEAN and the necessity to accommodate a variety of intraregional and wider international limitations resulted in a quite objective and rational view of a desired just regional order. Its core assumptions imply inclusiveness, acceptance of the nation-state-based international system, adherence to the shared norms and principles. They also indicate regional desire to see a lower Western interventionism but not the Western decline in the international system. As for China, Southeast Asian state perceive it as desirable strong economic, but not political force. ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific reflect this approach. However justified it seems, there are still open questions concerning the instruments of its implementation.

The article is devoted to the description of the main parameters, periodization and the role of Ho Chi Minh ideology, as well as its main components. Particular attention is paid to the influence of traditional Chinese military-strategic thought, first of all the concepts of Sun Tzu, on the formation of the strategy of the Vietnamese national liberation movement on the eve of the First Indochina War (1946-1954). The inclusion of ancient treatises in the political studies of leading party and military staffs led to the spread of the ability to think stratagemically. These strategic approaches were later actively used by DRV leaders in the conflict against the United States during the Second Indochina War (1965- 1975), as well as today to analyze the approaches of political leaders of the great powers to solve regional security problems.

The article focuses on the comparative analysis of political regimes and regime change within the “third wave” of democratization in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). The study sheds some light on the failure of democratic transition in China’s after the Tiananmen Square protests. In the course of the study, the key features of non-Western political transformation across the Taiwan Strait were identifi ed. As a result, it was found that Confucian political culture leads to neither democracy, nor authoritarian rule, it merely determines institutional design of the political regimes..

The notion of “normative power”, authored by Ian J. Manners, is usually applied to the European Union (EU). It describes the ability to impose one’s norms and values over other states, shaping the conventional understanding of what is “normal” in international relations. However, this notion is not exclusive to the EU: this article argues that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is another regional grouping that tries to disseminate its norms and values worldwide, thus transforming itself into a nascent “normative power”. ASEAN promotes the so-called “Asian values” (collectivism, state paternalism, cultural relativism, non-intervention into each other’s domestic affairs, etc.) through interregional arrangements with other states and international groupings, as well as through multilateral forums where it plays the central role. However, the concept of “Asian values” evokes much criticism that makes the transformation of ASEAN into a “normative power” highly questionable.

Various forms of state power are associated with various forms of resistance. This article argues that there is not only a Western or non-Western form of state power, but also the corresponding Western and non-Western forms of political resistance. Methodologically, the article is based on a semantic-pragmatic approach to the formation of concepts. This article clarifi es the concept of “non-Western political resistance.” First, the semantics of this concept is determined through a review of relevant scientifi c literature, namely the works of M. Foucault, M. Mann, I. Neumann and J. Habermas, and then using it studies Zomia as a case of a non-Western form of resistance. As a result of the conceptual study, the following conclusions can be made. Western forms of state power are based on governmentality or infrastructural power. Such governance methods give rise to their corresponding Western strategies of political resistance, based on the deliberative form of democracy as the closest to democracy based on communicative rationality. Non-Western forms of state power are understood as governance practices based on disciplinary or despotic power. They give rise to forms of non-Western resistance corresponding to them, which include either the desire to physically move away from state control in geographically inaccessible areas (the case of Zomia), or protest resistance up to civil wars and terrorism.

Medieval Europe before the Reformation and Moscow Russia before the Troubles are viewed in an ideally-typical manner as carriers of basic social and mental unities: faith and church organization, sacred empire as the Rome’s usccessor, basic social relations. As a result of the Reformation and the religious wars each of the European unities was destroyed, but parts of the former Pax Christiana continued to closely interact and compete with each other, to fight for leadership, that led to intensive modernization of the leading Western European powers with known global consequences. Moscow State after the Time of Trouble restored its unity in all three aspects. The features of the state and society here were significantly transformed as a result of the Schism, the formation of the Russian empire, administrative reforms of the 18–19 centuries, but the basic properties of etatism, centralism, priority of service, and power instrumentalization of the moral and religious sphere remained. The Russian social-political cycles have the phases: successful mobilization, stagnation, crisis, attempts of liberalization, authoritarian scrollback. The cyclical dynamics is explained by the interrelation of the following factors: 1) the primacy of military-compulsory (“colonial”) administration as a means of retaining and managing vast territories; 2) the state priorities of military power, size of the territory, and the volume of export products; 3) the order of military service as a basic model for political and social institutions; the corresponding weakness of autonomous capital and business activity; 4) the mental, cultural and property gap (lack of vertical solidarity) between the elites and the bulk of the population. 5) the monopoly of state religion (or forced atheism). Thus, unity of political power, religious and ideological monopoly can lead a country to military triumphs and even geopolitical success for decades but in the longue duree this unity generates vulnerability.

The political aspects of the formation of the civil society and the rule of law in modern Azerbaijan coincide with the general trends in the development of globalization and political processes in the modern world. The nature of the civil society formation in Azerbaijan is inseparably linked with the regional political processes. In particular, the analysis of internal political and regional processes, conducted on the basis of consideration of the legal framework and political structures of the country, the main stages of post-Soviet development, and tendencies in the development of civil society, which are mainly manifested through such forms of social life as the activities of non-governmental organizations, civic engagement, corruption and bureaucracy, authoritarianism in various echelons of power, showed that the civil society in Azerbaijan had not yet met the advanced standards of open society and democratic development. The formation of the rule of law is hampered by the regional contradictions, in particular, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as high legal illiteracy of the population, the traditions-bound nature of the social structure, elements of corruption and authoritarianism in management at certain levels.

The influential theory of Charles Tilly explaining the relationship between military activity and state building in early modern Europe has been often used to analyze the development of statehood outside Europe and North America. However, in Post-Soviet space it was referred to only a limited extent – mainly operationalising the struggle and bargaining between the state and society over the extraction of resources in favor of the state - for the analysis of post-communist transformations. Meanwhile, the post- Soviet space with its unresolved conflicts provides a reach material for checking the “military” component of this theory. Most authors agree that the international order established after the World War II does not allow the clear replication of the scheme elaborated by Tilly. This article is aiming to show that, although post-Soviet conflicts are of great symbolic importance for post-Soviet states, their material impact on the dynamics of state revenues and on the strengthening of state institutions is minimal. This paradox may be explained by the international geopolitical context around the conflicts where the buildup of military power of a state involved in the conflict cannot serve as a sufficient condition for resolving the conflict in favor of the state.

This paper is a study of water-sharing disputes in Inner Asia. The focal point is the issue of fresh water-sharing in the conditions of regional post-Soviet political order. The article is an attempt to verify a hypothesis: is there a correlation between hydro power control system and regional polticial order? We study the relations between Russia, China, and Mongolia that deal with transboundary rivers which fl ow into Lake Baikal. This lake is the world’s biggest fresh-water lake and is under protection by the UNESCO. The proposed paper is centered around the idea that institutional conditions influence the legitimization of rights on hydro reserves. The research is based on the methods of neo-institutionalism which is used to study the regional political order. The empirical basis of the paper is made up of legal acts on the distrubution of transboundary waters, speeches of Russian and Mongolian statesmen, offi cial statistical data, ecological monitoring data, and regional mass-media data. Our basic conclusion: the processes undergoing in Inner Asia could lead to a new political order in the foreseeable future. The ideas, values, and infrastructural macro-projects can change both the balance of power in the region and the level of water consumption. The arising ecological problems therefore become politicized.