

BEYOND EUROSCEPTICISM AND EUROPHILIA: MULTIPLE VIEWS ABOUT EUROPE¹

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Introduction

It has been frequently noted that “integration” is no longer to be seen as the only (simple and uni-dimensional) dependent variable to be studied by scholars interested in the EU. The European Union must be considered a fully fledged political system with a complex institutional network, where authoritative decisions are taken in several policy areas (Hix 1999) and problems of collective allocation of costs and benefits (with the ensuing questions of distributive justice, of legitimacy and solidarity) are increasingly relevant. The past debates on the necessity of a European Constitution till the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the current ones about the ways to face a major crisis (Cotta 2013) highlight the importance of a careful mapping of the positions of political elites (and of public opinions) with regard to a plurality of aspects of the European construction. The powers to be attributed to the different European institutions, the policy competences to be delegated to Brussels, the identity of the supranational political community and its relations with the national polities: on all these points there are significantly different views but not necessarily two opposing fronts.

In a previous work (Cotta & Russo 2011) we had explored the views national political and economic elites have about different aspects of the European construction and more specifically about the three main dimensions of a European citizenship — identity, representation and scope of governance (Cotta & Isernia 2009). Using the results of the Intune survey of 2007 based on national samples of elected politicians (members of national parliaments) and economic leaders (top executive officers of the top economic firms of each

country) we could show some interesting features of the views shared by the elites of the Member States about European integration. Given the multilevel and compound structure of the EU (Marks et Al. 1996; Fabbrini 2007; Cotta 2012) these views are important: the fundamental mechanisms of democratic accountability are still national and it is national governments that play a crucial role in defining the direction of the Union; what national elites think will probably guide (or in any case correspond closely to) the national governments positions in the top European institutions such as the Council of Ministers and the European Council.

The results of our analysis of the 2007 data could be summarized as follows:

1. A positive instrumental evaluation of the EU is shared by an extremely large proportion of national elites (both political and economic). European integration is globally seen as beneficial for national interests.

2. An affective connection with the EU is also shared by a very large majority, but its intensity is significantly lower than the attachment felt for the national community. In any case the two feelings are not contradictory but positively (albeit weakly) correlated.

3. Support for further advances in the process of integration is also rather broad.

4. When confronted with the dilemma between a Community focused on creating a more competitive economy or providing better social protection political and economic elites differ very significantly. While the latter elite group is heavily in favour of the first option, politicians

spread their positions in a more balanced way among the two.

5. With regard to the future of the EU a broad majority is ready to envisage a common foreign policy, some degree of solidarity with the less prosperous regions, and even a common social security and taxation systems. Politicians however are ready to express a strong support only for the first two aspects, while economic leaders only for a common foreign policy.

6. When it comes to a more precise and comparative choice between the national (or sub-national) level and the supra-national one for the conduct of specific policies, only with regard to immigration and environment national elites are ready to express a clear preference for the European solution against the national one. For healthcare, unemployment and taxation their preferences still go to the national level.

7. For what concerns the European process of representation a very large majority shares the view that member states do not have the same weight; but questioned whether the country interests are taken enough into account or not their views are evenly split. The overall evaluation of European representation is not too critical.

8. Quite in line with the former results the feeling of trust in European institutions is more positive than negative. Where it is possible to compare these levels of trust with those for similar national institutions differences are not so significant (but in any case favourable to the EU).

9. When faced with more concrete choices about the (relative) role and weight of different European institutions national elites are generally conservative: a large majority continues to defend the role of national states, and only a minority is ready to accept a transformation of the Commission in the true government of the Union. However, they are more open to accept increased powers for the European Parliament.

These results indicate that on average national elites of the member countries surveyed by Intune continue to provide a rather solid backing to the process of European integration. If European integration has been in the past an "Elite process" (Haller 2008) conducted with the "permissive consensus" of the masses, there was no strong sign until 2007 that the support for a continuation of this process would be discontinued by national elites. If any, problems might arise from the masses changing to a "constraining dissensus" (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Things become somewhat more complicated when it comes to the different possible directions of the integration process. The Intune survey has shown the variety of views about Europe that are present among national elites: when asked to express their attitudes and positions towards Europe and supranational integration, they do not define themselves along a simple one-dimensional continuum (pro-Europe anti-Europe) but rather display variable combinations of positions depending on whether they are asked to express their views on aspects that concern the nature of the European polity, its institutional configuration, or different sets of policy goals. Put in front of an articulated "European menu" the components of national elites tend to order rather diversified combinations of courses.

If we consider how the process of European integration has developed so far, we should not be too surprised by this finding. Integration has not been the result of the victory of one ideologically cohesive position against an opposite one, as if there were clear fronts defined by a neat cleavage between pro-Europeans and anti-Europeans. It was rather the product of a long series of (higher and lower) compromises negotiated among a plurality of national positions, carefully aware of their specific interests and trying to exploit as best as possible the advantages offered by a mechanism of integration which had shown its functional efficacy (and striving to contain the disadvantages entailed by it) (Hoffman 1966, Moravcsik 1998). The positions of national

elites fundamentally reflect this background. This obviously makes also for multifaceted and not necessarily geometrically coherent views about the European polity, the European citizenship and their future. This is particularly clear when views about the institutional shape of the European Union and about its policy competencies are examined: they are variable and susceptible to combine in multiple ways. Those who prefer a more supra-national institutional system do not necessarily want to expand also the policy competencies of the Union and vice versa. Moreover, with regard to policy competencies, preferences for a stronger European role vary according to policy sectors. This means that in the wide pool of national elites there is not simply a group that wants “more Europe”, but rather different groups each of which wants more of the different aspects of Europe. Vice versa there is not so much a group that is against more Europe, but rather different groups that oppose different aspects of European expansion. Changing the shape and scope of European governance and the contents of the European citizenship requires therefore broad coalitions and compromises among these different views.

In this article we try to move some steps forward also through the possibility of using a second set of data based upon the survey of 2009, which replicates the questionnaire of 2007, but introduces also a few additional questions. We will concentrate here our attention only upon politicians without considering here other elite groups for which data are also available.

1. We will first check to what extent preferences are stable over time

2. We will then replicate the search for the dimensions underlying the answers of national elites about the future of the EU in order to find if the dimensions found with the 2007 data are stable.

3. We will then try to interpret these dimensions and their meaning.

4. Having analysed first the whole European set of politicians as a pooled

sample (which would reflect the idea of the European Union as a unified polity, where national elites are just territorially dislocated component of a common elite) we will then explore with the use of cluster analysis the internal articulations of this elite pool.

5. Finally we will explore the potential consequences of these alignments for the future of European developments and for choices to be taken in time of crisis.

Both surveys included a representative sample of parliamentarians from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. The surveys covered also Serbia, which is excluded from the analyses because it is not a member state. With reference to member states, the 2007 survey included 1263 parliamentarians while the 2009 survey included 1069 parliamentarians.

1. Attitudes toward Europe after the onset of the crisis

As the first of the Intune surveys was conducted in 2007 when the biggest global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression was not yet announced (except by few visionaries), while the second was done in the spring of 2009, when the first impact of the crisis was already strongly felt, we can first briefly explore whether this event produced any significant change in the attitudes toward European integration.

Table 1 presents the answers to the main questions asked in both the 2007 and the 2009 surveys about the process of political integration. The broad support for the unification process has not changed in the period considered, showing a high level of stability. In both years, when asked to evaluate whether “unification has gone too far or should be strengthened”, more than two thirds among national parliamentarians (about 68%) ex-

Table 1

A summary table of variations 2007–2009

| | 2007 | 2009 | Difference |
|--|-------|-------|------------|
| Do you think that unification should be strengthened or has gone too far? (% who scored 6 or more on a 0–10 scale*) | 69,9% | 67,3% | -2,6% |
| Member States ought to remain the central actors (% agree strongly and agree somewhat) | 76,4% | 75,3% | -1,1% |
| European Commission should become true EU government (% agree strongly and agree somewhat) | 50,7% | 49,6% | -1,1% |
| European Parliament should be strengthened (% agree strongly and agree somewhat) | 74,0% | 75,7% | 1,7% |
| Single European Army or keep its own national army? (% in favour of European Army or both National and European) | 67,1% | 70,3% | 3,2% |
| How do you think it would be most appropriate to deal with each of the following policy areas? (% in favour of exclusive or concurrent European competence) | | | |
| <i>Fighting unemployment</i> | 38,9% | 33,9% | -5,0% |
| <i>Immigration policy</i> | 72,5% | 71,9% | -0,6% |
| <i>Environmental policy</i> | 78,4% | 78,5% | 0,1% |
| <i>Crime prevention</i> | 60,4% | 61,7% | 1,3% |
| <i>Health care</i> | 22,9% | 24,8% | 1,9% |
| The character of the European Union in 10 years. Tell me whether you approve or disapprove... (% strongly or somewhat in favour) | | | |
| ...a unified tax system for the European Union | 58,3% | 56,7% | -1,6% |
| ...a common system of social security | 66,7% | 65,7% | -1,1% |
| ...single foreign policy toward outside countries | 85,2% | 85,6% | 0,4% |
| ...more help for regions with economic or social difficulties | 89,9% | 88,6% | -1,3% |
| N | 1263 | 1069 | |

*On this scale, '0' means unification "has already gone too far" and '10' means it "should be strengthened

pressed their preference for further integration.

When we come to explore different aspects that can offer a more specific definition of the European model preferred differences between the two years are again not very strong. A very clear majority of national parliamentarians (about 75%) think that Member states should remain central actors, the European Parliament should be strengthened and a common European Army should be created. Both in 2007 and in 2009 parliamentarians are equally split between those in

favour and those against reinforcing the role of the Commission making it the real EU government.

With regard to policies and the choice for their allocation among different levels of government results of 2007 showed significant differences among policy sector. Environment and immigration gathered the highest support for a European responsibility, health care and fighting unemployment the least. As table 1 shows most of these opinions have been left untouched by the beginning of the crisis, but support for a European poli-

cy competence to fight unemployment has even declined.

Finally, when asked about the character of the European Union in 10 years, the vast majority of parliamentarians approve the adoption of a single foreign policy and more help for the regions with economic or social difficulties and a clear but less wide majority supported a unified tax system and a common system of social security. All these options were extremely stable between 2007 and 2009.

For what concerns the preferred institutional formula previous works (Cotta & Russo 2010 and 2011) analyzed preferences about the powers and roles of the main European institutions and of governments of the member states. Three main positions emerged from these data. As expected two more clear and opposite positions could be identified: the “federalist one”, combining support for the European Commission as the true government of the EU and a negative attitude towards the role of Member states governments, opposed to the “intergovernmental one” combining support for the role of Member states as central actors of the European Union and a negative attitude towards the Commission as the true government of the EU. A third position, defined “compound” as it combines support for the role of the Commission as EU government and for the central role of the Member states, was also fairly frequent. At the aggregate level, national parliamentarians’ preferences have not changed much between 2007 and 2009: a relative majority is still in favour of an intergovernmental solution (more than 40%), while the second most preferred option is a compound system (more than 30%). Less than 20% of national parliamentarians opt for a (rather centralized) federal system. There is also an overwhelming support for the opinion that the European Parliament should have more powers. However parliamentarians favoring different models of government have also different preferences about the role of the European Parliament, an institution which is clearly supranational: on aver-

age, with reference to the 2009 survey, 96% of the Federalists agree that the powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened, an opinion that is shared by only 60% of those supporting an intergovernmental solution (the others are in-between).

This first exploration suggests thus a rather stable panorama of preferences in spite of the emerging crisis. Unfortunately we have not yet systematic data for the more recent period and we cannot thus know whether the extension of the crisis changed significantly the views of political elites (possibly under the impact of changing views of the electorates).

2. Exploring the dimensionality of attitudes toward Europe among national elites

The unprecedented attempt to integrate different national polities, with a long tradition of political and military conflicts, into a single, albeit peculiar, political system has stimulated this fundamental question: why? Integration studies have tried to understand why the European integration effort was launched (Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963) and why it had periods of acceleration and interruptions (Hoffman 1966, Moravcsik 1991, Garrett 1992). Among scholars and the public there is widespread consensus that the process of European unification has been steered by the initiative of elites (Haller 2008, Best, Lengyel, Verzichelli 2012) and many studies attempted to explain why different national actors such as public opinion (Hooghe and Marks 2005), parties (Marks, Wilson & Ray 2002) and governments (Moravcsik 1993) supported or contrasted European integration. Various theories have been developed to explain the preferences of political actors toward the European unification. Most studies consider that the position of different actors can be ordered on a single scale with two extreme poles, Europhiles and Euro-sceptics. The European integration dimension is believed to reflect the conflict between national sovereignty and full political integration (Hix 1999, Hix and Lord 1997, Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999, Tsebelis

and Garrett, 2001) and the position of political actors is measured accordingly.

For instance, as Proksch and Lo (2012) noted, since 1999 the European Election Surveys have asked the following question to estimate voters' and parties' attitude toward European unification:

Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further'. What number on this scale best describes your position? And about where would you place the following parties on this scale? (quoted in Proksch and Lo 2012, p. 320).

An alternative source of information on party positions toward European unification is provided by expert surveys, which resort to the opinion of people who should be more knowledgeable than ordinary voters on party platforms. The Chapel Hill survey, one of the most authoritative source of data for studies on EU politics, measures the position of parties with the following questions:

How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2006? For each party, please circle the number that corresponds best to your view, scaled from 1 (strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (strongly in favour of European integration) (quoted in Proksch and Lo 2012, p. 321).

These studies do not neglect that attitudes toward EU integration might be multidimensional, but decide to focus on the most general and aggregate aspect of the question. However, we argue that the process of European integration has caused several successive transfers of sovereignty from member States to the supranational level, and the present conflict is on which additional aspects should be delegated as much as on whether the overall European integra-

tion process should be strengthened. Beyond the main line on conflict between advocates of more integration and defenders of national states, political actors may have different preferences on which policy domains should be dealt at the European rather than at the national level and on what institutional instruments should be developed and strengthened.

The questions of the Intune questionnaire were drafted on the assumption that the attitudes of national parliamentarians toward Europe could structure around several dimensions. More specifically the Intune surveys envisaged at the theoretical level three dimensions of citizenship (identity, representation and scope of government) as the structuring elements of these attitudes. In a previous contribution (Cotta & Russo 2012) we had explored inductively which dimensions could be found to be underlying the answers to the questions concerning different aspects of European integration. Our finding was that when asked to choose among the different courses of the integrationist Menu national parliamentarians combined different aspects and composed their own "Europe à la Carte".

If the preferences of national elite could be summarised by different latent dimensions it is important to know whether they are sufficiently stable or not. Table 2 shows the results of the factor analysis for all questions concerning the future of European integration that were included in both 2007 and 2009 waves². In performing this comparison some relevant items that were asked in only one of the two waves are excluded from the analysis³. By comparing the results obtained in the two waves it is possible to assess the stability of the dimension according to which national elites evaluate the process of integration. The results obtained in 2009 are virtually undistinguishable when compared to those of 2007: though not a test, this is an important indication further confirming that the structure of preferences about European Integration is rather stable.

Table 2

Dimensions of support for European integration (principal axis factoring, varimax rotation)

| Item number | | 2007 | | | 2009 | | |
|-------------|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 1 | Unification should be strengthened (1-10) | ,557 | ,186 | ,121 | ,665 | ,222 | ,143 |
| 2 | Member States ought to remain central actors (1-4) | -,413 | -,062 | -,148 | -,549 | -,050 | -,153 |
| 3 | European Commission should become EU government (1-4) | ,595 | ,261 | -,009 | ,538 | ,313 | ,085 |
| 4 | European Parliament should be strengthened (1-4) | ,523 | ,098 | ,119 | ,562 | ,173 | ,109 |
| 5 | European Army (1-3) | ,506 | ,147 | ,165 | ,479 | ,238 | ,158 |
| 6 | EU should make policy — unemployment (1-3) | ,078 | ,169 | ,343 | ,087 | ,157 | ,410 |
| 7 | EU should make policy — immigration (1-3) | ,185 | -,004 | ,555 | ,358 | ,108 | ,413 |
| 8 | EU should make policy — environment (1-3) | ,122 | -,118 | ,649 | ,188 | -,075 | ,532 |
| 9 | EU should make policy — crime (1-3) | ,085 | ,083 | ,568 | ,086 | ,106 | ,489 |
| 10 | EU should make policy — health (1-3) | ,052 | ,239 | ,295 | ,037 | ,202 | ,441 |
| 11 | Favours EU...for tax system (1-5) | ,383 | ,594 | ,118 | ,337 | ,657 | ,118 |
| 12 | Favours EU...for social security (1-5) | ,247 | ,832 | ,087 | ,261 | ,789 | ,156 |
| 13 | Favours EU...for foreign policy (1-5) | ,527 | ,241 | ,122 | ,524 | ,370 | ,167 |
| 14 | Favours EU...for regional aid (1-5) | ,181 | ,408 | ,011 | ,171 | ,411 | ,176 |
| | Rotation sums of squared loadings | 1,948 | 1,514 | 1,370 | 2,244 | 1,690 | 1,239 |

The results are sufficiently clear: three main dimensions can be found and it is not too difficult to interpret their meaning. On the first dimension we found a positive loading for the positions taken on the questions concerning “unification should be strengthened...”, the “European Commission should become the true government of Europe”, “the European Parliament should be strengthened”, and negatively on the question “Member States ought to remain central actors”. There was a significant positive loading also for a question concerning the choice for a European army as against purely national armies and another one concerning the desirability of a common foreign policy. On the second factor we could find positive loading for questions concerning the views about future developments of the European Union (in

the direction of “a unified tax system”, “a common system of social security” and, but to a lesser extent, of increased solidarity with regions in difficulties). On the third dimension there was a positive loading for all the questions concerning the allocation to the European level (as against national and sub-national levels) of the responsibility for a series of policy sectors (immigration, environment, fight against crime, and to a less extent unemployment and health care).

The first dimensions discovered is not too difficult to interpret: we will call it “Supranational integration”. This in fact concerns the development of the “EU stateness” as it touches upon crucial aspects of the political architecture of the Union and also upon two policy areas which have been traditionally linked to stateness (foreign policy and the army).

The second dimension is at first more difficult to interpret: the questions asked here concern also in some way policy areas (the tax system, social security, to a lesser extent aid to regions in difficulties), but the factor analysis has shown almost no connection with the next policy dimension. The questions were in fact formulated as concerning the future of the EU (“Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following....”) and mentioned aspects that had obviously a policy aspect but also a “systemic” aspect (“A unified tax system”, “A common system of social security”; “More help for EU regions in economic or social difficulties”). These could be seen as systemic features of the European polity suggesting a common solidarity (with regard to inputs and outputs) more than simple policy competences. The items loading on this dimension might have raised in the minds of parliamentarians the question of resource redistribution in favour of the people and the territories experiencing social and economic problems. We might tentatively call this dimension “Redistributive integration”.

The third dimension can be easily defined as “Policy delegation”: it has to do with transferring policy competencies from the state (and regional) to the supranational level. It suggests a somewhat instrumental view of the EU: the Union as a tool to solve policy problems that member states are probably not able to solve at the national or sub-national level. Our exploration has also shown that this is much more acceptable in some policy fields, such as crime prevention, immigration policy or environmental protection, than in others.

The factor structure emerging from the two waves suggest that at least for political elites views and preferences about the future of European integration can be synthetically organised along three main dimensions. These dimensions are meaningful and are relatively independent among each other. They suggest that views about Europe are

fundamentally “ordered” but also that they do not fit into the simple continuum “more Europe/less Europe”. European integration can be seen (positively and negatively!) from more angles: it can be seen as a “quasi-state” construction transferring in fact some of the traditional attributes of states (both institutional and functional) to the supranational level; it can be seen as a provider of policy solutions in alternative to the member states or their internal articulations; or it can be seen as the way to the creation of a European wide social policy space (here probably the main question is not the production of specific policies per se but the common space and the bonds of solidarity that European integration can imply).

3. In search of the structure of national elites’ attitudes toward the EU

The dimensions found in our analysis define a three-dimensional space on which each national parliamentarian can be placed, according to his or her unique combination of attitudes toward the process of European integration. After having analysed the dimensionality we will try to move a further step and see how these elements ideally structure the landscape of national politicians. Is it possible on the basis of common patterns of attitudes to define a series of typical profiles of parliamentarians, and to determine what is their share in the joint pool of national elites? The instrument we propose to find inductively this structure is *hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis*. Cluster analysis organizes observed data into groups based on a set of variables maximizing the similarity of cases within each cluster while maximizing the dissimilarity between different clusters. In hierarchical cluster analysis, one of the most popular clustering techniques employed in the social sciences, at the beginning each case is a separate cluster, and at each step the two most proximate clusters are merged into a single group. The researcher has to make three choices: the variables to

Table 3

Agglomeration schedule for the cluster analysis (Ward's method)

| Stage | Number of clusters | Coefficients | Coefficients change to the next stage |
|-------|--------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|
| 930 | 10 | 313245,737 | 22834,252 |
| 931 | 9 | 336079,989 | 30477,823 |
| 932 | 8 | 366557,812 | 33405,860 |
| 933 | 7 | 399963,672 | 34869,768 |
| 934 | 6 | 434833,440 | 58770,578 |
| 935 | 5 | 493604,018 | 79657,623 |
| 936 | 4 | 573261,641 | 109254,585 |
| 937 | 3 | 682516,226 | 126695,067 |
| 938 | 2 | 809211,293 | 364211,220 |
| 939 | 1 | 1173422,513 | |

include, the rule to measure the distance between clusters and the algorithm deciding how to merge clusters. In this article we perform a hierarchical cluster analysis to classify parliamentarians on the basis of the three dimensions of attitudes toward Europe discovered through factor analysis⁴, we adopt the Squared Euclidean distance as a proximity measure, and the Ward's algorithm to agglomerate the clusters⁵.

The major problem with hierarchical cluster analysis is choosing the "right" number of clusters. For this purpose it is useful to look at the agglomeration schedule, where for each stage of the agglomeration process it is indicated the two clusters which are merged and a dissimilarity measure⁶. As we want to cluster similar cases, we stop at the agglomeration stage reached before a large increase on the agglomeration coefficient (Burnes and Burnes 2009).

The analysis has been performed on the 940 parliamentarians interviewed in 2009 with no missing values on the variables used for the factor analysis. 129 parliamentarians were excluded for having missing values in at least one relevant variable. Table 3 shows the agglomeration schedule for the last 10 stages of the cluster analysis. The most intuitive solution is a two groups solution which could be approximately interpreted as a distinction between warmer (2/3 of the total) and less warm supporters (1/3) of European integration. To begin the analysis of the results it is useful to describe the clusters by comparing their mean score on each dimensions on which they are generated. Table 4 shows that on average members of Group2 have higher scores on all the dimensions of Europeanism, and that all the differences are statistically significant. In terms of magnitude, the

Table 4

Mean score on the three dimensions of Europeanism by cluster (two clusters solution)

| | Eurosceptics | Europhiles | T-test statistic | Sig. (two tailed) |
|----------------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Supranational Integration | 45,83 | 55,82 | -8,46 | 0,00 |
| Redistributive Integration | 30,06 | 70,48 | -48,32 | 0,00 |
| Policy delegation | 41 | 46,31 | -3,67 | 0,00 |
| N | 307 | 633 | | |

Table 5

Mean score on the three dimensions of Europeanism by cluster (four clusters solution)

| | Euro-instrumentalists | Moderate Europhiles | Radical Eurosceptics | Euro-enthusiasts | Total |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------|
| Supranational Integration | 58,12 | 55,11 | 32,47 | 59,86 | 52,56 |
| Redistributive Integration | 31,10 | 70,37 | 28,94 | 71,14 | 57,28 |
| Policy Delegation | 54,24 | 40,37 | 26,61 | 79,52 | 44,58 |
| N | 160 | 537 | 147 | 96 | 940 |

widest gap is observed on the “unified policy space” dimension.

This solution however blurs the distinctions that we have found to be relevant in our previous analyses. We suggest therefore to move to the next solution with four clusters. If compared with the previous one, the four clusters solution indicates that both the Eurosceptic and the Europhile groups are divided into two smaller sub-groups. The Eurosceptic group consists of two subgroups of similar size, which we propose to denominate *Euro-instrumentalists* (160) and *Radical Euro-sceptics* (147). Likewise, the Europhile group can be split in two subgroups, a very large one that we can label *Moderate Europhiles* (537) and a smaller one consisting of *Euro-enthusiasts* (96). Looking at the average mean scores of these four groups on the three dimensions of European integration reveals a more nuanced picture.

The error bars plotted in Figure 1 graphically describe the average position of every group on each dimension (the horizontal lines represent the overall average position on each dimension), while exact scores are reported in Table 5. On the first dimension (*Supranational Integration*), the attitudes of national parliamentarians are clearly polarized between the vast majority of national parliamentarians having a high score (more than 55) and only the *Radical Eurosceptics* having a low 32. The polarization is very pronounced also on the *Redistributive Integration* dimension, but in this case the *Euro-minimalists* join the *Radical Eurosceptics* at the very bottom of the scale. Finally, with regard to the *Policy Delegation* dimension the groups are scattered all along the whole scale;

the most supportive of policy delegation are the *Euro-enthusiasts*, followed by the *Euro-instrumentalists*, the *Moderate Europhiles* and the *Radical Eurosceptics*.

4. Preferences and geographical distribution of the four typical profiles of parliamentarians

Having identified the main clusters and the distribution of national politicians among them, we must now move to better clarify their meaning with regard to the position held by their members on the future of European integration, and more precisely on the questions used to generate the three factors. Next, we will explore the preferences of each of the four clusters regarding some additional aspects of the European integration process, especially those more related with the solutions to the current economic and political crisis. Finally, we will check how members of the clusters are distributed among different countries, to see the prevailing positions in each parliament at the outset of the crisis.

On the first point, after having described their relations with the three factors we have identified (Table 5) it is useful to examine how the different clusters fare with regard to some specific components of the three factors in order to provide more substance to our definition of the groups (Table 6). Only among *Radical Eurosceptics* the ideas that unification (27,2%) and the European Parliament (44,3%) should be strengthened are shared by a minority. In all other groups they enlist large majorities. The idea that Member States should remain central actors




Figure 1. Error bars for the three dimensions of Europeanism by cluster (four clusters solution)

of the EU prevails in all groups, while only *Euro-enthusiasts* and *Moderate Europhiles* want to transform the EU commission in the true government of the Union. If we combine the institutional preferences held by members of the four clusters to see their preferred model of government, we can appreciate the distance between *Euro-enthusiasts* and *Euro-sceptics* (30% against 6% in support of the federalist model, and 18% against 83% in support of the intergovernmental model) and the middle position of the two other groups. In all groups, with the usual exception of the *Radical Eurosceptics*, there is a clear consensus on the necessity of a European Army.

On policies to be attributed to the EU the four groups distribute themselves in a different way. It is interesting to see how *Euro-instrumentalists* and *Moderate Europhiles* are very close to each other and in a central position between the two more extreme groups. While *Radical Eurosceptics* oppose delegation in all the policy areas considered and *Euro-enthusiasts* are always in favour, the two moderate groups want to totally or partially delegate immigration policy, environmental policy and crime prevention and oppose delegation only when it comes to health care and fighting unemployment.

Moderate Europhiles and *Euro-instrumentalists* clearly differ with regard to their intention to build some redistributive channels within the EU. An overwhelming majority among the former favours a unified tax system and social security system, two aspects that are vigorously opposed by *Euro-instrumentalists*. As expected, with regard to these issues *Euro-enthusiasts* join forces