On New Interest in Nuclear Deterrence Capabilities in Germany

As nuclear proliferation risks grow, researchers are focusing on countries that were hardly associated with the problem earlier. Geopolitical developments and change in transatlantic relations are forcing European countries to overhaul their military policies. The current agenda includes possible development of a nuclear deterrent capability, autonomous from the United States. Since 2022 the most drastic changes have been taking place in Germany which declared the Zeitenwende (times-turn) in its defence posture. Recently, German politicians and experts have increasingly supported the idea of gaining access to nuclear weapons. During the Cold war, the nuclear factor played a major role in the politics of the FRG, despite its non-nuclear status as West Germany hosted one of the biggest American nuclear arsenals, its territory being considered the main theater of nuclear war. Influential politicians in Bonn believed that the FRG should develop its own nuclear program. The end of the bipolar confrontation made nuclear factor obsolete. Addressing nuclear weapons as a hypothetical means of deterrence anew makes it necessary to examine the substance and practical implications of this topic. The article examines the role and dynamics of the nuclear factor in the foreign policy of the FRG. It has analyzed the current discussion and identified the main problems and contradictions of the proposed nuclear options. The case for nuclear weapons, as it was during the Cold war, is supported by an artificially constructed “Russian threat”, and as such arises from the concerns about American security guarantees in case of a full-scale conflict. Today the prospects for Germany to acquire nuclear weapons, independently or through its European allies, are lacking substance. Still, the author believes that the relative discussions should not be underestimated. Making nuclear issues a “new normal” is a part of Germany’s general policies to build up its military capabilities, including development and deployment of conventional weapons that represent a considerable alternative to nuclear weapons.

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