The world becomes polycentric, but the theoretical foundations of this state of affairs remain not fully explained yet. The necessity to create a national-oriented theory of international relations is proclaimed. The question of a possibility of «tightening» macroregions in the form of a «Greater Eastern Asia» and «Greater Eurasia» is raised as well as the transformations of China being at least an influencing factor at the macroregional level with consequences of potentially global significance. It is possible to hypothesize that specifics of a megatrend of regional transformations of potentially global character may be connected with a rise of China to a global level and risks and consequences of this process. Since China has internal and external challenges, further development will be dependent on the level of China’s integration into world processes as well as wills, perspectives, and consequences of other states’ involvement in the orbit of common political-economic interests, humanistic nature of these processes as well as reactions of the world to them.

At present, there is no common perception in modern science and international political practice of what the world (international) order (legal order) is. The article analyzes the relevant points of view. It is concluded that by referring to the relevant provisions, generally accepted in the framework of the general theory of law and the theory of international law, it is possible to get close enough to the solution of this problem. The article also examines other problems related to the essence of the concepts of the world (international) order and its types (world public order, world legal order and global world legal order), and also the varieties of social norms of the international regulatory system, the results of the implementation of which shape the corresponding orders. Special attention is paid to the fact that, in contrast to the widespread perceptions, all three types of world order are neither a set of international relations, nor a set of norms regulating such relations. According to the theory of international law, they are the result of the implementation of the requirements of certain norms of the international regulatory system aimed at managing international public relations. In addition, various factors influence the state of a particular type of international order (including a change in the hierarchy of states depending on their role in the international political and/or economic system, the formation of new centers of power, a change in bipolarity, polycentricity or monocentricity of the world, the emergence of multilateral integration formations, the activities of international multilateral institutions, etc.), but they should also not be confused with international orders themselves.

The article examines the options for the interaction of paradiplomacy of subnational units – subjects of federations and territorial autonomies – and the national foreign policy of the central governments. The author identifies three main types of interaction: parallel, conflict, synergistic. It is noted that initially the term “paradiplomacy” referred to such external relations of subnational actors of international relations, which developed separately from the foreign policy of the federal level (that is, within the first or second type). It is shown that the development of interaction between foreign activity at the national and subnational levels has led to the expansion of the concept of “paradiplomacy” and the emergence of alternative terms. The author of the article proposes the synthetic term auxiliary paradiplomacy to describe such a type of synergistic interaction between the international activity of the center and the subnational unit, when the latter acts as a tool for achieving national goals.

The period of Xi Jinping’s rule in the sphere of economic policy is characterized by a sequential alternation of essentially different macroeconomic strategies, united by the general term “new normal”. To date, none of these strategies have met with fundamental success.

The article analyzes the nature of the political system of modern China in the context of the typology of communist political regimes. The author argues that the typologies of communist regimes proposed so far are of little use, since the differences between the regimes were not considered deeply enough, while the ideology factor was not actually used as a criterion for typological differences. The article proposes a new typology of communist regimes, in which the ideological factor is the key criterion. Based on the analysis of various communist regimes in accordance with the ideological criterion, the author identifies three main types of communist regimes: left-communist, right-communist and bureaucratic, and defines the current Chinese regime as evolving from right-communist to bureaucratic. The author concludes that the Chinese political experiment deserves close study and a departure from the West-centric clichés that still dominate world political science and historical science, and the new typology of communist regimes can serve as a useful tool both for its analysis and for clarifying the prospects for China's development.

This article provides an assessment of the development of the military potential of China and the United States from the perspective of the growing confrontation between the parties. Special attention is paid to the development of innovations and to technological diplomacy. Due to the high level of innovations integration in the military and civil spheres, a military-technical competition initiates a full-scale confrontation in the economic and industrial spheres. The growing potential of China poses a challenge for the USA to constrain China’s technological development, including by limiting its possibilities for scientific and technological cooperation with other countries.

Studying the experience of the regional policy of modern Russia and China in eliminating and leveling the disproportionate phenomena of socio-economic development of individual regions provides an opportunity to compare and determine the most effective tools and conditions for combating uneven trends in spatial development, based on a historical retrospective of the internal regional dynamics of two neighboring states. The purpose of this article is a comparative and consideration of the evolution of the regional policy of Russia and China in the context of the increasing unevenness and disproportionality of the internal regional development of the two countries in the modern period of history. The complex structure of the research involves the use of a comparative historical method, a systems approach, a retrospective method. The research is based on the texts of Russian and Chinese authors, as well as documents in Chinese. The main factor that increased the unevenness of regional socio-economic development in both China and Russia was the transition to the use of market relations instruments within the framework of spatial development. A characteristic feature of the spatial development of the Russian Federation and the PRC in order to combat disproportionate trends in the situation of the regions was the preparation of spatial development strategies with the participation of the expert community. Only in the PRC were these strategies correlated with national goals for China to achieve the level of developed countries of the world by 2049, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to effectively use the comparative advantages of individual provinces, cities, etc. In Russia, the experience in developing strategies for spatial development was guided by the current state of affairs in the development of a resource-based economy, the creation of supporting regions, “locomotives” of growth. The key instruments of the regional policy of Russia and China to eliminate internal unevenness in the development of regions at different stages of regional history were projects to strengthen individual support regions, to attract various types of state support for spatial development. If in Russia financial transfers of state support were the main means of solving problems of regional inequality, then in China the system of measures for the development of regions also included private investment.

The article is devoted to the study of the Eurasian vector in the international politics of Russia, including the Russian-Chinese relations at the present stage, participation in the Eurasian Economic Union, other interstate associations created by the states of the Asia-Pacific region. The authors have studied and analyzed the defining directions and features of Russian-Chinese foreign policy relations, both in the historical context and at the present stage of development. In particular, the main periods in the development of bilateral relations are outlined; the factors that influenced the change in the strategies of foreign policy interaction between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are analyzed; the nature of Russian-Chinese cooperation at the present stage is revealed, its role and importance both for regional policy and in the light of ongoing international processes, including in the field of international security, are characterized; identified possible risks that could negatively affect the nature of foreign policy interaction between Russia and China. The study concludes with conclusions and proposals related to the assessment of the political and international legal interaction of Russia in the integration track of Eurasian policy.

The spread of COVID-19 has intensified existing global conflicts and profoundly changed the global political, economic, and security landscape since the end of the Cold War. Recently, Russian leaders and think tank experts have given indepth consideration to the international landscape, world order, globalization process, and major-country relations in the “post-pandemic era”. They believe that as the international pattern and world order are being reshaped at an accelerating pace, Russia is facing the greatest strategic opportunity since the Crimean crisis and even the end of the Cold War. In Russia's strategic point of view, under the new circumstances, Russia needs to reshape its foreign policy thinking, consolidate its special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council with the unique privileges since the founding of the United Nations, deepen Eurasian integration cooperation, skillfully manage the triangular relationship between Russia, China, and the United States, balanced relations with China by multiple forces, and strive to improve Russian-American relations.

The article is devoted to the comparative historical analysis of the military component in China’s foreign policy in Africa. A brief historical sketch of China’s African policy after the end of the World War II helps to understand the roots of the impressive strengthening of its political and economic influence on the African continent between 2000 and 2020. Special attention in paid to the causes of political instability in many African countries, the military and political role of the United States on the Black Continent, UN peacekeeping activities and the participation of the Chinese military troops in special operations of this international organization. The authors conclude that there is a gradual evolution of the interpretation of the concept of responsible power, which holds a prominent place in the official foreign policy doctrine of the PRC. The article explores the genesis of this concept during the reign of the three Chairmen of the PRC Jiang Zemin (1993-2003), Hu Jintao (2003-2013) and Xi Jinping (after 2013), and discusses the stages of the formation of Chinese political-military doctrine, which is detailed in White papers of the Chinese State Council (2015, 2019, 2020). The article analyses the implementation of the military-political doctrine of the PRC in Africa, the creation of the first foreign multifunctional military base of the PRC in the Republic of Djibouti, and the transition of China from a bilateral model of relations with African countries to block diplomacy in the context of ensuring the collective security of participants in political associations.

The employment of China's tertiary education system’s graduates is considered, on the one hand, as a prerequisite for the implementation of the strategic goal set by the Chinese leadership – turning the country into a global center for the development of new knowledge and technologies by 2035, and on the other, as a factor of ensuring social stability. The analysis shows that an increasingly serious problem is the contradiction between the prevailing ideas in Chinese society about importance of “high scholarship” and the structure of vacancies for graduates of universities and higher professional colleges in the labor market; between the ideas of graduates about what kind of knowledge and skills are in demand by employers, and the requirements imposed by employers on applicants while searching for qualified personnel.

The article analyzes the evolution of the PRC's policy in the UNSC under Hu Jintao (2003 – 2013) and Xi Jinping (2013 – present) based on the country’s veto exercising pattern. A study of resolutions and meeting transcripts on the cases of the DPRK, Iran, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Syria proves that China’s UNSC veto policy has drastically changed by the end of Hu Jintao's tenure as President – it has become bolder in comparison with that in the early 2000s. An analysis of the veto use after 2013 testifies to the fact that Xi Jinping not only continued the line of his predecessor in the UNSC, but also further developed into an even more proactive one. The cause of such a change lies within two key factors: a significant increase in the PRC's capabilities in the international arena, and the adverse effect of the adoption of Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya. Operating in the UNSC, China is currently guided by the “soft balancing” strategy designed to compete with the United States in the zones of its interests without using military methods, but rather by creating coalitions within international institutions. In the near future, it is possible that this “soft” approach might evolve into a more rigid one.