<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">comparativepolitics</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сравнительная политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Comparative Politics Russia</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2221-3279</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2412-4990</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Издательская группа «Юрист»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.46272/2221-3279-2025-1-16-7</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">comparativepolitics-1785</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>МОЗАИЧНОЕ ПОЛЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ И МИРОВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>MOSAIC FIELD OF RUSSIAN AND WORLS POLITICS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>О возрождении интереса Германии к ядерному оружию</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>On New Interest in Nuclear Deterrence Capabilities in Germany</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0009-0009-6549-7111</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Павлов</surname><given-names>А. Е.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Pavlov</surname><given-names>A. E.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Александр Евгеньевич Павлов – младший научный сотрудник Отдела военно-экономических исследований безопасности, Центр международной безопасности, .</p><p>117997, Москва, Профсоюзная, д. 23.</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Alexander E. Pavlov – Junior Research Fellow, Center for International Security, </p><p>23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997.</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">alexander.e.pavloff@yandex.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>ИМЭМО им. Е.М. Примакова РАН</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS)</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>11</day><month>07</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>16</volume><issue>1</issue><issue-title>Мозаика страноведческих исследований</issue-title><fpage>128</fpage><lpage>146</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Павлов А.Е., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Павлов А.Е.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Pavlov A.E.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/1785">https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/1785</self-uri><abstract><p>По мере нарастания рисков ядерного распространения в фокус исследователей входят страны, которые ранее едва ли ассоциировались с этой проблемой. В силу геополитических причин и изменений в трансатлантических отношениях европейские страны пересматривают национальные военно-политические установки. Так, одним из пунктов повестки является возможное создание автономного от США военного потенциала в ядерной сфере. Наиболее резкие изменения происходят в ФРГ, которая в 2022 г. провозгласила «смену эпох» в оборонной политике. В последнее время немецкие политики и эксперты все чаще высказываются в пользу обретения доступа к ядерному оружию. В годы холодной войны ядерный фактор играл важнейшую роль в политике ФРГ, несмотря на ее безъядерный статус, поскольку в Западной Германии размещался один из крупнейших американских ядерных арсеналов, а территория страны рассматривалась в качестве вероятного театра войны с использованием ядерного оружия. Влиятельные политики в Бонне считали, что ФРГ должна была иметь собственную военную ядерную программу. С окончанием биполярного противостояния этот фактор ушел в прошлое. Возвращение к обсуждению ядерного оружия как гипотетического средства в военном арсенале побуждает рассматривать содержание и практические последствия актуализации этой темы. В настоящей статье рассматриваются роль и динамика ядерного фактора во внешней политике ФРГ. Проанализированы нынешние дискуссии, выявлены основные противоречия обсуждаемых вариантов «нуклеаризации» Германии. Интерес к ядерному оружию, как и в годы холодной войны, обосновывается искусственно нагнетаемой «русской угрозой» и, соответственно, связан с опасениями по поводу американских гарантий безопасности в случае полномасштабного конфликта. В настоящее время перспектива обретения Германией ядерного оружия самостоятельно или с помощью европейских союзников лишена предметного характера. Вместе с тем автор считает, что не следует недооценивать возможные последствия соответствующих дискуссий: актуализация ядерной тематики является частью общего курса Германии на наращивание военного потенциала, включая развитие и развертывание конвенциональных вооружений, представляющих серьезную альтернативу ядерному оружию.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>As nuclear proliferation risks grow, researchers are focusing on countries that were hardly associated with the problem earlier. Geopolitical developments and change in transatlantic relations are forcing European countries to overhaul their military policies. The current agenda includes possible development of a nuclear deterrent capability, autonomous from the United States. Since 2022 the most drastic changes have been taking place in Germany which declared the Zeitenwende (times-turn) in its defence posture. Recently, German politicians and experts have increasingly supported the idea of gaining access to nuclear weapons. During the Cold war, the nuclear factor played a major role in the politics of the FRG, despite its non-nuclear status as West Germany hosted one of the biggest American nuclear arsenals, its territory being considered the main theater of nuclear war. Influential politicians in Bonn believed that the FRG should develop its own nuclear program. The end of the bipolar confrontation made nuclear factor obsolete. Addressing nuclear weapons as a hypothetical means of deterrence anew makes it necessary to examine the substance and practical implications of this topic. The article examines the role and dynamics of the nuclear factor in the foreign policy of the FRG. It has analyzed the current discussion and identified the main problems and contradictions of the proposed nuclear options. The case for nuclear weapons, as it was during the Cold war, is supported by an artificially constructed “Russian threat”, and as such arises from the concerns about American security guarantees in case of a full-scale conflict. Today the prospects for Germany to acquire nuclear weapons, independently or through its European allies, are lacking substance. Still, the author believes that the relative discussions should not be underestimated. Making nuclear issues a “new normal” is a part of Germany’s general policies to build up its military capabilities, including development and deployment of conventional weapons that represent a considerable alternative to nuclear weapons.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>Германия</kwd><kwd>ядерное оружие</kwd><kwd>ядерное нераспространение</kwd><kwd>европейская безопасность</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Germany</kwd><kwd>Zeitenwende</kwd><kwd>nuclear weapons</kwd><kwd>nuclear non-proliferation</kwd><kwd>European security</kwd><kwd>European nuclear deterrence</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арбатов А.Г. (2021) Десять апорий нашего времени. Теория и практика ядерного сдерживания. Полис. Политические исследования. (8): 88-111. DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2021.04.08.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Arbatov A.G. (2021) Desyat' aporij nashego vremeni. Teoriya i praktika yadernogo sderzhivaniya [The Ten Aporias of Our Time. The Theory and Practice of Nuclear Deterrence]. Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya [Polis. Political Studies] (8): 88-111. DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2021.04.08. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арбатов А.Г. (2024) Несущая конструкция глобальной безопасности. Мировая экономика и международные отношения 68(7): 5-24. DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2024-68-7-5-24.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Arbatov A.G. (2024) Nesushchaya konstrukciya global'noj bezopasnosti [The Supporting Structure of Global Security]. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [World Economy and International Relations] 68(7): 5-24. DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2024-68-75-24. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арбатов А.Г. и др. (ред.) (2023) Международная безопасность: новый миропорядок и технологическая революция. М.: ИМЭМО РАН. 432 c.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bunde T. (2024) Nuclear Zeitenwende(n): Germany and NATO nuclear posture. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-7.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit4"><label>4</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Орлов В.А., Семенов С.Д. (ред.) (2023) Новая ядерная девятка? Оценка угроз распространения ядерного оружия в мире. Издание 2-е. М.: ПИР-Пресс. 230 с.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kühn U. (ed.) (2024) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. 346 p. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit5"><label>5</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Павлов А.Е. (2024) «Смена эпох» в оборонной политике ФРГ: основные шаги, ограничения и риски. Общественные науки и современность (6): 124-137. DOI:10.31857/S0869049924060096.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Horovitz L., Wachs L. (2023) France’s Nuclear Weapons and Europe. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. DOI: 10.18449/2023C15.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit6"><label>6</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арбатов А.Г., Дворкин В.З., Ознобищев С.К. (ред.) (2012) Перспективы участия европейских ядерных держав в ограничении стратегических вооружений. М.: ИМЭМО РАН. 107 c.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kaiser K. &amp; Krause J. (2023) Der diskrete Charme der Ambivalenz – Atomwaffen und Deutschlands Vereinigung. SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 7(4): 354-367. DOI: 10.1515/sirius-2023-4003.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit7"><label>7</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Арбатов А.Г. (ред.) (2025) Стратегический обзор 2024. ИМЭМО РАН; МГИМО МИД России. М: МГИМО-Университет. 348 с.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kamp K.-H. (2023) Deutschlands nukleare Interessen nach dem Ukraine-Krieg. Nomos Verlag. 113 S. DOI: 10.5771/9783748943006.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit8"><label>8</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Тимофеев П.П., Хорольская М.В. (2024) Дилеммы европейской безопасности: сравнение подходов Германии и Франции к соотношению роли ЕС и НАТО в Европе после 2022 г. Сравнительная политика. 15(4): 132-154. DOI: 10.46272/2221-3279-2024-4-15-8.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kristensen H., et al. (2023) Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79(6): 393-406. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2266944</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit9"><label>9</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Епифанова Л.М., Залесский К.А. (ред.) (2009) Ядерное нераспространение: Краткая энциклопедия. М.: Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН); ПИР-Центр, 2009. 383 с.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kühn U. (2024) Germany and the Puzzling End of Nuclear Latency. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-16.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit10"><label>10</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bunde T. (2024) Nuclear Zeitenwende(n): Germany and NATO nuclear posture. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-7.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kunz B. &amp; Kühn U. (2024) German Musings About a Franco-German or German Bomb. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-8.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit11"><label>11</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kühn U. (ed.) (2024) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. 346 p. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lübkemeier E. (2020) Europa schaffen mit eigenen Waffen? Chancen und Risiken europäischer Selbstverteidigung. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. 29. September. DOI: 10.18449/2020S17.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit12"><label>12</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Horovitz L., Wachs L. (2023) France’s Nuclear Weapons and Europe. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. DOI: 10.18449/2023C15.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lutsch A. (2023) Die nukleare Dimension von Deutschlands F-35-Entscheidung von 2022 in historischer Perspektive. SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 7(4): 368-389. DOI: 10.1515/sirius-2023-4004.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit13"><label>13</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kaiser K. &amp; Krause J. (2023) Der diskrete Charme der Ambivalenz – Atomwaffen und Deutschlands Vereinigung. SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 7(4): 354-367. DOI: 10.1515/sirius-2023-4003.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mearsheimer J.J. (1990) Back to the Future. International Security 15(1): 5-56.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit14"><label>14</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kamp K.-H. (2023) Deutschlands nukleare Interessen nach dem Ukraine-Krieg. Nomos Verlag. 113 S. DOI: 10.5771/9783748943006.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Arbatov A.G. et.al. (eds.) (2023) Mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost': novyj miroporyadok i tekhnologicheskaya revolyuciya [International Security: The New World Order and Technology Revolution]. Moscow: IMEMO, VES MIR. 432 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit15"><label>15</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kristensen H., et al. (2023) Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79(6): 393-406. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2266944</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Müller H. (2000) Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefinition. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 55/2000. Available at: https://www.prif.org/fileadmin/Daten/Publikationen/Prif_Reports/2000/prif55.pdf (accessed 14 March 2025).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit16"><label>16</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kühn U. (2024) Germany and the Puzzling End of Nuclear Latency. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-16.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Norris R.S. et al. (1999) Where They Were. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55(6): 26-35. DOI: 10.2968/055006011.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit17"><label>17</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kunz B. &amp; Kühn U. (2024) German Musings About a Franco-German or German Bomb. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-8.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Orlov V.A. and Semenov S.D. (eds.) (2023) Novaya yadernaya devyatka? Ocenka ugroz rasprostraneniya yadernogo oruzhiyav mire [A New Nuclear Nine? Assessing the Threats of Nuclear Proliferation around the World]. Moscow, PIR-PRESS, 2nd edition. 230 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit18"><label>18</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lübkemeier E. (2020) Europa schaffen mit eigenen Waffen? Chancen und Risiken europäischer Selbstverteidigung. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. 29. September. DOI: 10.18449/2020S17.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Onderco M. (2024) German Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Before and After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-9.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit19"><label>19</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lutsch A. (2023) Die nukleare Dimension von Deutschlands F-35-Entscheidung von 2022 in historischer Perspektive. SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen 7(4): 368-389. DOI: 10.1515/sirius-2023-4004.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pavlov A.E. (2024) “Smena epoh“ v oboronnoj politike FRG: osnovnye shagi, ogranicheniya i riski [The “Zeitenwende” in German Defence Policy: Major Steps, Limits and Risks]. Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost' [Social Sciences and Contemporary World] (6): 124-137. DOI: 10.31857/S0869049924060096. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit20"><label>20</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mearsheimer J.J. (1990) Back to the Future. International Security 15(1): 5-56.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Arbatov A.G. et al. (eds.) (2012) Perspektivy uchastiya evropejskih yadernyh derzhav v ogranichenii strategicheskih vooruzhenij [The Prospects of Engaging European Nuclearweapon States in Strategic Arms Control]  Moscow, IMEMO RAN. 107 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit21"><label>21</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Müller H. (2000) Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefinition. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 55/2000. Available at: https://www.prif.org/fileadmin/Daten/Publikationen/Prif_Reports/2000/prif55.pdf (accessed 14 March 2025).</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Rudolf P. (2020) Deutschland, die Nato und die nukleare Abschreckung. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. DOI: 10.18449/2020S11.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit22"><label>22</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Norris R.S. et al. (1999) Where They Were. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55(6): 26-35. DOI: 10.2968/055006011.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Schneider J. (2024) Deutschland und die Zukunft der nuklearen Rüstungskontrolle. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. DOI: 10.18449/2024S25.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit23"><label>23</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Onderco M. (2024) German Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Before and After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. In: Kühn U. (ed.) Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Routledge, 1st ed. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341161-9.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Arbatov A.G. (ed.) (2025) Strategicheskij obzor 2024 [Strategic Review 2024]. IMEMO; MGIMO. Moscow: MGIMO University. 348 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit24"><label>24</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Rudolf P. (2020) Deutschland, die Nato und die nukleare Abschreckung. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. DOI: 10.18449/2020S11.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Strauß F.J. (1989) Die Erinnerungen. Berlin: Siedler Verlag. 575 S.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit25"><label>25</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Schneider J. (2024) Deutschland und die Zukunft der nuklearen Rüstungskontrolle. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. DOI: 10.18449/2024S25.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Timofeev P.P. &amp; Khorolskaya M.V. (2024) Dilemmy evropejskoj bezopasnosti: sravnenie podhodov Germanii i Francii k sootnosheniyu roli ES i NATO v Evrope posle 2022 goda [European Security Dilemmas: A Comparison of Germany and France's Approaches to the Relationship of the EU and NATO Roles in Europe after 2022]. Sravnitel'naya politika [Comparative Politics Russia] 15(4): 132-154. DOI: 10.46272/2221-3279-2024-4-15-8. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit26"><label>26</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Strauß F.J. (1989) Die Erinnerungen. Berlin: Siedler Verlag. 575 S.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Volpe T. &amp; Kühn U. (2017) Germany’s Nuclear Education: Why a Few Elites Are Testing a Taboo. The Washington Quarterly 40(3): 7–27. DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2017.1370317.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit27"><label>27</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Volpe T. &amp; Kühn U. (2017) Germany’s Nuclear Education: Why a Few Elites Are Testing a Taboo. The Washington Quarterly 40(3): 7–27. DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2017.1370317.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Waltz K.N. (1993) The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security 18(2): 44-79.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit28"><label>28</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Waltz K.N. (1993) The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security 18(2): 44-79.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Epifanova L.M., Zalessky K.A. (eds.) (2009) Yadernoe nerasprostranenie: Kratkaya enciklopediya [Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Brief Encyclopedia] (2009). Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN); PIR-Center. 383 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
