

НАУЧНАЯ ЖИЗНЬ

ВСТРЕЧА СОТРУДНИКОВ МГИМО И ЛАЙЛИ ГОЛДСТИНА

11 июля 2016 года на круглом столе Факультета политологии о российско-американо-китайских отношениях выступил доцент и научный сотрудник Военно-морского колледжа США Лайли Голдстин. Мероприятие прошло при поддержке журнала «Сравнительная политика».



В своем выступлении Л. Голдстин представил свое видение путей наращивания сотрудничества как в двусторонних американо-российских и американо-китайских отношениях, так и в формате трехстороннего взаимодействия в треугольнике Россия — США — Китай. По мнению американского исследователя, недостаток доверия можно преодолеть за счет поступательных малых шагов в области стратегического взаимодействия, которые он называ-

ет «спиралями» развития сотрудничества. На данную тему Л. Голдстин недавно выпустил книгу в США.

Лайли Голдстин рассказал также о проблеме нехватки профессиональной экспертизы по России в американском академическом и политическом сообществах и выразил пожелания укреплять контакты между США и Россией на академическом уровне с целью преодоления недопонимания на уровне политическом.

В дискуссии с главным докладчиком выступили участники круглого стола: декан Факультета политологии профессор кафедры востоковедения А.Д. Воскресенский, профессор кафедры МО и ВП Ю.А. Дубинин и заместители декана Факультета политологии доцент кафедры востоковедения Е.В. Колдунова и доцент кафедры сравнительной политологии И.Ю. Окунев.

По результатам круглого стола было решено посвятить теме треугольника взаимодействия Россия — США — Китай специальный раздел в одном из ближайших выпусков журнала «Сравнительная политика».

*И.Ю. Окунев
к.полит.н., доцент
МГИМО МИД России*



PROJECT PRESENTATION “RUSSIA FUTURES PROJECT” / “MEETING CHINA HALFWAY”

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July 2016



Note: This presentation reflects the personal views of the author and not the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other entity of the U.S. Government.






Projects

1. US-China Relations
2. US-Russia Relations
3. China-Russia Relations





东北亚论坛 2013:3

“US-North Korean contradictions have been transformed into US-China contradictions. China has become the ‘wall blocking the wind.’”

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“US-North Korean contradictions have been transformed into US-China contradictions. China has become the ‘wall blocking the wind.’”



“If denuclearization fails on the Korean Peninsula, China will be harmed the most.”

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“... [now] ‘stability’ has been put in ahead of ‘denuclearization’ and a new concept ‘no fighting, no chaos, no collapse’ has been described as the main principle in China’s Korean policy.”



“THE ‘FIVE NO’S’ POLICY: ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S SOUTH CHINA SEA POLICY”

“This was the first time that the US government had openly declared that the ‘nine dashed line’ is inconsistent with international law, thus rejecting China’s historic claim, and also indicating a major revision in America’s policy in the South China Sea.”

“... the US has ... added two new policies against China’s long-standing position ... [T]he US opposes sovereignty claims based on historical rights, and opposes negotiating the disputes in bilateral ways.”

“... the US has openly opposed Chinese efforts to create platforms for bilateral negotiated resolution of South China Sea maritime disputes, thus placing continuous pressure on China, and demanding that China initiate multilateral negotiations with ASEAN.”

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Feb 2015
Naval & Merchant Ships



南基洛级潜艇
何时成军?

Predicted Methods of
Vietnamese Employment:
Deterrence
Ambush
Blockade
Local Superiority



南基洛级潜艇
何时成军?

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
南基洛级潜艇
何时成军?

南基洛级潜艇
何时成军?


"[With the new submarines, the Vietnamese Navy] ... will be more stealthy, independent, and capable of deterrence .."



"... with the advantage of constructing large numbers [of Type 056A light frigates], this should be sufficient to cope with Vietnam's conventional submarines."




Cooperation Spiral: Southeast Asia 合作螺旋：东南亚





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Russia Futures Project—Summary Report

On 25 March 2016, the Naval War College convened a group of faculty experts to discuss Russia's future trajectory and the challenge it may pose to U.S. national security. The group of about 20 professors included many with extensive Russian-language skills and significant time in either Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, or Central Europe. There were also a number of faculty members with diplomatic and military experience dealing with Moscow present for the seminar. Some faculty experts with specialized knowledge (e.g., Syria, energy, arms control) were also invited to participate. As a forum open to the whole of the NWC faculty, the group not only was exceptionally knowledgeable regarding Russian affairs and associated issues but can genuinely provide a "sense of the faculty" assessment with respect to the Russian challenge.


I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY AND THIS REPORT

This "sense of the faculty" study is unique in at least three respects. First, there was a commitment to focusing on the in-house talent resident at the Naval War College on the faculty. NWC professors are neither constrained by rigid bureaucracies, nor beholden to sponsors for research contracts, nor so close to events that they are chasing headlines. They have a uniquely objective set of viewpoints built on broad and deep intellectual experience. Second, this study aims to gauge faculty viewpoints through the use of surveys. While not without pitfalls, this methodology has the advantage of delivering crisp assessments to decision makers in an efficient format. The organization of this seminar implies, moreover, that these results represent a genuine poll of uniquely qualified experts.

Third and finally, this study embraces an academic approach to policy formulation that emphasizes open and informed debate. There was no expectation that participants would agree on the major issues. Quite the

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DEBATE #1: Russia's Strategic Intentions

LIMITED IN SCOPE

It is clear that Russia under Vladimir Putin is actively working to alter the post-Cold War settlement, and is prepared to use force or the threat of force in certain circumstances. Many now advocate for major increases in U.S. spending and deployments to counter Russian revisionism. Given that any pivot "back to Europe" would shift resources away from other geostrategic priorities, it is important to consider whether a renewed focus on countering Russia is an overreaction.

Russian moves—while deeply troubling to Russia's immediate neighbors—are in the large part limited in scope and are not any effort to restart the Cold War. Russia is seeking the ability to dominate the core of the Eurasian landmass and its adjacent coastal waters. Russia does not directly threaten core U.S. interests and it does not seek to conquer or control Europe but instead to create a "Eurasian" pole of power that would counterbalance the Western Euro-Atlantic world and a rising China.

Russia most directly threatens the interests of post-Soviet neighbors that prefer to be integrated into the West and also seeks to pressure those members of the EU and NATO who favor extending the Western zone into the Eurasian space. This is not equivalent to the Soviet era when the USSR was committed to spreading Communism and was prepared to send military forces into European states in the event of any major conflict with the West.

It is a problem that is containable with existing U.S. forces working with European allies who can deter Russian adventurism from impacting the European core. Indeed,

A DIRECT THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

The United States is facing an aggressive and revanchist regime in Russia that is determined to pursue its objectives not just through economic and political means but also through its increasingly capable military. Since Vladimir Putin came to office, Russia has sought to reclaim a sphere of privileged interest along its periphery. In Europe Putin's two principal goals are (1) to hollow out the existing security regime by undermining NATO's ability to act collectively in a crisis; and (2) to exploit the current crisis in the EU, especially the migration crisis, in order to paralyze European Union institutions. This strategy directly threatens the interests of the U.S. and our allies. Russia is a revisionist power, as Putin has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the "greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century."

Since Russia's power was significantly degraded in the 1990s, Putin has played from a position of relative weakness; still, before the collapse of energy prices, he nonetheless managed to capitalize on Russia's energy resources to consolidate state power and to modernize its military. During the past 15 years Russia has bought selectively into different sectors of Europe's economies, with a special focus on energy and banking. On the military side, Putin's decision to launch a 10-year military modernization program—at a time when Europe has effectively disarmed and the United States has withdrawn assets from Europe—has significantly altered the balance of power along NATO's northeastern flank. Russian deployments in Kaliningrad and more recently in Crimea constitute a direct challenge to NATO's ability to operate in the Baltic and the Black Sea. This changing strategic landscape poses a direct threat to the

DEBATE #4 Russia in Syria

A Blunder in the Long Run ...

"Russia ... will foolishly own Syria's dysfunction for the foreseeable future. In the short six months of the intervention, Russia has strained its bilateral relations with Turkey to the breaking point with significant trade and security implications."

... A Successful Intervention

"In 2013, Putin's role as an intermediary allowed Asad to remain in power and avoid US military action ... Russia has positioned itself as an honest broker between the Asad regime, Syrian opposition groups, and the US-led anti-ISIL campaign... Action in Syria plays well for the Russian domestic audience and provide a distraction from events in Ukraine."

DEBATE #5 Russia and China

Unlikely to Form an Effective Coalition ...

"A strategically effective Sino-Russian naval coalition is unlikely because they are each other's prime adversaries, while the US is at best only a secondary enemy. Historical tensions over the lengthy Sino-Russian border, Beijing's growing economic clout, plus possible Chinese revanchism in Siberia, prohibit a close alliance."

... Strategic Synergies Are Evident

"[A joint naval] exercise of unprecedented scale (23 surface ships and two submarines) occurred in August 2015 in the Sea of Japan. The tendency in these [bilateral] exercises is toward more complex and realistic war-fighting drills, such as a new focus on anti-submarine warfare. China's tacit diplomatic support has been crucial on such issues as Russia's annexation of Crimea...."

1. US-China Relations
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民族问题 苏联之殇

韓克敏

【内容提要】苏联解体与苏联剧变是两个概念,剧变是因为党的问题,而解体是因为民族问题。苏联民族问题是苏共、苏军、苏联分裂的主要原因。苏联民族问题的根源是民族自治的恶果和民族自治的制度。民族自治的最高表现形式是民族联邦制。

【作者简介】 孙克武，民族自治、民族自治、民族制即制
【作者简介】 孙克武，1972年生，中国社会科学院俄罗斯东欧中亚研究所副研
究员。（北京 100007）

苏联解体，是世界历史的一个重大事件。1991年12月25日，一个空荡荡的克里姆林宫，在内外压力和内部动乱的冲击下，出人意料地土崩瓦解，在其废墟上诞生了15个新的民族国家。回首苏联解体的过程，有深刻的理论价值和现实意义，也关系到国家前途，也禁不住反思历史。苏联解体，中外学者普遍认为，是苏联解体三大因素所致，而社会和各权力集团作用的说法。这三大因素是民族矛盾、经济、在分裂是大势所趋，总有一个主要矛盾和矛盾的主要方面的问题。笔者认为，通晓解构，不仅问题是苏联解体是根本矛盾所致，而且仅仅从表面看而因之一个民族问题根源是苏共的民族自决思想和在思想产生了新的民族自治制度（包括民族自治州、民族、民族自治地方、民族自治和民族自治地方等民族自治形式），民族自治制度的最高表现是民族联邦制。

一 问题的缘起：解体 and 剧变、
苏联和苏共

探讨苏联解体,首先要分清两个概念:一个为苏联国家的解体,一个是苏联社会主义制度的终结。不能把两个概念混淆^②。苏联社会主义制度的崩溃,是社会制度层面的问题。而苏联解体,则体现为 15 个新民族国家的建立,是国家层面的问题。解体和崩溃,是两个不同的概念,层面不同,性质不同。苏共的问题,又分为两个层面,党

② 索马里联邦政府和民间组织讨论, 可参阅: (加) 福莱, 十一, 第 104 页; (台) 高志彬, 《索马里的国家、部落国家与民族主义》, 载于 1987 年《国际关系研究》, 以及从美国芝加哥国际关系学院, 或从美国芝加哥大学 1988 年 5 月、6 月会议等会议《民族主义与联邦主义》, 国际民族主义 1995 年版, George Gagnon, *Federalism and Internationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR* (Cambridge, Wisconsin, 1997), 因此, 对索马里民族主义实施的可能性, 见《领导学》杂志第 33, 34 期。

③ 关于《起死回生》的翻译, 见《索马里民族主义翻译》一书第 34 页, “领导和制度主义国家体系, 其领导事务是单一, 一个领导, 一个制度主义国家, 一个国际主义国家体系的变化, 将导致了国际主义和民族主义国家, 正由于这个原因, 国际主义, 领导民族主义, 分析民族主义和制度主义一样”, 这个从制度主义是更深刻的。

— 18 —

"I am not a naïve person who is easily fooled" GLOBAL TIMES, 25 October 2014



14 国际论坛

环球时报

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编辑: 张涛 编辑: 陈 洁 电话: (010) 85306912

"... Russia-China investment projects have been severely impacted."

"China Should or Should Not 'Rescue' Russia" GLOBAL TIMES, 19 DEC 2014.

"We don't have the ability to save [Russia]..."

"At a time when China is seeking to reform the global system ... and is actively implementing the 'One Belt One Road' [Initiative] ... China requires Russia's support and coordination."

中国该不该“救”俄罗斯

机, 中国应伸出援手

"What will be the benefit to us? ... we had better not forget Chinese national interests ..."

"Some people think that Russia-China [cooperation] is Russia's only choice, but Russians do not see it that way ... Russia is also emphasizing strategic partnerships with India and Vietnam"



乌克兰事件的世界意义及其对中国的警示

"THE MEANING OF THE UKRAINE EVENTS FOR THE WORLD AND ALSO THEIR WARNING TO CHINA" - ZHANG Wenmu



"Realizing unification with Taiwan ... Yes, we can. In the Ukraine Crisis, Putin was able to extend his security zone all the way to the south of Crimea, but NATO had no recourse, because [Crimea] lay beyond the reach of its power..."

