The editor-in-chief proposes a context for examining the crisis processes in American society explored in the articles. The author suggests that this crisis should be viewed in the context of the American history cycles. Many of the current conflicts in the USA have a similar internal source, which is a sharp intra-elite conflict involving a significant part of society. This conflict is unusual in its depth, given that for many decades the «trademark» of the American political class has been its consensus character. One important element of this consensus can be seen as an unquestioned focus on global American leadership and a shared commitment among members of the community to the force imperatives in foreign policy – either the classic “hard” or “flexible” power. Among the sources of American foreign policy continuity are a number of factors. First, it is the stability of institutional mechanisms of decision-making, which, in turn, is based on a stable system of representation of dominant interests. Second, the stability of formal and informal institutions that ensure a high degree of elite cohesion; and the specificity of American political culture, which is based on a set of political and philosophical views of messianic nature. The consensual nature of the political elite was the system-forming basis of liberal democracy, so the breakdown of this consensus may entail – and partially has already entailed – a crisis of the US political system.

According to the most experts, there is a bipartisan consensus in the United States regarding China: both parties recognize that China poses an existential threat to the United States, its economy, socio-political structure and the role as a global leader. This core conceptual consent represents a clear contrast with the endless battles between Democrats and Republicans in the domestic political arena, blocking any legislative initiatives and the development of a unified sociopolitical agenda for the country. This rare unity has made many observers to claim the emergence of a new external enemy, in the face of which America will be able to overcome its identical crisis and to come back to national unity. The political elite also actively uses the image of the enemy, calling on the Nation for unity. This article is aimed to understand what lies behind political slogans and the bipartisan concept of confronting China. The study is based on the analysis of several sources that make it possible to judge the attitude towards China in the United States along party lines, specific to each level of the party-political system party platforms at the federal level, legislative initiatives at the state and city levels, public opinion polls at the level of the society. The research hypothesis is that Democrats and Republicans, who agree on the conceptual vision of the Chinese threat, offer different ways to counter it. The difference in methods of struggle stems from different ideological and value models that manifest themselves in the implementation of both the socioeconomic agenda within the country and foreign policy strategies in the international arena. The unity of the parties ends exactly by the developing of a conceptual framework for confrontation with the opponent. The implementation of specific steps of the anti-Chinese agenda at the state and city levels is taking place in accordance with the ideological and political guidelines of each party, and the public attitude towards the Chinese threat demonstrates a clear split along party lines. The conceptual positioning of a new external enemy instead of unification brought to the United States anti-Chinese hysteria among conservative politicians at the state level, which was realized in the adoption of discriminatory laws in Republican states against Chinese citizens and a new wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in society, manifested in outbreaks of violence against Asian minorities.

The article examines trade policy initiatives of the Biden administration. In a complex climate of domestic political polarization, the United States compete with China and defends its position in international markets. These challenges affect the areas of high technologies, digital economy, information and communications sector, renewable energy sources, and infrastructure. At the same time, an equally important problem in the context of increased geopolitical risks remains increasing the reliability of logistics and production chains, primarily for microelectronics. Addressing these challenges requires the creation of appropriate platforms that allow the United States to interact with partner countries. Within these frameworks, the United States intends to promote the priorities of the Biden administration: standards in the field of high technologies, ensuring the energy transition, protecting working conditions and inclusion. Another crucial area is promoting the fight against corruption, ensuring transparency of business processes in partner countries and training personnel. Completing these goals should attract American business and investment to the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and Latin America. These should also increase American leverage in its strategic competition with China. At the same time, the formats of cooperation created by the United States must be insured against their internal political situation and the risks of interruption of work when there is a change of presidential administrations. In less than four years of its work (2021–2024), the Biden administration has proposed three platforms: the Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, and the Partnership of the Americas for Economic Prosperity. The results of their implementation are different. This article examines the two last mentioned regional platforms and describes conditions for their creation, work prospects, probable risks, and some results.

The rise of China constitutes a challenge for the U.S. hegemonic aspirations. However, Washington reacts to it rather belatedly and with restrain. Up until the mid-2020s, the United States did not consider the preventive use of force as a means to deter its competitor. On the contrary, it maintained intensive economic ties with China, contributing to its further strengthening. The article argues that the U.S. policy towards China reflects the optimism within the U.S. leadership regarding the long-term preservation of the foundations of its international standing. In other words, the United States does not perceive itself a declining power; rather, it believes that China will not be able to compete with it in the forceable future. In this regard, the U.S. has pursued primarily a delaying strategy, combining restrained pressure with unwillingness to either escalate or make significant concessions. The U.S. optimism proceeds from the prevailing uncertainty in international relations about the relative balance of power among great powers and the unclear prospects of future shifts in national capabilities. Under these conditions, Washington relies on ideological convictions in the superiority of its political, economic and social model over its competitors and appeals to the past patterns of great power rivalry. This study covers the period from the late 2000s to the mid-2020s. The article begins with a theoretical justification of the origins of optimism of weakening powers. Then, it examines changes in balance of power between the U.S. and China based on traditional indicators of national capabilities. Following this, the article explores the arguments against the U.S. decline and summarizes official assessments of threats to U.S. global standing. Finally, it traces the comparative roles of accommodation, coercion and restraint in the U.S. policy towards China. The analysis envisages an adjustment in the conceptual understanding of the dynamics of great power rivalry. It demonstrates that the lack of reliable information does not necessarily lead to intensifications of rivalries (as suggested by the “security dilemma”), but can also limit confrontation.

The U.S. Administration has been increasingly using secondary sanctions to make legal persons in foreign jurisdictions comply with the U.S. regimes of economic restrictive measures. The practice of secondary sanctions has been towering since the outbreak of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Hundreds of companies in third jurisdictions found themselves in Specially Designated Nationals List of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. At the same time the concept of secondary sanctions as well as empirical reflections of their use hardly enjoy satisfactory reflection in the academic literature. The purpose of the article is to fill in this gap. Key research questions concern the intensity of the use of the U.S. secondary sanction in relation to Russia, the main reasons of their use against particular persons, the distribution of sanctioned persons in terms of country of origin and other variables. Main hypothesis implies the quantitative rise of sanctions related to the violation of export control and connections to already sanctions persons in such countries as China, UAE, Turkey and others. The processing of 511 cases of secondary sanctions database is the main tool to test this assumption.

The evolution of US migration policy has run several cycles: at first, the fate of immigrants was the responsibility of the employer (companies, who brought them to the USA), then, with an increase in their influx and their gradual resettlement, the lives of newcomers began to be determined at the state level. Only at the end of the 19th century migration regulation began to acquire the features of the federal government’s established policy with a vector towards liberalization throughout the next century. Starting from the 2010s there is a reverse trend – back to restrictionism and ‘descend’ of the regulation to the level of state authorities, especially for illegal immigrants. Such shift causes a clash between states and federal government, and at the same time emphasises the inability of this government to carry out objectively aspired reform.

Today immigration policy in the United States can be divided into two major areas: legal immigration regulation and government attempts to solve the problem of illegal immigration. This division, albeit conditionally, helps to understand why for 30 years now no Congress has been able to work out a comprehensive immigration reform or at least agree on key areas for the implementation of its’ certain aspects. A set of acute problems of socio-economic, moral and ethical nature forms an inseparable set of challenges. It equally includes both the areas necessary for the country’s successful economic development: highly qualified personnel attraction, aging of the nation combating, increase of the birth rate, and the challenges associated with the burden on society and the increase in crime: the influx of refugees, illegal, seasonal and permanent immigrants and their families.

Due to domestic political peculiarities in the modern United States, party coalitions cannot agree on even one of these areas, let alone develop a profound working system that meets constantly changing needs of the economy, foreign policy challenges, and is in consensus with states’ authorities, who would finally assimilate newcomers.

Will the current crisis on the southwestern border of the United States affect J. Biden’s reelection in November 2024? What strategy has D. Trump chosen to bypass his rival? – you will find from this article.

The politics of the United States, both internal and external, and the analysis of its historiosophic foundations, topical subjects, trends and prospects of development have occupied a special place in the Russian school of international relations. On the one hand, interest in this topic has always been determined by its applied nature: for most of the 20^th century, the USA was the main adversary of the USSR, and today the relations between the two countries are in a state of systemic confrontation, albeit of a different kind. On the other hand, with its history, economics, culture, ideology and politics, the USA as an experimental state and laboratory society has always been a field of scientific research and an object of intellectual reflection for researchers of all socio-humanitarian disciplines. All these works reveal different facets of American reality, but for Russian Americanists among historians and political scientists, those that allow them to find a key to understanding the driving forces of American politics and to forecast its development are especially valuable. The interview with leading Russian Historian-Americanist Dr. V.O. Pechatnov is an attempt to understand these key issues.

Book review: America against All [Amerika protiv vsekh] (2023). Geopolitics, Statehood and Global Role of the USA: History and Modernity [Geopolitika, gosudarstvennost’ i global’naya rol’ SSHA: istoriya i sovremennost’]. Moscow: LLC “Commonwealth of Cultures” [OOO “Sodruzhestvo kul’tur”], 588 p.

What is America for Russia, the rest of the world and itself? This question is answered differently by historians, journalists, writers, diplomats, academic researchers, and incumbent politicians. Why has the United States – in recent years especially – pursued an exemplarily offensive foreign policy, as if directed “against everyone”? The authors of the book of the same name, “America Against All. Geopolitics, Statehood and the Global Role of the United States: History and Modernity” offer their answer to this question. The authors of the monograph analyze a significant body of literature on the U.S. geopolitical thought, reflect on the origins of American statehood, and seek to trace the formation of the so-called ‘‘American empire” and the spread of American hegemony from the late 19th century to the present day. In conclusion, the authors outline proposals for democratizing modern America. This book review is an attempt to critically analyze the assessments and recommendations of a large number of authors from the Diplomatic Academy, IMEMO RAS, MGIMO University, RUDN, and branch institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences.