A Systemic Crisis: Political Consequences of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Events

Abstract

The article attempts to revise the understanding of the nature of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis and its consequences in the context of comparison with Soviet/Russian history of 1980-1990s. Several dozens of studies and op-ed pieces focused on the problem earlier (especially in Russian-language literature) but these papers lacked Chinese sources, intended to liken the Tiananmen Square crisis to the Russian agenda, and simplified complicated cause-effects relations of the Chinese historical process. As a result, the conclusions are limited to the question of the necessity of a decisive crackdown on any turmoil or political manifestation as a sole tool to protect one nation’s stability and prosperity. China’s stability and prosperity after the Tiananmen Square Crisis should not be seen as a result of crackdowns. Paradoxically, despite the conservatives’ victory in 1989, China got back to the path of reforms several years after the Tiananmen Square events. It can be attributed to the complex set of internal and external factors, and the freezing of China’s political reforms was just one of them. Moreover, the process was facilitated not only by overcoming its political crisis but also by observing the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe. Faced with the threat of being ousted from power, China’s elites consolidated – a factor that became crucial for the implementation of systemic market reforms in the 1990s. The author concludes that a similar situation was observed in post-Soviet Russia in 1998-2000: the Russian financial crisis and several events including Second Chechnya Campaign became the ‘backbone crisis’ of Vladimir Putin’s presidency.