The article presents a large-format context of ambiguous processes in the postSoviet space. In understanding its current state, one should take into account its historical genesis and the different duration of including of various lands within a single state. The geostrategic perspective of consideration presupposes the recognition of the importance of civilizational coordinates, cultural identifications and economic parameters of this area, which absorbed significantly dissimilar civilizational formations with dissimilar historical and political experience and level of economic development. While considering current processes in the post-Soviet space, it is reasonable to assume the fundamental position of all six editions of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation adopted under three presidents of the Russian Federation: development of cooperation with neighboring countries is the primary priority of the Russian Federation. This space, both in the past and the present, is highly heterogeneous entity in all dimensions, including significant diversification and even polarization of foreign policy aspirations. The heterogeneity of the near abroad is so significant that its most common definition remains its identification through denial. Nevertheless, despite the cultural, civilizational and political-cultural specifics, the diversification of the internal political design and foreign policy attitudes of the countries that were previously part of the USSR, the latter still retain similarities in a number of important parameters, and geographically the area closest to Russia is of great importance to it. In the face of intense competition from non-regional political actors for dominance in the region, Russia still has numerous competitive advantages. In foreign policy, the common denominator of the postSoviet republics is the multi-vector nature of international orientations, which means the desire to balance between different centers of power, without unequivocally adhering to any of them. In the coming years, the post-Soviet space will continue to be an arena of intense competition for resources, territories, footholds, and assets.

In the article the research team proceeds with study of broad security issues of the Black Sea region (BSR) in its various geopolitical configurations (the BSR as including seven riparian states; the Wider BSR as including seven riparian states, Armenia and Azerbaijan; the Baltic-Black Sea region; the Black Sea-Caspian region; and the BSR as the “nerve” of the Greater Mediterranean) through the lens of Russia’s national interests. The paper examines the policies adopted by the USA, the EU, Great Britain, NATO and Ukraine toward the BSR after 2014 at the conceptual and doctrinal levels. The article analyzes the doctrinal papers of the actors revealing their Black Sea strategies, goals and objectives. The study of the doctrinal and, to some extent, conceptual issues of the policies implemented in the BSR allows for determining the degree of compatibility, conflict and possible compromise between various regional and global actors competing for positions in the region in its various geopolitical configurations. The research draws on political realism, combined with constructivism as well as systems and geopolitical approaches. Contextual and discursive analysis of documents as well as qualitative content-analysis are basic applied methods. The analysed doctrinal papers of the collective West (NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, Integrated Review Refresh 2023, Ukraine Maritime Security Strategy, US Black Sea Strategy 2022–2024) reflect the evolution of the Wider BSR concept of 2004–2006. The concept leaves no room for any military, political or other Russian presence in the Black Sea basin. The UK’s aspiration to play the leading role reflects its traditional desire to be present in the Black and Caspian Seas and to build its line of defence, while pushing Russia back to Eurasia. The authors view this as Britain’s desire to implement its traditional geostrategic approaches, which were developed by H. Mackinder: to control the Heartland through Central Asia (1904) and Eastern Europe via the Baltic-Black Sea bridge (1919). Now we see a combination and synthesis of Mackinder’s two approaches: the West is seeking to create a Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian sanitary belt to “contain” Russia, with two maritime entrances into the region: the Baltic and the Black Sea. However, Britain’s historical experience also includes a period when Russia was temporarily excluded from the Black Sea-Mediterranean game in the wake of the Crimean War. From the Western perspective, its influence on the Black Sea region should result into Russia’s expulsion from the region, with a simultaneous reduction of Turkey’s influence, This could be achieved by eroding and circumventing the Montreux Convention, as well as by establishing the permanent presence of NATO military forces in the Black Sea in addition to the regional forces of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, including through alternative routes to the Black Sea Straits.

The article is devoted to the transformation of the approaches of Poland and Lithuania to humanitarian interaction with Belarus and Belarusian non-state subjects in 2014-2024. The scientific novelty of the study lies in identifying the specifics of the humanitarian influence of Poland and Lithuania in the Belarusian direction in the context of changes in regional security caused by the events of 2014, 2020 and 2022. The aim of this study is to fill a research gap through a comparative analysis of the official approaches of Warsaw and Vilnius, the role of humanitarian policy in their foreign policy strategies toward Belarus, and the practices of non-governmental actors in these states. It concludes that, despite the declared convergence of approaches at the official level, significant divergences in the interests of Poland and Lithuania manifest themselves in their interactions with the Belarusian opposition. These states view this area of political relations as an opportunity to realize their aspirations for regional leadership. These ambitions are reinforced at the value and ideological level, including through the actualization of historical narratives in the information sphere.

The article mentions the organisations, whose activities in Russia have been officially recognised as undesirable. These mentions are made only for scientific purposes, as they do not seek to disseminate information about these organisations.

Amidst a transforming global agenda and a redistribution of influence, the substantive emphasis of international partnerships and their institutional logic are shifting. These processes, often with contradictory consequences, affect many influential associations, including the EU and NATO. Non-Western structures and platforms are gaining additional opportunities. Russia and its closest ally, Belarus, facing intense external pressure, are attempting to build their potential not only for effective resistance but also for constructive internal development. They see significant opportunities in the integration arena. This article tests the hypothesis of a convergence of thematic priorities and conceptual frameworks of the integration agenda shaped by the national authorities of the two countries. The empirical base includes a set of official conceptual and strategic documents, as well as public statements by government officials. Methodologically, the study combines formalized content analysis, which allowed for the identification of frequency and thematic patterns, with a qualitative analysis of documents. A comprehensive examination of these sources allowed us to identify similarities and differences in the approaches of the two countries. A convergence of positions and discursive practices across a broad thematic spectrum is demonstrated, with articulation of economic issues. Russia and Belarus currently demonstrate a similar vision of the Union State as a unique and simultaneously model integration format for other regional associations. Integration within this framework is linked to broader spatial processes within Greater Eurasia. Overall, the approaches of Russia and Belarus are characterized by a pragmatism of integration interaction.

The study aims to identify the similarities and differences between the factors of strengthening Russian national identity in Crimea and Donbas (2014–2024) in the context of memory policy and symbolic policy. The research question is what is the combination of factors for strengthening Russian identity in the new subjects of the federation and why there are differences in the prevalence of Russian identity in the compared regions. The methodological basis of the research is social constructivism. Systematic, comparative-functional and cross-regional comparative analysis methods are used. A cross-temporal comparison of the results of questionnaires and population censuses is carried out. Such factors of strengthening Russian identity in Crimea and Donbas as the historical memory of regional communities, changes in the ethnic and linguistic composition of the population, urbanization, and the composition and practices of the subjects of identity politics have been identified. Based on the results of questionnaires and population censuses, it was found that middle-aged and elderly people, ethnic Russians, men, and residents of large cities with higher education are most likely to share Russian national identity. The multiethnic and multi-confessional communities of Crimea and Donbass determine the uneven strengthening of Russian identity; this process also depends on the duration of the policy aimed at reintegration with Russia. Therefore, Russian identity in Crimea, especially in industrial cities (Sevastopol, Kerch), is more consolidated than in the recently liberated areas of Donbass, for example, Mariupol. The research reveals the composition of the subjects of identity policy in the new subjects of the federation, which include federal and regional governmental bodies, local governments, political parties, educational institutions and museums, national cultural and religious organizations. Comparing the results of opinion polls, despite their fragmentary nature, the study assumes that the strengthening of Russian identity in Crimea and Donbas was noted in the context of a Special military operation. This is due to the actualization of historical traditions, the adaptation of society to military conditions, and the consolidation of Russian society in the face of a geopolitical threat.

The article offers a comparative analysis of the concepts of cognitive and information warfare within both Russian and international academic traditions. In the context of digitalization and increasingly complex communication processes, the study of new forms of intangible confrontation aimed at transforming individual behavior and internal mental schemas has become especially relevant. Cognitive transformation, here, refers to the alteration of stable mental structures responsible for perception, interpretation, and response to incoming information. The objective of this study is to delineate the conceptual boundaries of «information warfare» and

«cognitive warfare» through a comparative approach. The article identifies their key characteristics and theoretical distinctions. The analysis reveals both shared and divergent features in terms of their primary objects, goals, methods, tools, and anticipated outcomes. It is demonstrated that cognitive warfare constitutes an advanced form of non-kinetic influence, with a primary focus on modifying cognitive functions and interpretative frameworks rather than merely manipulating informational content. Furthermore, the article explores the potential institutionalization of cognitive warfare as an independent strategic domain, driven by the rapid development of neuroscience, attention-modulation technologies, and artificial intelligence. A refined definition of cognitive warfare is proposed, clarifying its place in the evolving spectrum of modern strategic conflict. The findings contribute to the theoretical advancement of cognitive warfare studies and may serve as a foundation for practical strategies to counter such threats. The conclusion emphasizes the need for an interdisciplinary approach – integrating political science, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology – to more fully understand the nature of emerging political conflicts.

Book review: GR-management in Business Organizations in Contemporary Russia: Complex Analysis and Practical Technologies / M.D. Bondarev, A.A. Degtyarev, A.A. Lialikov et al. / ed. By A.A. Degtyarev, A.S. Teteriuk. Moscow; Prometey, 2024. 386 p.

The relationship between business and the State have constantly been in the focus of attention of both domestic and foreign researchers studying the contemporary political process. However, aspects related to the political management of communicative and intersectoral interactions of interested stakeholders, such as GR management, are rarely given appropriate attention in political science. The book under review, authored by a team of experts in this field, is devoted both to the theoretical understanding of these aspects of political communications and to the analysis of specific lobbying practices as mechanisms for promoting corporate interests. Presenting modern approaches to structuring this important domain of political management, the book is a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and lobbying practitioners alike. While the primary focus is on Russian practices, the analysis also incorporates relevant international cases.

What was the significance of the Dayton Accords? Could a different, more effective model for resolving the crisis have been proposed? What does the future hold for Bosnia and Herzegovina? To discuss these matters, Comparative Politics Russia sat down with one of Russia's leading experts on political processes in Central and Eastern Europe, Professor Elena G. Ponomareva, Doctor of Political Science, Department of Comparative Politics, MGIMO University.

The interview focuses on an analysis of the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995. Dr. Elena Ponomareva views Dayton as a symbol of the establishment of a new world order in the post-socialist space, associated with the strengthening of the influence of Western institutions and the loss of sovereignty of nation states. The expert highlights three key lessons of the Dayton: the priority of force in Western politics, the destructiveness of Russia's unprincipled foreign policy in the 1990s, and the emergence of a new form of international protectionism, expressed in the external administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the professor, the state structure created under the terms of the agreement can be characterized as a “phantom state” — an entity that formally possesses the attributes of sovereignty but is in fact controlled from outside. Three possible scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina are discussed: maintaining the status quo, the absorption of the Republika Srpska into the Federation of BiH, and the separation of the entities.

Special attention is paid to Russia's role as guarantor of the Agreements and its current discrepancies with the West over the issue of international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interview concludes with an analysis of the problem of history falsification using the example of the Bosnian war, including the UN General Assembly resolution on the “genocide in Srebrenica.” As a countermeasure to such practices, the active dissemination of historical truth using the tools of culture, education, and the media is proposed.