СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ ЗНАЧЕНИЕ ЗАПАДНОГО ПОЛУШАРИЯ: ИНТЕРЕСЫ США В РЕГИОНЕ
https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2015-6-2(19)-66-72
Аннотация
В статье анализируется значение Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна относительно безопасности США. Автор подчеркивает, что взаимоотношения США с данным регионом связано не только с инвестициями США, но и с рядом проблем, таких как террористическая деятельность, преступность, беженцы. В статье выделяются четыре основные угрозы: организованная преступность, исламский радикализм, Россия и Китай. Автор детально рассматривает данные угрозы и анализирует их влияние в регионе на США. Также делаются выводы о дальнейшей стратегии и необходимых мерах Соединенных Штатов Америки по отношению к странам латиноамериканского региона.
Ключевые слова
США,
Латинская Америка,
Карибский бассейн,
организованная преступность,
исламский радикализм,
Иран,
Китай,
Россия
Об авторе
Р. Э. Эллис
Институт стратегических исследований Военного колледжа Армии США (Карлайсл Барракс, Пенсильвания)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
PhD, профессор
Соединённые Штаты Америки
PhD, профессор
Список литературы
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2. “Crimen organizado mandaba en 13 municipios de Guerrero: PGR,” Animal Politico, January 21, 2015, http://www.animalpolitico.com/2015/01/crimen-organizado-mandaba-en-13-municipios-de-guerrero-pgr. See also Arron Daugherty, “75% of Mexico Municipalities Susceptible to Organized Crime: Offi cial,” Insight Crime, January 23, 2015, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/75-of-mexico-municipalities-susceptibleto-organized-crime-offi cial.
3. Leticia Pineda, “Mexico arrests Beltran Leyva cartel chief,” Yahoo! News, October 2, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/mexico-captures-most-wanted-drug-cartelkingpin-015758497.html.
4. In the fi rst half of 2013, Mexico extradited 19 persons to the United States, compared to 579 extradited during the six years of the Calderon administration. See Luis Pablo Beauregard, “‘El Chapo’ Guzman consigue frenar su extradicion a EE UU,” El Pais, January 27, 2015, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/01/27/actualidad/1422318809_357796.html. See also Loren Riesenfeld, “’El Chapo’ Gains Ground in Fight Against Extradition,” Insight Crime, January 27, 2015, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-chapo-gainsground-fi ght-against-extradition.
5. See, for example, Marguerite Cawley, “MS13 Expanding After Truce Collapse in El Salvador?” Insight Crime, June 2, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/ms13-expanding-after-truce-collapse-in-el-salvador.
6. “Otto Perez apoya legalizar marihuana y amapola,”Prensa Libre, March 4, 2014, http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/politica/Perez-apoya-legalizar-marihuanaamapola_0_1113488655.html.
7. Silvia Blanco, ““La guerra al narco es una guerra que no es nuestra’” El Pais, October 1, 2014, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/10/01/actualidad/1412199282_188307.html.
8. German H. Reyes R., “’La investigacion criminal esta en detrimento’: Fiscal Especial de Delitos contra la Vida,” Revistazo, December 9, 2014, http://www.revistazo.biz/web2/index.php/nacional/item/997-“la-investigacion-criminal-esta-en-detriment. See also Kyra Gurney, “Honduras Solves 1% of Homicide Cases: Report,” Insight Crime, December 19, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/honduras-solves-1-of-homicide-cases.
9. Elyssa Pachico, “US Releases New Plan for Caribbean Drug Traffi cking,” Insight Crime, January 26, 2015, http://www.insightcrime.com/news-analysis/usreleases-new-plan-for-caribbean-drug-traffi cking.
10. “Presidential Determination – Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2015.” White House, Offi cial Website, September 15, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi ce/2014/09/15/presidential-determination-major-drug-transit-or-majorillicit-drug-prod.
11. Antonio Maria Delgado, “Identifi can a Diosdado Cabello como jefe del Cartel de los Soles,” El Nuevo Herald, January 27, 2015, http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/venezuela-es/article8206548.html.
12. For a detailed overview of growing trans-Pacifi c crime ties, see R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America,” Prism, Vol. 4, No. 1, December 1, 2012, pp. 67-77.
13. “Los Templarios controlaban exportacion minera a China desde Lazaro Cardenas,” La Vanguardia, January 5, 2014, http://www.vanguardia.com.mx/lostemplarioscontrolabanexportacionmineraachinadesdelazarocardenas-1917212.html.
14. Julieta Pelcastre, “‘El Chapo’ conspires with Chinese mafi as to produce synthetic drugs in Latin America,” El Dialogo, February 19, 2014, http://dialogoamericas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2014/02/19/sinaloa-alianza-china.
15. Bruno Ribiero, “PCC envia dinheiro do trafi co para Estados Unidos e China,” O Estado de Sao Paulo, January 15, 2015, http://sao-paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pcc-envia-dinheiro-do-trafico-paraestados-unidos-e-china,1619985. See also Kyra Gurney, “Brazil’s PCC, Mimicking the Country, Shifts Towards China,” Insight Crime, January 19, 2015, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/brazil-pcc-gang-laundermoney-in-china-united-states.
16. “Colombia entrego nota de protesta a Rusia por violacion de espacio aereo,” El Espectador, November 6, 2013, http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/colombia-entrego-nota-de-protesta-rusia-violacion-dees-articulo-456989.
17. “La presencia de un buque espia ruso en La Habana ante el comienzo del deshielo provoca recelo,” ABC, January 21, 2015, http://www.abc.es/internacional/20150121/abci-cuba-eeuu-intriga-presencia-buque-espia- ruso-201501202144.html. See also Michael Winter, “Russian Spy Ship Visits Havana,” USA Today, February 28, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/02/27/russia-cuba-warship/5876249/.
18. Fred Weir, “Russia sends clear message - and spy ship – on eve of US-Cuba talks,” Christian Science Monitor, January 21, 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/0121/Russia-sends-clear-message-andspy-ship-on-eve-of-US-Cuba-talks-video.
19. “Russia Seeks New Arms Deals on Growing Latin American Market,” RIA Novosti, May 18, 2013, http://en.ria.ru/world/20130518/181219365/Russia-Seeks-New-Arms-Deals-on-Growing-Latin-American-Market.html.
20. In December 2013, for example, the Peruvian military signed a contract to acquire an additional 24 Mi-171 helicopters in a contract valued at $528 million, in support of increasing the mobility of its forces operating in the region. See “El ministro de Defensa de Peru revisa en Moscu con su homologo ruso los avances del contrato para el suministro de 24 Mi-171Sh-P Hip H,” Defensa, September 4, 2014, http://www.defensa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13173:elministro-de-defensa-de-peru-revisa-en-moscu-consu-homologo-ruso-los-avances-del-contrato-para-elsuministro-de-24-mi-171sh-p-hip-h&catid=55:latinoamerica&Itemid=163.
21. In 2014, Russian intelligence reportedly helped Nicaragua to decommission more than a ton of cocaine. “Rusia busca ampliar relaciones con Nicaragua,”Estrategia y Negocios, January 24, 2015, http://www.estrategiaynegocios.net/lasclavesdeldia/785285-330/rusia-busca-ampliar-relaciones-con-nicaragua.
22. “Russia to open police anti-drug training centre in Nicaragua,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, March 25, 2013, https://janes.ihs.com
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24. Greg Botelho and Faith Karimi, “Russia fl exes muscles with long-range bomber fl ights near U.S. shores,” CNN, November 13, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/13/world/europe/russia-bombers-plan/index.html.
25. See G. Sulzburger, “2 men convicted in Kennedy Airport Plot,” New York Times, August 3, 2010, p. A1.
26. Jason Ryan, “Lebanese Drug Lord Charged in US: Links to Zetas and Hezbollah,” ABC News, December 13, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/12/lebanesedrug-lord-charged-in-us-links-to-zetas-and-hezbollah/.
27. Cecelia Valenzuela, “Terrorismo sin fronteras,”El Comercio, September 29, 2014, http://elcomercio.pe/opinion/columnistas/terrorismo-sin-fronterascecilia-valenzuela-noticia-1767395. See also “Presunto miembro de Hezbola fue detenido en Surquillo,”El Comercio, Lima, Peru, October 28, 2014, http://elcomercio.pe/lima/ciudad/presunto-terrorista-hezbolafue-detenido-surquillo-noticia-1767375?ref=nota_lima&ft=mod_leatambien&e=titulo.
28. “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Interamerican Dialogue, accessed January 18, 2015, http://thedialogue.org/map_list.
29. Ed Adamczyk, “China agrees to fi nancing for Ecuador, Venezuela,” United Press International, January 8, 2014, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/01/08/Chinaagrees-to-fi nancing-for-Ecuador-Venezuela/6751420741127/.
30. See R. Evan Ellis, “Strategic Insights: The China-CELAC Summit: Opening a New Phase in China-Latin America-U.S. Relations?” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, January 27, 2015, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-China-CELAC-Summit/2015/01/27.
31. For a detailed account of such sales, see R. Evan Ellis, The Strategic Dimension of China’s Engagement with Latin America, Washington DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013, http://chds.dodlive.mil/fi les/2013/12/pub-PP-ellis.pdf. See also R. Evan Ellis, China – Latin America Military Engagement, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display. cfm?pubID=1077.
32. Peru selecciona el sistema tactico de lanzacohetes multiples Norinco tipo 90B,” Infodefensa, January 10, 2014, http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2014/01/10/noticia-selecciona-sistema-tactico-lanzacohetesmultiples-norinco.html. See also “El Ejercito de Peru adquiere sistemas de artilleria chinos por 38 millones de dolares,” Defensa, December 27, 2013, http://www.defensa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11143:el-ejercito-de-peruadquiere-sistemas-de-artilleria-chinos-por-38-millonesde-dolares&catid=55:latinoamerica&Itemid=163.
33. Ridzwan Rahmat, “Trinidad and Tobago to receive Chinese-supplied patrol vessel,” IHS Janes 360, March 12, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/35273/trinidadand-tobago-to-receive-chinese-supplied-patrol-vessel.
34. “Argentina escolhe a China como parceira para seus OPV,” Poder Naval, January 27, 2015, http://www.naval.com.br/blog/2015/01/27/argentina-escolhe-achina-como-parceira-para-seus-opv
35. “En busca de nuevos acuerdos militares entre Rusia y Argentina,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, January 20, 2015, http://es.rbth.com/internacional/2015/01/20/en_busca-de_nuevos_acuerdos_militares_entre_rusia_y_argentina_46603.html.
36. Gareth Wood, “Argentina looking to buy Anti-Ship Strike Fighter from China,” Fighter Jet News, January 1, 2015, https://fi ghterjetnews.wordpress.com/2015/01/01/argentina-looking-to-buy-chinese-fighters-and-antishipping-missiles/.
37. Jeff Franks, “Chinese navy hospital ship visits Cuba, Caribbean,“ Reuters, October 22, 2011, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/idINIndia-60058520111021.
38. “Armadas de China y Chile Realizaron Ejercicios Navales,” Noticias FFAA Chile. October 16, 2013, http://noticiasffaachile.blogspot.com/2013/10/armadasde-china-y-chile-realizaron.html.
39. “PLAN taskforce conducts joint maritime exercise with Brazilian Navy,” Ministry of National Defense, Peoples Republic of China, Offi cial Website, October 28, 2013, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2013-10/28/content_4472787.htm.
40. For a more detailed discussion of such scenarios, see R. Evan Ellis, “The Strategic Relevance of Latin America for the United States,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 8, 2014, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Strategic-Relevance-of-Latin-America/2014/12/08.
41. For a more detailed discussion of such possibilities, see R. Evan Ellis, “Strategic Insights: The Strategic Relevance of Latin America for the United States,”U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 8, 2014, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Strategic-Relevance-of-Latin-America/2014/12/08.
42. See, for example, R. Evan Ellis, “Re-Engagement with Cuba: The Strategic Calculus,“ War on the Rocks, December 18, 201, http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/re-engagement-with-cuba-the-strategic-calculus/.
Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Эллис Р.Э. СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ ЗНАЧЕНИЕ ЗАПАДНОГО ПОЛУШАРИЯ: ИНТЕРЕСЫ США В РЕГИОНЕ. Сравнительная политика. 2015;6(2(19)):66-72. https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2015-6-2(19)-66-72
For citation:
Ellis R.E. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: DEFI NING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION. Comparative Politics Russia. 2015;6(2(19)):66-72. https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2015-6-2(19)-66-72
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