comparativepoliticsСравнительная политикаComparative Politics Russia2221-32792412-4990Издательская группа «Юрист»10.24411/2221-3279-2020-10058comparativepolitics-1249Research ArticleИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИRESEARCHERS’ NOTESЗачем автократам выборы? Политическая наука о роли выборов при авторитаризмеWhy Do Autocrats Need Elections? Political Science about the Role of Elections in AuthoritarianismМедведевЮ. С.MedvedevYu. S.

Юрий Семенович Медведев - к.полит.н., доцент, руководитель образовательного направления «Политология»

Санкт-Петербу́рг

Yuri S. Medvedev - Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Educational Program in “Political Science”

St. Petersburg

ymedvedev@yandex.ruСеверо-Западный институт управления Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службыРоссияNorth-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (NWIM RANEPA)Russian Federation202009112020114ЛОГИКА НОВОЙ МИРОУСТРОИТЕЛЬНОЙ АРХИТЕКТОНИКИ И ПОИСК КИТАЕМ СВОЕГО МЕСТА (I)189200Copyright © Медведев Ю.С., 20202020Медведев Ю.С.Medvedev Y.S.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.sravpol.ru/jour/article/view/1249

Еще сравнительно недавно исследователи авторитаризма не уделяли серьезного внимания институтам. Считалось, что поскольку авторитарная власть – это по большей части произвол, ее институциональное оформление не имеет большого значения. Современный подход, однако, заключается в том, что институты в авторитарных режимах не менее важны, чем при демократии. Это относится и к такому традиционно ассоциируемому с демократией политическому институту, как выборы. Последние работы по сравнительному авторитаризму дают все больше подтверждений того, что проведение выборов может способствовать выживанию автократов. Начиная с «третьей волны» демократизации все большее распространение получают политические режимы «электорального авторитаризма», т.е. режимы, авторитарные по своей природе, однако успешно имплементирующие исходно демократические политические институты, в том числе выборы. Регулярное проведение умеренно конкурентных выборов характерно для обеих важнейших разновидностей электорального авторитаризма – как гегемонистских, так и конкурентных авторитарных режимов. В настоящей статье предпринимается попытка обобщить и систематизировать имеющиеся в литературе концептуальные представления о роли выборов в авторитарных режимах. Выделяются и анализируются четыре основные функции авторитарных выборов: легитимация, демонстрация силы, кооптация и сбор информации.

Relatively recently, students of authoritarianism have not paid much attention to institutions. It was believed that since authoritarian rule is generally an arbitrariness, its institutionalism is not really important. Modern approach, however, is that institutions in authoritarian regimes are no less important than in a democracy. This is also applicable to such a political institution traditionally associated with democracy as elections. Recent works on comparative authoritarianism provide more evidence that holding election may help autocrats to survive. Starting from the “third wave” of democratization, the political regimes of “electoral authoritarianism,” that means regimes that are authoritarian in nature, but successfully implementing initially democratic political institutions including elections, are becoming more widespread. The regular holding of moderately competitive elections is characteristic of two the most important types of electoral authoritarianism, both hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes. This article attempts to generalize and systematize the conceptual views available in literature on the elections role in authoritarian regimes. Four main functions of authoritarian elections are identified and analyzed: legitimation, display of strength, co-optation and information acquisition.

выборыполитические институтыэлекторальный авторитаризмгибридные режимылегитимациядемонстрация силыкооптациясбор информацииelectionspolitical institutionselectoral authoritarianismhybrid regimeslegitimationdisplay of strengthco-optationinformation acquisition – acquisitionReferencesЛаст-Окар Э. Выборы в авторитарных режимах: уроки Иордании // Патрон-клиентские отношения в истории и современности: хрестоматия. М.: Политическая энциклопедия, 2016.Albrecht, H. How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt // Democratization, 2005, Vol. 12, No. 3.Хантингтон С. Политический порядок в меняющихся обществах. М.: Прогресс-Традиция, 2004.Blaydes, L. Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt. Paper presented at Princeton University Conference on Dictatorships, Princeton, NJ, 2008.Хантингтон С. Третья волна. Демократизация в конце XX века. М.: РОССПЭН, 2003.Boix, C.; Svolik, M. The Foundation of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and PowerSharing in Dictatorships // The Journal of Politics, 2013, Vol. 75, No. 2.Харпфер К.В., Бернхаген П., Инглхарт Р.Ф., Вельцель К. (ред.). Демократизация. М.: Издательский дом Высшей школы экономики, 2015.Brownlee, J.Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.Albrecht, H. How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt // Democratization, 2005, Vol. 12, No. 3.Brownlee, J. Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transition // American Journal of Political Science, 2009, Vol. 53. No. 3.Blaydes, L. Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt. Paper presented at Princeton University Conference on Dictatorships, Princeton, NJ, 2008.Collier, D.; Levitsky, St. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research // World Politics, 1997, Vol. 49, No. 3.Boix, C.; Svolik, M. The Foundation of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships // The Journal of Politics, 2013, Vol. 75, No. 2.Colton, T.J.; Hale, H.E. The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime // Slavic Review, 2009, Vol. 68, No. 3.Brownlee, J. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.Coy, P.G. Co-optation / In The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Malden, MA: Wiley, 2013.Brownlee, J. Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transition // American Journal of Political Science, 2009, Vol. 53. No. 3.Diamond, L. Thinking About Hybrid Regimes // Journal of Democracy, 2002, Vol. 13, No. 2.Collier, D.; Levitsky, St. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research // World Politics, 1997, Vol. 49, No. 3.Donno, D. Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes // American Journal of Political Science, 2013, Vol. 57, No. 3.Colton, T.J.; Hale, H.E. The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime // Slavic Review, 2009, Vol. 68, No. 3.Friedrich, C.; Brzezinski, Z. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Praeger, 1961.Coy, P.G. Co-optation / In The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Malden, MA: Wiley, 2013.Gandhi, J.; Lust-Okar, E. Elections under Authoritarianism // Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 12. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 2009.Diamond, L. Thinking About Hybrid Regimes // Journal of Democracy, 2002, Vol. 13, No. 2.Gandhi, J.; Przeworski, A. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats // Comparative Political Studies, 2007, Vol. 40, No. 11.Donno, D. Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes // American Journal of Political Science, 2013, Vol. 57, No. 3.Gandhi, J.; Przeworski, A. Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorship // Economics & Politics, 2006, Vol. 18, No. 1.Friedrich, C.; Brzezinski, Z. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Praeger, 1961.Geddes, B. Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes? Revised version of a paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC, 2006.Gandhi, J.; Lust-Okar, E. Elections under Authoritarianism // Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 12. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 2009.Gerschewski, J. The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes // Democratization, 2013, Vol. 20, No. 1.Gandhi, J.; Przeworski, A. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats // Comparative Political Studies, 2007, Vol. 40, No. 11.Ginsburg, T.; Elkins, Z.; Melton, J. The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions / In Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, edited by T. Ginsburg and A. Simpser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.Gandhi, J.; Przeworski, A. Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorship // Economics & Politics, 2006, Vol. 18, No. 1.Haerpfer, C.W.; Bernhagen, P.; Inglehart, R.F.; Welzel, C. (red.). Demokratizatsiia (Democratization). Moscow: Izdatel’skii dom Vysshei shkoly ekonomiki, 2015.Geddes, B. Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes? Revised version of a paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC, 2006.Hale, H.E. Eurasian Polities as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin’s Russia // Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2010, Vol. 1, No. 1.Gerschewski, J. The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes // Democratization, 2013, Vol. 20, No. 1.Hawkins, D.; Jacoby, W. How Agents Matter / In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson and M. Tierney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.Ginsburg, T.; Elkins, Z.; Melton, J. The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions / In Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, edited by T. Ginsburg and A. Simpser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.Howard, M.M.; Roessler, Ph.G. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes // American Journal of Political Science, 2006, Vol. 50, No. 2.Hale, H.E. Eurasian Polities as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin’s Russia // Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2010, Vol. 1, No. 1.Huntington, S.Politicheskii poriadok v meniaiushchikhsia obshchestvakh (Political Order in Changing Societies). Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2004.Hawkins, D.; Jacoby, W. How Agents Matter / In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson and M. Tierney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.Huntington, S. Tret’ia volna. Demokratizatsiia v kontse XX veka (The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century). Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003.Howard, M.M.; Roessler, Ph.G. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes // American Journal of Political Science, 2006, Vol. 50, No. 2.Laffont, J.-J.; Martimort, D. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.Laffont, J.-J.; Martimort, D. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.Levitsky, S.; Way, L. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.Levitsky, S.; Way, L. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.Levitsky, S.; Way, L. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism // Journal of Democracy, 2002, Vol. 13, No. 2.Levitsky, S.; Way, L. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism // Journal of Democracy, 2002, Vol. 13, No. 2.Little, A.T. Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution // Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2012, Vol. 7, No. 3.Little, A.T. Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution // Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2012, Vol. 7, No. 3.Lust-Okar, E. Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.Lust-Okar, E. Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.Lust-Okar, E. Vybory v avtoritarnykh rezhimakh: uroki Iordanii (Election under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan) // Patron-klientskie otnosheniia v istorii i sovremennosti: khrestomatiia (Patron-Client Relations in History and Modernity: A Reader). Moscow: Politicheskaia entsiklopediia, 2016.Magaloni, B. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.Magaloni, B. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.Miller, M.K. Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since // British Journal of Political Science, 2015, Vol. 45, No. 3.Miller, M.K. Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since // British Journal of Political Science, 2015, Vol. 45, No. 3.Miller, M.K. Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes // Comparative Political Studies, 2015, Vol. 48, No. 6.Miller, M.K. Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes // Comparative Political Studies, 2015, Vol. 48, No. 6.Morgenbesser, L. Elections in Hybrid Regimes: Conceptual Stretching Revived // Political Studies, 2014, Vol. 22, No. 1.Morgenbesser, L. Elections in Hybrid Regimes: Conceptual Stretching Revived // Political Studies, 2014, Vol. 22, No. 1.Petrov, N.; Lipman, M.; Hale, H.E. Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin // Post-Soviet Affairs, 2014, Vol. 30, No. 1.Petrov, N.; Lipman, M.; Hale, H.E. Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin // Post-Soviet Affairs, 2014, Vol. 30, No. 1.Schedler, A. The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism / In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, edited by A. Schedler. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.Schedler, A. The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism / In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, edited by A. Schedler. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.Schedler, A. The Menu of Manipulation // Journal of Democracy, 2002, Vol. 13, No. 2.Schedler, A. The Menu of Manipulation // Journal of Democracy, 2002, Vol. 13, No. 2.Seeberg, M.B. State Capacity and the Paradox of Authoritarian Elections // Democratization, 2014, Vol. 21, No. 7.Seeberg, M.B. State Capacity and the Paradox of Authoritarian Elections // Democratization, 2014, Vol. 21, No. 7.Simpser, A. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.Simpser, A. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.Weeden, L. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. Chicago: University Chicago Press, 2008.Weeden, L. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. Chicago: University Chicago Press, 2008.Wintrobe, R. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.Wintrobe, R. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.