Why Does Not the U.S. Attack China? The Fog of the Future and Historic Optimism in Policies of Great Powers

The rise of China constitutes a challenge for the U.S. hegemonic aspirations. However, Washington reacts to it rather belatedly and with restrain. Up until the mid-2020s, the United States did not consider the preventive use of force as a means to deter its competitor. On the contrary, it maintained intensive economic ties with China, contributing to its further strengthening. The article argues that the U.S. policy towards China reflects the optimism within the U.S. leadership regarding the long-term preservation of the foundations of its international standing. In other words, the United States does not perceive itself a declining power; rather, it believes that China will not be able to compete with it in the forceable future. In this regard, the U.S. has pursued primarily a delaying strategy, combining restrained pressure with unwillingness to either escalate or make significant concessions. The U.S. optimism proceeds from the prevailing uncertainty in international relations about the relative balance of power among great powers and the unclear prospects of future shifts in national capabilities. Under these conditions, Washington relies on ideological convictions in the superiority of its political, economic and social model over its competitors and appeals to the past patterns of great power rivalry. This study covers the period from the late 2000s to the mid-2020s. The article begins with a theoretical justification of the origins of optimism of weakening powers. Then, it examines changes in balance of power between the U.S. and China based on traditional indicators of national capabilities. Following this, the article explores the arguments against the U.S. decline and summarizes official assessments of threats to U.S. global standing. Finally, it traces the comparative roles of accommodation, coercion and restraint in the U.S. policy towards China. The analysis envisages an adjustment in the conceptual understanding of the dynamics of great power rivalry. It demonstrates that the lack of reliable information does not necessarily lead to intensifications of rivalries (as suggested by the “security dilemma”), but can also limit confrontation.

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