U.S. Nuclear Policy in Comparative Perspective
https://doi.org/10.46272/2221-3279-2025-2-16-4
Abstract
The article delves into American nuclear strategy and its implications for the U.S. arsenal and the U.S. current and future nuclear stance. The piece examines J. Biden administration’s key document in this field, namely Nuclear Posture Review, and other relevant American military and political documents. The article compares them with the analogous documents of the first D. Trump presidency and the preceding B. Obama administration, as well as with Trump’s early announcements and practical steps taken in this field after his return to the White House. The piece analyzes the new concept of Integrated Deterrence introduced in the Biden administration’s basic military posturing documents. This concept emphasizes closer correlation between nuclear and conventional weapons as well as intertwined cooperation with the U.S. allies and partners. The study shows that the reduced role for nuclear weapons in the American strategy, as stated by the Biden’s administration, did not fully manifest itself in its actions. Its alleged desire to focus on de-escalation measures, diplomacy and reinvigorated nuclear arms control did not live up to its potential and was consequently subjected to certain revision. Pro-military pundits in Washington give as a reason for this about-face the U.S. primary competitors’, China’s and Russia’s, allegedly aggressive behavior, their military build-up, and prospects for their possible collusion. All these are cited as causes for growing and modernizing the U.S. own nuclear arsenal, including each component of the U.S. strategic triad, as well as its other nuclear capabilities.
About the Author
N. I. BubnovaRussian Federation
Dr. Natalia I. BUBNOVA – Leading Research Fellow, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations
23 Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997
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Review
For citations:
Bubnova N.I. U.S. Nuclear Policy in Comparative Perspective. Comparative Politics Russia. 2025;16(2):97–123. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.46272/2221-3279-2025-2-16-4