САМОИДЕНТИФИКАЦИЯ БЕЛОРУСОВ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИОННОГО ПОГРАНИЧЬЯ
https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2013-4-1(11)-4-22
Аннотация
Cамоидентификация белорусов в рамках цивилизационного пограничья оказывает значительное влияние на сложный процесс строительства национальной идентичности. Глава государства и официальный политический курс рассматриваются в качестве ключевых определителей идентичности в геополитическом и цивилизационном смысле. Маятниковая внешняя политика А. Лукашенко определяет основные ориентиры национальной идентичности, российское или западное направление. В конце 2010 г. российские и западные ориентации уравновесились в контексте маневрирования между Москвой и Брюсселем. Это означает, что идентификационная траектория может быть изменена в зависимости от внешнеполитических предпочтений правящей элиты и политической конъюнктуры. Несмотря на наличие европейской идентичности в коде белорусской идентичности, в основном в качестве символа лучших стандартов жизни ее роль остается нерелевантной. Автор приходит к выводу, что сильные связи с восточной православной цивилизацией будут преобладать в качестве доминирующего вектора национальной идентификации в долгосрочной перспективе.
Об авторе
Л. Волахава
Карлов университет в Праге
Чехия
аспирант Института политических исследований Факультета социальных наук
Чехия
аспирант Института политических исследований Факультета социальных наук
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44. The Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), based in Lithuania since 2005 (when its functioning in Belarus was suspended by the Supreme Court decision), was one of the first non-governmental analytical centres in the country in the early 1990s. IISEPS is widely known and appreciated abroad for its impartial coverage of principal social trends. Importantly, most of the solid analyses are conducted with references to the IISEPS polling data (G. Ioffe, D. Marples, N. Bekus, A. Wilson, St. White, E. Korosteleva).
45. Belarusians tend to associate themselves with certain nations on the basis of similar culture (39.9%) and common history (49.5%) [IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institut socialno-ekonomicheskich i politicheskich issljedovanij. (2010a). Osobjennosti bjelorusskoj identichnosti. March 2010. Available online: <http://www.iiseps.org/03-10.html> [cit. 10-08-2012]].
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81. Minjenkov G. Op.cit. P. 86.
82. G. Ioffe provides an explanation of Russia’s dominance on the basis of several objective factors: 1) most Belarusians are of Orthodox background; 2) Russia has long been in the position of prime cultural donor vis- -vis Belarus; 3) the statehood was achieved due to external, not internal forces; 4) the country’s apparent economic dependence on Russia.
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86. “Our ultimate goal…is not to allow the loss of our state independence, to protect our language, culture, work, and property by dismissing the illegitimate pro-Moscow government” [Paznjak Z. Belarus — Ushodnjaja Europa. Belaruskaja Salidarnasc. 14.12.2003. Available online: <http://www.bielarus.net/archives/2003/12/14/63> [cit. 10-08-2012].
87. Huntington S.P. Political Order In Changing Societies. New Haven and L.: Yale University Press, 1968. P. 1.
88. Wilson A. Op. cit. P. 139.
89. Kuzio T. «Nationalising States» or Nation-building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature. // Nations and Nationalism. 2001. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 148.
90. Compared to the Soviet times, the number of Belarusian language schools today is lower. In 2011/2012 school year, only 18% of Belarusian high school students studied in the Belarusian language [Belorusskij partizan 2012c]. By contrast, the number of Belarusian-language students in 1993 reached 76% [Charter97. org 2009].
91. For more on the role of the Belarusian language in contemporary Belarus see Ioffe (2003b); Goujon (1999).
92. Wilson A. Op.cit. P. 123.
93. Nacionalnyj Statisticheskij Komitet Respubliki Belarus. (2009c). Perepis naselenija Respubliki Belarus 2009 goda. Obschaja chislennost naseljenija, jego sostav po vozrastu, polu, sostojaniju v brakje, urovnju obrazovanija, nacionalnostjam, jazyku i istochnikam sredstv k suschestvovaniju. Respublika Belarus (RAR.). URL: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/2009/itogi1.php [10-08-2012]. Р. 25.
94. More on the authorities’ activities on promoting the Belarusian language and culture see Leshchenko (Leshchenko N. A Fine Instrument: Two Nation-Building Strategies in Post-Soviet Belarus. Nations and Nationalism. 2004. Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 333-352.); Wilson (Wolson A. Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship. New Haven and L.: Yale University Press. P. 226).
95. IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institute socialno-ekonomicheskich I politicheskich issledovabij. (2011b). Dinamika belorusskogo obshestvennogo mnjenija. December 2011. URL: http://www.iiseps.org/trend.html [10-08-2012].
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97. Ioffe G. Culture Wars, Soul-Searching, and Belarusian Identity // East European Politics and Societies. 2007. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 352.
98. Wilson A. Op.cit. P.255.
99. Mjetit li Lukashenko v prezidenty Rossiji? 05.02.2011. URL: http://www.belaruspartizan.org/bp-forte/?page=100&backPage=13&news=76400&newsPage=0 [10-08-2012].
100. Alexandr Lukashenko: „my ne provincija, nam nado vyprjamitsja“. 27.03.2003. URL: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2003/03/27/ic_articles_112_144203/ [10-08-2012].
101. Alexandr Lukashenko: „my ne provincija, nam nado vyprjamitsja“. 27.03.2003. URL: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2003/03/27/ic_articles_112_144203/ [10-08-2012].
102. Ukrainians.
103. Belarusians.
104. Zjuganov prizval Lukashenko, Medvjedjeva i Janukovicha srastit „uzly i sosudy“. 17.08.2010. URL: http://www.belaruspartizan.org/bp-forte/?page=100&news=65954 [10-08-2012].
105. Alexandr Lukashenko: „my ne provincija, nam nado vyprjamitsja.“ 27.03.2003. URL: http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2003/03/27/ic_articles_112_144203/ [10-08-2012].
106. IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institute socialno-ekonomicheskich I politicheskich issledovabij. (2010a). Osobjennosti bjelorusskoj identichnosti. March 2010. URL: http://www.iiseps.org/03-10.html [10-08-2012].
107. IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institute socialno-ekonomicheskich I politicheskich issledovanij. Vzgljad na SSHA i Rossiju iz Belarusi. June 2006. URL: http://www.iiseps.org/6-062-1.html [10-08-2012].
108. IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institute socialno-ekonomicheskich I politicheskich issledovabij. (2010e). Belorusskij vybor mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadom. December 2010. URL: http://www.iiseps.org/12-10-11. html [10-08-2012].IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institute socialno-ekonomicheskich I politicheskich issledovabij. (2011). Faktory geopoliticheskogo vybora. December 2011. URL: http://www.iiseps.org/12-11-07.html[10-08-2012]. IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institute socialno-ekonomicheskich I politicheskich issledovabij. (2012). Vjetjer s Vostoka. March 2012. URL: http://www.iiseps.org/03-12-05.html [10-08-2012].
109. IISEPS (NISEPI): Nezavisimyj institute socialno-ekonomicheskich I politicheskich issledovabij. (2012). Vjetjer s Vostoka. March 2012. URL: http://www.iiseps.org/03-12-05.html [10-08-2012].
110. It seems quite natural that a good deal of international politics is negotiated and decided behind the scenes. To avoid a detailed description of numerous controversies surrounding some EU officials’ approaching the issue, I will mention some of the recent facts. So in February 2012, Slovenia blocked the EU initiative to extend sanctions against the Belarusian regime by adding the name of Lukashenko’s presumed key sponsor Y. Chizh on the EU travel ban list. Some EU diplomats claimed that the country’s step was motivated by Slovenia’s Riko Group business interests in Belarus, since the company had won a tender to build a five-star Kempinski hotel in Minsk [URL: http://euobserver.com/foreign/115397]. Also, despite EU and U.S. wide criticism, the International Ice Hockey Federation has repeatedly reaffirmed its decision to hold the 2014 World Cup in Minsk, Belarus’ capital city.
111. “By some accounts, there is a powerful Belarusian lobby in Moscow, although it was noticeably weakened when Moscow’s mayor Yuriy Luzhkov was fired by President Medvedev” [Ioffe; Yarashevich Op.cit.
112. In this respect, the Russian Federation can be fairly considered an interim winner of the geopolitical game over the region. Serious economic concessions (Belarus’ strategic assets) can serve as strong evidence. In November 2011, A. Lukashenko agreed to sell the remaining 50% of the Belarusian gas company Beltransgaz to the Russian Gazprom, which implied Russia’s absolute monopoly over the Belarusian gas pipeline system. In return he could benefit from significantly lower gas prices. In June 2012, the two sides signed an agreement on the construction of a Russia-financed nuclear plant in Belarus (10 billion USD).
113. State of Nation Address to the Belarusian People and the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus. 08.05.2012. URL: http://president.gov.by/en/press129510.html [10-08-2012].
114. Lukashenko Called Belarus “Gateway to Eurasia.” 25.05.2012. Available online: <http://telegraf.by/en/2012/05/lukashenko-nazval-belarus-vratami-v-evroaziyu> [10-08-2012].
115. State of Nation Address to the Belarusian People and the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus. 08.05.2012. URL: http://president.gov.by/en/press129510.html [10-08-2012].
116. Paznjak Z. Belarus — Ushodnjaja Europa. Belaruskaja Salidarnasc. 14.12.2003. URL: http://www.bielarus.net/archives/2003/12/14/63 [10-08-2012].
117. Wilson A. Op.cit. P. 139.
118. Babickaja V. Diego Marani: „Dobivatsja chistoj rasy — prestupno, dobivatsja chistogo jazyka — absurd“ // Openspace.ru. 26.06.2009. URL: http://www.openspace.ru/literature/names/details/10930 [10-08-2012].
Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Волахава Л. САМОИДЕНТИФИКАЦИЯ БЕЛОРУСОВ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИОННОГО ПОГРАНИЧЬЯ. Сравнительная политика. 2013;4(1(11)):4-22. https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2013-4-1(11)-4-22
For citation:
Volakhava L. BELARUSIANS’ SELFIDENTIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVILIZATIONAL BORDERLAND. Comparative Politics Russia. 2013;4(1(11)):4-22. https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2013-4-1(11)-4-22
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