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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">comparativepolitics</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сравнительная политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Comparative Politics Russia</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2221-3279</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2412-4990</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Издательская группа «Юрист»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18611/2221-3279-2018-9-3-14-25</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">comparativepolitics-836</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ КОНЦЕПЦИЙ И ИНСТИТУТОВ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS AND INSTITUTIONS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ВОЕННЫХ ДОКТРИН ИНДИИ И ПАКИСТАНА</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY DOCTRINES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Зайцев</surname><given-names>М. С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Zaytsev</surname><given-names>M. S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Михаил Сергеевич Зайцев –атташе, Посольство Российской Федерации в Республике Индии</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Mikhail S. Zaytsev – Attaché, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of India</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">gree090@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>26</day><month>06</month><year>2018</year></pub-date><volume>9</volume><issue>3</issue><issue-title>Тихоокеанские стратегии; возможность или реальность</issue-title><fpage>14</fpage><lpage>25</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Зайцев М.С., 2018</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2018</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Зайцев М.С.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Zaytsev M.S.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/836">https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/836</self-uri><abstract><p>Статья посвящена военным доктринам Индии и Пакистана, взаимоотношения которых во многом определяют баланс сил в Южной Азии и характеризуются высоким уровнем напряженности и взаимного недоверия. Стороны на протяжении всего периода с1947 г. рассматривают друг друга в качестве основных потенциальных противников, что во многом влияет на стратегическое мышление Нью-Дели и Исламабада. После проведения ядерных испытаний противостояние вышло на новый уровень, и состояние двусторонних отношений вызывает резонную озабоченность мирового сообщества с учетом непрекращающихся взаимных обстрелов и очередного витка роста напряженности в хронически нестабильном штате Джамму и Кашмир. Анализ военных доктрин Индии и Пакистана дает основания считать, что Нью-Дели и Исламабад имеют боеспособные силы, сосредоточенные на границе, и готовы применить их в случае угрозы со стороны противника с целью захвата и удержания стратегической инициативы. Экономический потенциал Пакистана не позволит ему вести длительные боевые действия, равно как и Индия не в состоянии выдержать войну «на изнеможение», таким образом, упор делается на оперативность и широкое применение наступательных вооружений. Вместе с тем применение ядерного оружия рассматривается только в крайнем случае в ситуации угрозы суверенитету и территориальной целостности, а имеющиеся ядерные арсеналы обеих стран не позволят нанести друг другу сокрушительный ущерб. Несмотря на агрессивную риторику, стороны не готовы к полномасштабной войне, а боевые действия будут носить локальный и непродолжительный характер.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article is devoted to the comparison of the military doctrines ofIndiaandPakistan; their bilateral relations greatly determine the existing balance of power in the region ofSouth Asiaand are marked with high level of tension and mutual mistrust. Since theIndependenceof the former members of the British Dominion in 1947 the sides consider each other as the main potential adversary. After nuclear tests conducted by both countries the conformation ofNew DelhiandIslamabadescalated to a new level, and the state of bilateral relations is a matter of reasonable concern all over the globe. The analysis of military doctrines ofIndiaandPakistangives every reason to think that, despite the aggressive and jingoish rhetoric of the sides, they are not ready for a full-scale war, and military warfare will be limited and short-term.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>военная доктрина Индии</kwd><kwd>военная доктрина Пакистана</kwd><kwd>доктрина «холодного старта»</kwd><kwd>тактическое ядерное оружие</kwd><kwd>взаимное ядерное сдерживание</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>military doctrine of India</kwd><kwd>military doctrine of Pakistan</kwd><kwd>the doctrine of «cold start»</kwd><kwd>tactical nuclear weapon</kwd><kwd>mutual nuclear deterrence</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арбатов А.Г., Чуфрин Г.И. 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