comparativepoliticsСравнительная политикаComparative Politics Russia2221-32792412-4990Издательская группа «Юрист»10.46272/2221-3279-2024-1-15-62-94comparativepolitics-1676Research ArticleСША В ПОСТАМЕРИКАНСКОМ МИРЕTHE UNITED STATES IN THE POST-AMERICAN WORLDПочему США не нападают на Китай? Туман будущего и исторический оптимизм в политике великих державWhy Does Not the U.S. Attack China? The Fog of the Future and Historic Optimism in Policies of Great Powershttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8334-6343ИстоминИ. А.IstominI. A.

Игорь Александрович Истомин – кандидат политических наук, доцент, и.о. заведующего Кафедрой прикладного анализа международных проблем, МГИМО МИД России.

119454, Москва, пр-т Вернадского, д. 76

Dr. Igor A. Istomin – Associate Professor, Head, Department of Applied International Political Analysis, MGIMO University

76 Prospect Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119454

iaistomin@gmail.comМГИМО МИД РоссииРоссияMGIMO UniversityRussian Federation202402092024151США в постамериканском мире6294Copyright © Истомин И.А., 20242024Истомин И.А.Istomin I.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/1676

Подъем Китая породил вызов попыткам доминирования США на мировой арене. Тем не менее Вашингтон сравнительно запоздало и сдержанно реагировал на него. США не рассматривали вариант силового устранения потенциального конкурента, а, напротив, сохраняли с КНР интенсивные связи, способствующие ее дальнейшему усилению. Настоящая статья утверждает, что политика Вашингтона в отношении Китая определяется оптимизмом в руководстве США относительно сохранения долгосрочных оснований американского могущества. Иными словами, Соединенные Штаты не считают себя слабеющей державой и рассчитывают на то, что в долгосрочной перспективе КНР не выдержит конкуренции с ними. В этой связи они проводят преимущественно выжидательный курс, сочетающий элементы давления с неготовностью ни к серьезной эскалации, ни к значимым уступкам. Основания для американского оптимизма дают господствующая в международных отношениях неопределенность относительно соотношения сил между великими державами и неясность перспектив сохранения текущих трендов изменения национальной мощи. В этих условиях оценки Вашингтона строятся на идеологизированных представлениях о превосходстве либерально-демократической модели над конкурентами и апелляциях к примерам великодержавного соперничества в прошлом. Хронологические рамки исследования охватывают период с конца 2000-х до середины 2020-х гг. Статья начинается с теоретического обоснования истоков оптимизма слабеющих держав. После этого описывается изменение соотношения сил между США и КНР на основе традиционных показателей национальной мощи. Далее приводятся аргументы, оспаривающие американское ослабление. Излагаются официальные оценки угроз позициям США. Наконец, прослеживается соотношение аккомодации, давления и сдержанности в политике Вашингтона. Результаты анализа побуждают скорректировать теоретические представления о динамике великодержавного соперничества. Они показывают, что недостаток достоверной информации может вести не только к обострению соперничества (как предполагает «дилемма безопасности»), но и к ограничению конфронтации.

The rise of China constitutes a challenge for the U.S. hegemonic aspirations. However, Washington reacts to it rather belatedly and with restrain. Up until the mid-2020s, the United States did not consider the preventive use of force as a means to deter its competitor. On the contrary, it maintained intensive economic ties with China, contributing to its further strengthening. The article argues that the U.S. policy towards China reflects the optimism within the U.S. leadership regarding the long-term preservation of the foundations of its international standing. In other words, the United States does not perceive itself a declining power; rather, it believes that China will not be able to compete with it in the forceable future. In this regard, the U.S. has pursued primarily a delaying strategy, combining restrained pressure with unwillingness to either escalate or make significant concessions. The U.S. optimism proceeds from the prevailing uncertainty in international relations about the relative balance of power among great powers and the unclear prospects of future shifts in national capabilities. Under these conditions, Washington relies on ideological convictions in the superiority of its political, economic and social model over its competitors and appeals to the past patterns of great power rivalry. This study covers the period from the late 2000s to the mid-2020s. The article begins with a theoretical justification of the origins of optimism of weakening powers. Then, it examines changes in balance of power between the U.S. and China based on traditional indicators of national capabilities. Following this, the article explores the arguments against the U.S. decline and summarizes official assessments of threats to U.S. global standing. Finally, it traces the comparative roles of accommodation, coercion and restraint in the U.S. policy towards China. The analysis envisages an adjustment in the conceptual understanding of the dynamics of great power rivalry. It demonstrates that the lack of reliable information does not necessarily lead to intensifications of rivalries (as suggested by the “security dilemma”), but can also limit confrontation.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.