comparativepoliticsСравнительная политикаComparative Politics Russia2221-32792412-4990Издательская группа «Юрист»10.46272/2221-3279-2024-1-15-95-114comparativepolitics-1677Research ArticleСША В ПОСТАМЕРИКАНСКОМ МИРЕTHE UNITED STATES IN THE POST-AMERICAN WORLDВторичные санкции США на российском направлении: опыт эмпирического анализаThe U.S. Secondary Sanctions Related to Russia: Empirical Analysishttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1676-2221ТимофеевИ. Н.TimofeevI. N.

Иван Николаевич Тимофеев – кандидат политических наук, доцент кафедры политической теории, МГИМО МИД России.

119454, Москва, пр-т Вернадского, д. 76

Dr. Ivan N. Timofeev – Associate Professor, Department of Political Theory, MGIMO University.

76 Prospect Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119454.

itimofeev@russiancouncil.ruМГИМО МИД РоссииРоссияMGIMO UniversityRussian Federation202403092024151США в постамериканском мире95114Copyright © Тимофеев И.Н., 20242024Тимофеев И.Н.Timofeev I.N.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/1677

Понятие вторичных санкций прочно вошло в категориальный аппарат профильных государственных ведомств США, задействованных в политике односторонних ограничительных мер. Расширяется практика их использования по основаниям правовых механизмов, регламентирующих санкции против России. После начала специальной военной операции России на Украине число вторичных санкций США существенно возросло. В то же время в литературе наметился значительный пробел в области теоретического и эмпирического анализа вторичных санкций. На уровне теории сохраняются лакуны в определении понятия вторичных санкций. На эмпирическом уровне имеет место недостаток баз данных, в которых были бы систематизированы случаи применения вторичных санкций. Цель статьи состоит в заполнении обозначенных теоретических и эмпирических пробелов, а также в ответе на следующие исследовательские вопросы: как именно реализуется политика вторичных санкций США в отношении российских партнеров за рубежом после начала СВО? Как распределяются попавшие под вторичные санкции компании с точки зрения их принадлежности к той или иной стране? Что служит ключевым основанием для введения вторичных санкций? Выдвигаются гипотезы о количественном наращивании применения вторичных санкций; о концентрации вторичных санкций на пресечении поставок промышленных товаров и технологий двойного назначения; о применении вторичных санкций против компаний из дружественных России стран; о доминировании среди попавших под вторичные санкции небольших компаний и отсутствии среди них крупных «глобальных» компаний. Гипотезы проверяются с помощью базы данных вторичных санкций США, включающей в себя 511 случаев за 2022 – 2024 гг.

The U.S. Administration has been increasingly using secondary sanctions to make legal persons in foreign jurisdictions comply with the U.S. regimes of economic restrictive measures. The practice of secondary sanctions has been towering since the outbreak of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Hundreds of companies in third jurisdictions found themselves in Specially Designated Nationals List of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. At the same time the concept of secondary sanctions as well as empirical reflections of their use hardly enjoy satisfactory reflection in the academic literature. The purpose of the article is to fill in this gap. Key research questions concern the intensity of the use of the U.S. secondary sanction in relation to Russia, the main reasons of their use against particular persons, the distribution of sanctioned persons in terms of country of origin and other variables. Main hypothesis implies the quantitative rise of sanctions related to the violation of export control and connections to already sanctions persons in such countries as China, UAE, Turkey and others. The processing of 511 cases of secondary sanctions database is the main tool to test this assumption.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.