Why Do Autocrats Need Elections? Political Science about the Role of Elections in Authoritarianism

Relatively recently, students of authoritarianism have not paid much attention to institutions. It was believed that since authoritarian rule is generally an arbitrariness, its institutionalism is not really important. Modern approach, however, is that institutions in authoritarian regimes are no less important than in a democracy. This is also applicable to such a political institution traditionally associated with democracy as elections. Recent works on comparative authoritarianism provide more evidence that holding election may help autocrats to survive. Starting from the “third wave” of democratization, the political regimes of “electoral authoritarianism,” that means regimes that are authoritarian in nature, but successfully implementing initially democratic political institutions including elections, are becoming more widespread. The regular holding of moderately competitive elections is characteristic of two the most important types of electoral authoritarianism, both hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes. This article attempts to generalize and systematize the conceptual views available in literature on the elections role in authoritarian regimes. Four main functions of authoritarian elections are identified and analyzed: legitimation, display of strength, co-optation and information acquisition.

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