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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">comparativepolitics</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сравнительная политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Comparative Politics Russia</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2221-3279</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2412-4990</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Издательская группа «Юрист»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.46272/2221-3279-2025-2-16-4</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">comparativepolitics-1833</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>МОЗАИЧНОЕ ПОЛЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ И МИРОВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>MOSAIC FIELD OF RUSSIAN AND WORLS POLITICS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Ядерная политика США в сравнительной перспективе</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>U.S. Nuclear Policy in Comparative Perspective</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1434-4133</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Бубнова</surname><given-names>Н. И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Bubnova</surname><given-names>N. I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Наталия Игоревна Бубнова – кандидат исторических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник Центра международной безопасности </p><p>117997, Москва, ул. Профсоюзная, д. 23 </p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Dr. Natalia I. BUBNOVA – Leading Research Fellow, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations </p><p>23 Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997 </p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">nataliaibubnova@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>ИМЭМО им. Е.М. Примакова РАН</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>10</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>16</volume><issue>2</issue><issue-title>Мозаика страноведческих исследований</issue-title><elocation-id>97–123</elocation-id><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Бубнова Н.И., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Бубнова Н.И.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Bubnova N.I.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/1833">https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/1833</self-uri><abstract><p>Статья посвящена ядерной стратегии США, ее теоретическому обоснованию и практическому воплощению. Опубликованный во время президентства Дж. Байдена «Обзор ядерной политики», являющийся главным американским документом в сфере ядерной политики, и затрагивающие данный вопрос другие его нормоустановочные военнополитические документы проанализированы в сравнении с более ранними документами администрации Б. Обамы, с аналогичными документами первой каденции Д. Трампа, а также первыми шагами республиканского президента в данной области, предпринимавшимися после его возвращения в Белый дом. Анализ показал, что в рамках выдвинутой американским руководством в 2022 г. концепции «интегрированного сдерживания» был сделан упор на взаимодополняемость ядерных и конвенциональных вооружений, подготовку к сопряженным военным и невоенным действиям в различных средах и разных регионах, а также на интенсификацию взаимоотношений с союзниками. В статье предлагается ответ на вопрос, насколько состоятельной оказалась попытка администрации Дж. Байдена вернуть взамен курса Д. Трампа на возрождение роли ядерного оружия заявленную во время президентства Б. Обамы установку на снижение значимости ядерного оружия и приоритизацию усилий по недопущению ядерного конфликта, разработку мер по деэскалации и интенсификацию контроля над ядерными вооружениями. Проведенное исследование свидетельствует о том, что относительно сдержанные намерения администрации Байдена не всегда соотносились с реальными шагами и подвергались определенной ревизии, что аргументировалось в Вашингтоне обострившимся противостоянием с ключевыми государствами-конкурентами, ракетным строительством в Китае и предпринятым им наращиванием ядерных вооружений, событиями на Украине и разработками России в области нестратегических ядерных вооружений, а также якобы проявляемой государствами-соперниками неготовностью идти на переговоры по контролю над вооружениями. Тем временем в самих Соединенных Штатах курс на усиление и модернизацию каждой из ветвей стратегической триады и других видов ядерных вооружений продолжался.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article delves into American nuclear strategy and its implications for the U.S. arsenal and the U.S. current and future nuclear stance. The piece examines J. Biden administration’s key document in this field, namely Nuclear Posture Review, and other relevant American military and political documents. The article compares them with the analogous documents of the first D. Trump presidency and the preceding B. Obama administration, as well as with Trump’s early announcements and practical steps taken in this field after his return to the White House. The piece analyzes the new concept of Integrated Deterrence introduced in the Biden administration’s basic military posturing documents. This concept emphasizes closer correlation between nuclear and conventional weapons as well as intertwined cooperation with the U.S. allies and partners. The study shows that the reduced role for nuclear weapons in the American strategy, as stated by the Biden’s administration, did not fully manifest itself in its actions. Its alleged desire to focus on de-escalation measures, diplomacy and reinvigorated nuclear arms control did not live up to its potential and was consequently subjected to certain revision. Pro-military pundits in Washington give as a reason for this about-face the U.S. primary competitors’, China’s and Russia’s, allegedly aggressive behavior, their military build-up, and prospects for their possible collusion. All these are cited as causes for growing and modernizing the U.S. own nuclear arsenal, including each component of the U.S. strategic triad, as well as its other nuclear capabilities.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>«Обзор ядерной политики»</kwd><kwd>ядерная доктрина США</kwd><kwd>ядерные вооружения</kwd><kwd>«интегрированное сдерживание»</kwd><kwd>«расширенное сдерживание»</kwd><kwd>адаптированный страновой подход</kwd><kwd>НАТО</kwd><kwd>российско-американские отношения</kwd><kwd>контроль над ядерными вооружениями</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Nuclear Posture Review</kwd><kwd>U.S. nuclear policy</kwd><kwd>nuclear weapons</kwd><kwd>integrated deterrence</kwd><kwd>extended deterrence</kwd><kwd>tailored approach</kwd><kwd>NATO allies</kwd><kwd>nuclear modernization programs</kwd><kwd>U.S.–Russia relations</kwd><kwd>nuclear arms control</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арбатов А.Г., Богданов К.В., Гусарова О.В., Евтодьева М.Г. 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