

# ETHNIC MINORITY ELITES IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF ESTONIA

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## I. Introduction and Background

Interethnic relations and multicultural policies are one of the major factors for security and stability in the Baltic region. Estonia has considerable ethnic diversity comprising 32% of ethnic minorities and 68% of Estonians. These people are not recent immigrants common to many European countries, but living permanently in Estonia the second or third generation after forceful inclusion into USSR. How to integrate the two numerous communities — this is the acute question that has caused wide and lively debates for many years after regaining independence and today. In this situation the state's main concern is to avoid any potential interethnic conflict and separatist movements. In the context of Estonia national and local community should be open to the dialogue between different ethnic groups.

Robert A. Dahl's five criterias for evaluating democratic processes are widely recognized by international community of social scientists. These five criterias are: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion of all adults. They are criterias that a process for governing association would have to meet in order to satisfy the requirements that all the members are equally entitled to participate in the associations decision about his policies<sup>1</sup>.

Political equality (equal consideration) is the underlying key terms (rationale) for the choice of these five. Although most elites lack strong unity in a democracy, the main issue is to what extent elite agrees on basic values related to the political regime. Political stability in democracies rests on a minimum level of normative integration among the elite.

The elite theories maintain that elites are the decisive force for regime change and democratic development. The role of new political elites is of particular importance in multiethnic societies and in transition to liberal democracy or in acquiring liberal values.

Each of the post-communist states had its peculiar and complex process for establishing new political elites. Common to most post-communist states, however, is that new elites broadly and effectively exploited nationalistic rhetoric to win over and mobilize electorate. In this respect recirculated old communist elites were often more radical than the new ones. Their emphasis on ethnic solidarity and the rights of nation allowed them in some sense to justify communist past.

After Estonia regained independence in 1991, the political elite adopted the state restoration model in order to guarantee the continuity of the Republic of Estonia as a subject of international law. The restorationist approach, however, constituted the rejection of democratic inclusive approach to the legal status of ethnic minorities. According to the declared principle of legal restoration, only pre-1940 Estonian citizens and their descendants were recognized as having automatic right to citizenship. Thus, Estonia's quite large population of permanent residents without roots in pre-1940 Estonia became stateless. The policy of "leave aside" was not so much intentional, as it reflected the situation among political elites—there were simply not any constructive ideas how to deal with those highly complicated issues. After new parliamentary elections in 1992 (also in Latvia 1993) the takeover of ethno-political power was complete: all 101 deputies in the

new Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) were ethnic Estonians, some 90 percent of the deputies in the Latvian parliament (the Saeima) were ethnic Latvians<sup>2</sup>. The democratic ideal of the representativeness of minority groups was perceived to be a direct menace to national independence. The new legal regulations changed dramatically the situation in society. At the same time it created high uncertainty among Russians as it was common in those time to suspect some sort of hidden agenda concerning repatriation or indirect expulsion. The need of securing national independence from Russia has resulted in an indigenous elite consolidation by ethnic recruitment, safeguarding basic national intuitions from external influence.

After years of silence, in 1996, the first official efforts involving the elaboration of future models for the Russian minority in Estonia was launched. Importantly the bodies elaborating the first principles of minority policy were not so much political parties but rather academic circles. At the beginning of the year 2000 the most observable changes occurred at the level of political as well as public discourse. A serious attempt was made at switching the paradigm from the ethnic centered model to a liberal (civic) one. The interstate aspect in the Estonian citizenship policy was represented by the international security and political policies of the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, which became more visible. Imposed political standards on citizenship legislation, minority protection and human rights, as well as their framework of interstate mediation and consultation started to contribute to the shaping of nationality policies of Estonia<sup>3</sup>.

Integration as a prospective and political concept became natural part of Estonian political opinion. At the same time the whole field of relations between Estonians and Russians lost gradually its vital and extremely emotional position in public debate. While in 1990's the majority of Estonians and non-Estonians considered the majority-minority conflict to be one of the most critical in the country, at the beginning of the year

2000 those problems were transformed into ordinary subjects of discussion, standing side by side with questions of educational options, job preferences, crime rates, joining EU and NATO<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, the paradigm of collective fear and danger has gradually been replaced by the paradigm of increasing individual resources and social capital.

Today Estonia has considerable ethnic diversity comprising 32% of ethnic minorities and 68% of Estonians. These people are not recent immigrants common to many European countries, but living permanently in Estonia the second or third generation after Soviet occupation. How to integrate the two numerous communities — this is the acute question that has caused wide and lively debates for many years after regaining independence and today. In this situation the state's main concern is to avoid any potential interethnic conflict and separatist movements. In the context of Estonia national and local community should be open to the dialogue between different ethnic groups.

Social science is defining the elites as social category possessing power and influence and minority is regarded as a group not being politically dominant. Elites have extensive effects in socio-political development. The thinking, mentalities, appeals and actions of elites are prime shapers of collective consciousness, identities, and actions outside the political arena.

According to V. Pareto and H. Lasswell understanding the elite is not homogenous block but segmented into various elites related to functional systems- politics, business, science, culture etc. G. Mosca (1939) stressed the variability of elite organisation, cohesion and collective will. In many European countries the dominant focus on ethnic minorities has been so far in terms of under class with low educational level, unemployment etc. The vertical mobility of minorities is largely underresearched. Current research is unique since the issues of ethnic elites in multiethnic societies have not been separately included to the focus of elite studies. So far the research done in this area is incor-

porated into political elites framework. The scientific literature dealing with elites addresses many key questions such as: Who are they and how unified they are? How important they are for democratization and policy outcomes? Whether there exist identifiable power elite marked by continuity, cohesion and joint interests? How integrated or divided the elites are?

Elite theory is promoting the idea that in democratic society the ruling class must be able to integrate multiple social forces. In new democracies a consensual unification of disunified elites is a vital step in creating democratic stability. Only consensual elites provide the “unity in diversity” that is essential for a Schumpeterian democratic regime that is also stable<sup>5</sup>. Hence the shape of elites matters. It might matter for example, if the leadership class is more or less representative (demographically) of the general population. It might matter if the elite is unified or divided, well educated or poorly educated, cosmopolitan or parochial, etc. Openness, where the “elite doors” are open for all talented persons, assumes high level of free circulation of elites and vice versus closeness of elite group is one of the key characteristics of non-democratic regime. The circulation itself might be shallow or deep depending to what extent recirculation is actually happening.

Research follows the general methodology of elite studies and neoealist approach. Empirical analysis is completed by investigating three four basic aspects of elite configurations: recruitment patterns and continuity, minority representation, attitudes and orientations of minorities in Estonia. One of the main tasks is to detect which orientations are dominating among the elites and therefore will have consequences for policy making and implementation. We expect the recruitment patterns, the perceptions and attitudes of ethnic elites to be relatively homogenous without remarkable differentiation. On the other hand high level of differentiation prompts to the category which is classified

as non-unified elites, the criteria leading a state away from consensus democracy. For non-unified or divided elite is characteristic weak or no shared ethos, reciprocal distrust and suspicion, dense and segmented network<sup>6</sup>.

Thus, the focus is on patterns of elite recruitment, representation, orientations, how they are shaped and their consequences for democratic stability and rebuilding of the state. This is done by analyzing the empirical data from minority elite interviews carried out in the fall 2009- 2011 in Estonian Riigikogu and Ida-Virumaa. Total amount of respondents was 64 (42 females, 22 males) representing wide variety of high social statuses and professions — members of parliament (elected 2007), civil servants, members of local municipal governments and city councils. Several cities and towns were included into the sample: Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe, Tallinn. In these cities and towns the proportion of those speaking the Russian language is bigger than 30%. For example in Narva (remote city in EU Eastern border) 98% of the population is Russian-speaking. Structured interview strategy was chosen. The interviews proceeded thematically and covered the following topics: elite recruitment patterns and continuity, democratic participation and inclusiveness, integration and citizenship attitudes.

Thus, the research instrument contains the sections on elite studies, interethnic relations and general democratic theory.

## II. Ethnic Elite recruitment patterns and representation

In multiethnic societies elite recruitment is of interest because the kind of elites are attracted to politics and the ways in which they are attracted, are revealing indicators of the regime and its policies. Famous Robert D. Putnam's question “Does social background matter?” should be answered affirmatively. It matters who decides and governs. The relevance of representatives selection and recruitment is twofold: At an individual level their social and po-


litical backgrounds and career trajectories have supposedly an impact on their attitudes-orientations and qualifications, at a systemic level the ways in which political elites structure adopt to the challenges posed by social, economic and political change are constitutive for political systems performance, legitimacy and stability<sup>7</sup>. Elite recruitment is of interest because the kind of elites attracted to politics, and the ways in which they are attracted, reveal what interests, beliefs and policy preferences enter into national and local level policy making process. It takes time to recruit and train a new elite and procedures to bring them into elite positions. The occupational experience of the members of elites is an important indicator of recruitment paths. The degree of „openness of elite structure“ may vary from low, elites being recruited from one single social stratum, to high, where elites are not dominated by any single social stratum. The „openness“ also implies the circulation of elites, which is vital for both their renewal from the people and the implementation of stable and effective decision-making<sup>8</sup>. There are many specific questions that one usually asks as far as the elite recruitment is concerned. For instance, who can be linked to previous regime and what percentage are new? Whether young, middle-aged, elder people are preferred in recruitment? Is there any average patterns in terms of age, profession, social status that might be considered as prevailing patterns?

The mobility problem must be tackled in any elite studies. In an open societies individuals should be free for social mobility and make careers. Therefore, an important aspect of democratic elite recruitment is social mobility of the elites. The question is: is it so that elites are self-recruited from high social strata or is social mobility taking place from low social groups? Usually the new elites are coming from earlier high social positions. However, ethnic elite continuity is hardly visible in Estonia since most of the local elites minorities parents were rank

and file workers (82%) in Soviet time. Only 6% of elite members were recruited from families where one or another parent had an elite position by holding high social positions as engineers, principals, managers etc. Nor did the ethnic local elite hold high social positions before being elected or appointed to current position. More than half of the local elites were recruited rather recently during the years 2004–2010, they were elected to their positions or nominated by municipalities and they are largely middle-aged (average for local ones is 43 and 55 years for parliamentary ethnic elites), with high education. Thus, the tendency of elitist recruitment is not valid rather one could follow more upward mobility. They are largely newcomers without much political experience. Although most of the national legislative elites had high social position before being elected and political experience previously in local municipalities, only few representatives of ethnic legislative elites had considerable long-term electoral experience in previous terms of Riigikogu (*see app. I*). Therefore the parliamentary ethnic elite high political reproduction has been quite modest, though their status continuity is high.

Most political scientists agree on the importance of education for active citizenship and participation. In liberal democracies education is closely related with elite status. Elite members have much higher, usually academic education as compared to the people. Similarities in ethnicity and education account for similar orientations and activities. Professionalism is usually based on educational level, the quality of educational establishment he, she has attended, political experience he/she has acquired. Relatively long lasting social status and political experience contributes professionalization of politics and individuals in a society. How well trained is the political elite? Political elites in Estonia (also in Latvia and Lithuania) are highly educated. Higher education has 88,3% of respondents, 5% don't have, 7% are still studying at the college (*see chart I*).

Chart I



*Compiled by the author*

Top legislative elites have all high education. Therefore high education seems to have been important determinant of recruitment paths. It should be kept in mind that high education in Estonia as well as in many other EU states is mandatory requirement for appointment to higher social positions. As a rule (with some minor specific exceptions) only Estonian citizens are eligible to hold high social positions of civil servants in state structures.

The construction of politics in Estonia and elsewhere in the Baltics, even in smaller communities is influenced by political parties. In consolidative democracy with each election after regaining independence, the trend of each parties range of voters is becoming more and more homogenous and more distinct, with parties attracting members of national minorities and core-nationals. Ethnically homogenous party affiliation in multicultural heterogenous societies is more likely to be source of unstability in consolidative democracy rather than stability hindering in policy-making to find consensus and common agenda. For example, in Latvia one can speak about ethnically divided parties whereas in Estonia the Russian parties have not succeeded in gaining a voice in parliamentary elections. No Russian parties were elected in the first post-Soviet Riigikogu (1992) due to peak time of nationalistic ideology. In 1995 several Russian

political parties, such as Vene Erakond Eestis (Russian party of Estonia, VEE, later renamed Vene Balti Erakond Eestis — Baltic Russian party of Estonia) and Eesti hendatud Rahvapartei (Union People's party) were founded and ran in a coalition „Our Home is Estonia“ receiving 5.87% of the votes which correspond to six Riigikogu seats out of 101. In 1999 elections E R gained 8.13% of the vote and 6 seats during the elections. Since then, the representatives of Russian parties have failed to pass the required electoral threshold (5%) in 2003, 2007, 2011 elections. Nevertheless, six minority representatives were elected through the lists Estonian mainstream parties in the last (2011) Riigikogu elections. *See app. II* (<http://www.vvk.ee/>).

Political analysts have hypothesized that the possibility of participating in the local elections in Estonia gave the local Russian elite an opportunity for local self-realization and moreover motivated many political parties to target political marketing on the Russian speaking electorate. For instance, the Centre party headed by Edgar Savisaar succeeded in gathering major part of the Russian-speaking electorate nearly in all elections since 1991<sup>9</sup>.

Generally speaking Estonian Russian-speakers tend to prefer a variety of parties not necessarily those advocating purely minority issues. The reason for that is probably in acknowledgment of limited efficacy of Russian parties due to splits and merges so far focusing on minority issues. The lack of legitimate popular leaders clearly undermines the activities of minority parties. Even in minority dominated Ida-Virumaa region, the voters elected the candidates running on the lists of main Estonian parties to promote their interests more effectively on national level. Thus, voters across Estonia demonstrate the same model of electoral behaviour regardless of their ethnic affiliation. For instance the elections for the Riigikogu (2007) and also Latvian Saeima (2005) after the heated debates on education reforms, the development of integration programmes and the consequences of the EU membership stressed the grow-

ing propensity of non-core ethnics to vote for mainstream parties, whose focus is on minority social problems rather than merely promoting a minority agenda. Similarly to Latvian situation, the Estonian government coalitions after 2007, 2011 elections were formed without the Centre party, which represented large sections of the Russian-speaking electorate, despite it holding approximately quarter of the votes in last (2007, 2011) elections. In part, the political situations has been interpreted as a projection of everyday beliefs into the realm of politics, with minority/majority parties holding controversial views on the geopolitical situation of Estonia, educational reforms, citizenship, language policies etc.<sup>10</sup>

However, power sharing is the hallmark of consensually united elite, and the periodic, peaceful alternations in executive power that mark liberal democracies are its principal manifestations. Many prominent researchers such as Highley and Burton, Steen, Perry<sup>11</sup> insist that elite can operate successfully if there is a trust among its members, if members with different ideological views can debate their ideas and compete with one another and if at the same time everyone accepts the rules of the game of democracy. This type is classified as integrated or unified elite. Among disunified—conflicting elites there is mistrust. There are doubts about the elite groups and their competence,

if there are ideological differences, the mistrust is also focused on those who take decisions<sup>12</sup>. Because of the mistrust and hatreds that pervade a divided elite, breaking out of the configuration is rather difficult, it probably requires a sudden, deliberate, and fundamental elite settlement that can occur in a profound crisis that threatens the interests of all main elite groups more or less equally<sup>13</sup>.

During the last 20 years the cleavage line lies between those parties supporting more nationalistic mainstream of policy (Reform, ProPatria —Respublica Union) and the parties arguing in favor of more moderate ethnic policy. (Centre, Social-Democratic party). The office holding parties have been firm supporters of clear-cut nationstate policy, whereas opposition and center-leftist parties propagated further concessions in ethnic policy. Big parties are not treating Russian-speaking electorate as separate interest group, since vital problems of all people regardless of their ethnicity are similar.

For some political actors alignment with ethnic values has been to considerable extent a means of remaining in power. As Boris Tsi-levich argues „In any event belonging to- or at least articulating ones loyalty to-the titular groups, the „masters of their land“ seems to be necessary prerequisite for becoming part of the new political elites in many of the post-communist countries. Instead of playing a role as the avangarde of liberal principles, the

Table I

Turnout in local and nationwide elections (2007–2009) (Percentage)

	General turnout	Estonians	Ethnic Minorities, who have Estonian citizenship	Non-Estonian citizens	Russian citizens
Participated in local elections (2009)	61%	74%	80%	81	72%
Participated in Europarliment (2009) elections	44%	68%	68%	0	0
Participated in Riigikogu (2007) elections	62%	71%	72%	0	0

Source: <http://www.vvk.ee/>, Monitooring 2010, <http://www.slideshare.net/kultuuriministeerium/limumiskava-monitooring>

new elites often stired up nationalistic emotions within their constituencies in order to maintain power<sup>14</sup>.

However, willingness to participate in politics is high among non-Estonians. Surprisingly some of the minorities turnout figures exceed even that of core nationals ones (see table I).

Modern liberal constitutionalism incorporates the concepts of equality and society within a common conceptual framework. The dynamic of liberal equality is biased in the direction of inclusiveness. Initially (historically) the application of the idea of equality was quite narrow, but gradually the scope of application is enlarged. Obviously the outcome of higher level of elite circulation and differentiation is greater representation of different sectors of society at the political elite level. Highley and Burton point out the importance of high levels of representation for regime stability<sup>15</sup>. Minority underrepresentation among higher social strata enhances the potential of instability and conflicts in the country. It goes without saying that in the Baltic states, at least in Estonia, also in Latvia the minority communities are not represented proportionally to their size among the top political and social elites. The ethnic minorities are not represented much in executive nor legislative power. In Estonia after regaining independence there has been only few (4) ethnic Russian or other nationality ministers in top executive power, scarcely were minorities represented in state administration and governmental structures (see app. III). The problem is that in the context of specific nation-state concept in Estonia, as well as the regular tensions between Estonia and Russia which fuel the ethnic connotation of the concept, the representation of the specific political interests of Estonian Russians and the advancement of Russian culture are regarded rather suspiciously by the larger society<sup>16</sup>. The figures indicate a policy of protecting the core activities of the state from influence of other groups. As a strategy of nationbuilding and promoting national interests it tend to be ra-

tional. However, the long-term effect on the decision making process and conflict solution, remains to be seen.

The state should treat the minority representatives equally with other nationals by giving them chance to work both in top executive power as well as in high positions in state administration. This will make minorities more valued and equal with titular nationality. At the same time there need to be minority pioneers that pursue and achieve high level positions in order to show other non-Estonians that such things are possible. This will contribute to the creation of a Russian speaking elite, which is still underway and flimsy<sup>17</sup>. However, Estonian legal regulations do not differ from European practice and contribute for further involvement of minorities in state apparatus. Every individual, who wish to obtain citizenship and participate in political life, is free to do so. However, the hidden perceptions and understandings of two large communities are hard to change and might be fully acknowledged only after new generation, who have not witnessed Soviet occupation, steps in. Therefore, the answer to the question „do we witness irreversible trend towards minority participation in the government and if yes, what are its implications?“, is still under question mark. The 2002 and 2005 integration monitoring report suggested that Estonians and non-Estonians have fundamentally different attitudes with respect to the participation of non-Estonians in the Riigikogu, the government, defence forces. While non-Estonians tended to support greater involvement in these institutions, Estonians consistently favoured limited participation<sup>18</sup>. On the other hand, the structural limits do exist for minority participation in political processes. First of all, their legal status and social status. Secondly, the centrality of language knowledge for employment in public office limits access to many governmental positions for the members of noncore ethnic group.

Democracy rests on three pillars: broad participation, free and fair regular election and competition for power institutional-

ized as a multi-party system. Although present-day democracy still requires the equality of individuals to their electoral right, the meaning of electoral participation is of much more limited importance for overall understanding of contemporary democracy<sup>19</sup>. Participatory democracy by definition, implies that universal participation is the main foundation throughout the political process and is not restricted to elections<sup>20</sup>. For some elite oriented theorists like Schumpeter<sup>21</sup> competing elites are more important than mass participation. However, the bottomline argument in liberal democracy is inclusion, equality of citizens and acceptance of divergent views are all necessary for a country to be a liberal democracy. Thus, in liberal democracies participation as a value is firmly rooted and the political elite in general is rather positive about popular influence in the political process. Inclusiveness is a part of more broader conception of participatory democracy (see app. V). When it comes to inclusiveness, the elite responses to the question: “whether to use certain quotas among high officials social positions to involve more Russian-Speakers in local municipality affairs and parliament?”, was answered affirmatively (63,3%), whereas top elites were mostly in disfavor of establishing special quota system (see table II). The discourse „there is no vital need to set up additional quotas, since democratic legal procedures are firmly rooted on state level“ is widely spread among among parliamentary elites“ (interviews).

Table II

**Special quotas of minority representation (percentage)**

*Local elites Riigikogu minority elites*

In favour	63,3	(25%)
Rather in favour	2	0
Disfavor	0	(75%)
No answer	34,7	0
total	100%	100%

*Compiled by the author*

Policy making environment assumes that each politician has certain impact on political decisions. More the individuals have impact, more rational the political decision-making potentially would be. Ideally all members of the political community should have an equal impact towards decisions they make. However, in practice it does not work out to large extent. In this case rather weak or no impact of an individual in municipality decision making was assessed by half of the local elites. Parliamentary elites assessed their impact to decision-making to be rather intermediate (see table III).

Table III

**Assessment of individual impact in city/municipality, parliamentary decisions? (Percentage)**

*Local elites parliamentary elites*

Strong impact	5	0
Rather strong	20	25
Intermediate	25	75
Weak	30	
No impact	20	
Total	100	100

*Compiled by the author. Intermediate influence means that sometimes the proposals are taken into account by incumbent elites but not necessarily always.*

One quarter of the local elites assessed their impact to be strong or rather strong on municipality decisions. Consequently the concern to make his/her voice to be heard more is pretty high among ethnic elites.

**III. Elite Attitudes and Orientations Towards Integrational Issues and Citizenship policy. Mutual Trust**

Within democratic theory it is often argued that democracy requires a certain set of attitudes and orientations. Integration and integrated seems to have an apparent positive connotation, while opposite expressions like slow integration, weakly integrated



or unintegrated connote a lack of harmony and social problem. The concept of integration in multicultural societies is frequently the basis of mutual mistrust and non-confidence between majorities and minorities. The guiding principle, in line with liberal democracy which representatives of majority often invoke in similar contexts is, „integration yes, forcible assimilation no.“ The institutional solutions, however, short of assimilation and secession at the same time, which could give concreteness to the principles, keeps the competing communities entrapped in a strange vicious circle, in which the minimum of minority demands are perceived by majority as the first step to secession, while the maximum of what majority can offer, consistent with its perception of democracy, is usually interpreted by minorities as the first step to assimilation<sup>22</sup>. The indigenous incumbent elite wish is to adopt the minorities to the „host“ society dominant way of thinking, speaking and behaving, when integration becomes difficult there arises a social problem, a functional error in the social apparatus.

Estonian government continues to place great emphasis on its commitment to building multicultural society as it is stressed in National Integration programme. The programme (2008–2013) aims to encourage people to share common values, participate more actively in civil society. A crucial part of the integration policy is focused not only on encouraging Russians to accept integration, but also on persuading Estonians to allow the Russians to integrate and to accept them as equal members of common Estonian-language institutions. Should this effort fail, so that Russian-speakers become more and more disillusioned about the prospects for successful integration, the potential exists for the Russian-speaking community to reorganize itself as a national minority and to mobilize for territorial and cultural autonomy<sup>23</sup>.

Integration means that all residents of Estonia have an equal interest, desire and opportunities for contributing to the devel-

opment of the state and participating in social life, regardless of their ethnic origin<sup>24</sup>. Political scientists emphasize that the lack of effectiveness in national integration policies can be often blamed on political parties and politicians, within the struggle over political power, frequently made vast use of ethnic and linguistic belonging as an effective form of political capital, polarising this way society.

The integration of Estonian Russians in the political or cultural spheres, in which successful adaptation depends to a large extent also on the attitudes of larger community, is highly problematic. This is the reason why even the term integration sometimes has negative connotation among Estonian Russians. The ethnically connoted nation-state model equates integration with forced acculturation, and as the majority of Estonian Russians do not wish to assimilate, integration for them means something to avoid<sup>25</sup>. Integration is still not viewed as a two-way process by most of the elites and the questions about the willingness of the government to include Russian speakers into decision-making process still persist. Estonian as well as Latvian elite agree that their societies are only partially integrated societies and the serious obstacles to integration remains<sup>26</sup>. Thus, the national elites are not so much interested in content rich integration rather instigating assimilation under the cover of integration.

In 2005 survey the success of integrational policies was emphasized by only 45% of Estonians and 31% of Russians. The important role and place of integration is more stressed in localities where the individual lives and when he/she realizes the practical changes of the process. In big cities and Ida-Virumaa region people tend to be more sceptical about the efficiency of integration<sup>27</sup>. This is clearly seen from empirical data, when most of the elites assessed the outcome of current integrations policy being the same or even worse (*see table IV*).

Table IV

**Ethnic Elites assessment of current integration policy in 2010,2011 (percentage)**

Local elites Parliamentary		
Has become worse	36,6%	33,3
Has remained the same level,no change	50%	50
Improved	8,1%	33,3
No answer	5%	
Total	100%	100

*Compiled by the author.*

However, many argued the integration program launched by the state is highly necessary to overcome the cleavages and misunderstandings that exist between the two communities.

We assume that the elites perception of an open and transparent government is one important aspect of a democratic system. Furthermore we consider the degree of trust people have in different political institutions to be important indicators of support for democracy. Democracy to be stable, leaders and the masses must have minimum level of confidence in institutions and members of the elite must have basic level of trust in each other. Trust is a core aspect of elite integration. According to Almond and Verba<sup>28</sup>, Putnam<sup>29</sup> certain level of basic trust in other persons is prerequisite for a democratic political culture. Therefore trust in other political actors and people in general, that is, interpersonal trust has been seen as an essential prerequisite for democratic development. Theoretically trust is a foundation of cooperation<sup>30</sup>. It means that people tend to behave in a democratic spirit to the extent that they believe other can be trusted to behave likewise<sup>31</sup>. Democratic consolidation assumes high level of interpersonal trust and tolerance in a society, it evaluates active citizen and citizen participation. Elites are somewhat responsible how these orientations and attitudes are implemented in re-

al life. The answers to the question „Whether mutual trust and wish to cooperate between two communities have been improved?“ is responded rather sceptically by both elite groups. More than 80% of the elites assessed mutual trust and wish to cooperate between two communities being on the same level or even became worse. The low level of trust is reflecting divided (fragmented) elites, who are bound together not so much with pragmatic considerations but rather national elite consensus.

The reactions to the question: „What should Estonians do in order to trust more Russian community“ revealed for both elite groups the angle of enlightened understanding of two cultures, inclusiveness and mutual tolerance.

*„Estonians should be more tolerant to other cultures and ethnic groups, no state is purely national, other experiences of interethnic relations should be studied more carefully. Estonians should trust more Russian-speakers since most of the leading positions in state apparatus are occupied by Estonians, not blame the others (minority) as occupants and enemies rather consider Russian community to be great potential for fostering life in the country, internal enemy seeking paralyses the assessment of real situation, listen more and take into account the minority opinions in policy making, improve relations with Russia as long as this is the homeland of our ancestors, change the political nationalistic mainstream, which has been performed by the government ever since Estonia regained independence. It,s time to finish the fears, forget about insults and think more, how to move on together, how to build up common future.“ (interviews)*

Generally speaking many EU states including the Baltics are facing new challenge today. This challenge does not come from enemies within or outside the nation. Instead, the challenge comes from democracy's own citizens, who have grown distrustful of politicians, sceptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned how the democrat-

ic process functions<sup>32</sup>. Experience shows that confidence in the political institutions correlates with viable democracy<sup>33</sup>. It is the policy performance of democratic institutions over a period of time that gives legitimacy to the political system. Belief in democratic institutions depends on symbolic attractiveness, the general performance of the system, and how the leaders ability to form consensus touches upon the interests of social groups. The crucial question is how different strata of the population react to institutions, and how dependent the authorities are on support from different groups for stability<sup>34</sup>. Much of the public attention so far has emphasized the question of political allegiance of the Russian-speaking minority. Since parliament, government, president, etc. are key state institutions of any democracy the low level of support for these institutions is a cause for concern. The data from 2009 indicate that the Russian-speakers are three times less trusting state institutions than Estonians regardless of their citizenship status (*see app. VI*). The question is, what are the reasons for the persistent mutual distrust between minority populations and the state institutions in Estonia?

First, there are reasons connected with insufficient command of state language and the lack of trust towards high state institutions.

Secondly, general passivity among aliens and non-Estonian citizens. Rikmann and Lagerpetz suggested that the passivity of Russian speakers is different from the analogues passivity of the economically weak groups of the titular population. The researchers interpret the general political passivity of minorities as a result of their disillusionment with the political system, which has failed to provide them with channels for the participation needed to bring causes closer to policy-makers<sup>35</sup>. Thirdly, the low level of general trust in institutions is obviously reflecting divided elites, who are bound together more by ethnic affiliation rather than by the loyalty to the state.

Fourth, the removal of bronze soldier in 2007 symbolizing the victory of Russians in the Second World War enhanced scepticism towards state authorities and government. President and the government have the lowest amount of trust compared with other other institutions.

On the other hand majority of Russian-speakers (80%) are considering Russians to be loyal to Estonian state, whereas among Estonians the contention is agreed only by 40 percent<sup>36</sup>.

In Eastern part of Estonia (Ida-Virumaa) integrational issues are closely linked with other city affairs. Local municipalities are usually supporting financially all the acting ethnic communities and their activities. Local authorities are providing rooms for meetings. As a rule flats are given to Estonian language teachers free of charge.

Celebration of joint anniversaries contributes to mutual understanding of each other.

Both elite groups stressed the point that first, integration program implementation plan should firstly be elaborated on grass-roots level. Secondly, this program should be included into general development plan of the city. Thirdly, development plans of schools as well as other educational programs should contain special subdivision „Integration“. Fourth, local media should contain more information about the relationship between two communities. Fifth, integration starts from early childhood, in kindekardens and schools. Hence mixed composition of kindekardens would contribute to mutual understanding of each other. (interviews)

The elites vision with regard of further scenarios and potential outcomes of integration is diverse. As one can see from the table V, the second option prevails thus giving credit to mainstream of integration strategy. Integration starts first of all from equal civic rights and continues with free development of different cultures.

Table V

**Possible outcomes of integration ( percentage)**  
**Local elites Parliamentary elites**

Estonians and minorities share common values, ethnic minorities preserve and develop their culture.	6,7	50
Estonians and minorities share common values, they have equal civil rights and possibilities to preserve and develop their culture.	75	50
Estonians and minorities have equal civil rights, however, they live and act separately in accordance with their cultural background, customs and traditions.	15	
Ethnic minorities are merging into Estonian society by taking over their culture and identity.	3,3	
Total	100	100

*Compiled by the author.*

In fact among Russian minority NGO's, members of ethnic elites there are four key elements that are mentioned by almost all respondent groups: integration as a two-way process; equality between ethnic groups; common values; and mutual respect.

The first is the idea that integration should be a two-way process between Estonians and minority groups, and that Estonians must not resist the idea that they too must be integrated. Several elite persons emphasized that while Russians are learning to speak Estonian and making Estonian friends, very few Estonians are making any effort to learn Russian or to mix with Russians socially<sup>37</sup>.

Minority NGO's leaders standpoint coincides with ethnic local elites. As they argued.

*„Integration itself is “two-ways traffic” means that the government should carry out more efforts in order to introduce majority of population Russian culture, history, on the other hand the image of enemy and prejudices should be left aside, one should bear more efforts to set up „round tables” of discussion between interethnic communities. The schools and studying programs should get rid of the term occupant, young people tend to transfer*

*this knowledge to their kids. Raising children in an Estonian environment and culture enable them better to understand core nations values and mentalities.” (interviews).*

The local elites stressed the idea that Russians should more communicate with Estonians by working even temporarily in Estonian language speaking environment.

*„They should convince the other countrymen of being unseparable part of Estonia (not Russia). Big mistake was made when Estonians received long-expected freedom by dividing the society on ethnic grounds. We are able to understand them, since they got back their own state, however, they forgot the state belongs also to the others. Integrational programs should be joint dialogue between two communities on absolutely equal basis. It's time to finish the division of population into Estonians and non-Estonians. We all work for the same end to make Estonia richer and prosperous.” (interviews)*

Citizenship is one of the most important, but elusive concepts of modern political discourse and practice. It's often understood as a universal concept. All citizens in a nation state are equal before the law. Simply put, citizenship is membership of a nation state, which is deemed as the solitary locus of the political community<sup>38</sup>. Membership of a political com-

munity gives an identity to an individual that supersedes all the other identities such as religion, gender, class etc. It is important because citizenship, or the lack of it, determines peoples political legal and social rights. It is both a source and a result of inclusion and identification, as it demarcates groups of individuals, who have certain privileges and responsibilities in common<sup>39</sup>. In political process efforts to build nation-state inevitably involve either assimilating or excluding minority identities and cultures, rendering them invisible in public sphere. For the multiculturalist this is unfair, and a denial of peoples, legitimate interests in their identity and culture. The only way to build truly inclusive democracies, therefore, is to challenge this ideology of nationhood in the name of more multicultural conception of citizenship. Such conception of citizenship attempts to replace or supplement nation-building policies with policies that explicitly recognize and accommodate groups whose cultural differences have been excluded from the national imaginary, whether they be national minorities, religious minorities etc.<sup>40</sup>

Before regime change overall majority of the respondents parents had Soviet citizenship. However, the legal status of many people living in Estonia changed substantially after regime change. Citizenship policy derived largely its core from restitution of pre-war citizenship policy by excluding most Russian speaking settlers during the Soviet period. Many former Soviet citizens chose Russian citizenship (see table VI). In principle multiple citizenship is not allowed in Estonia with the exception of emigree Estonians living in US, Sweden, Canada, Australia, elsewhere. Most of these people left the country after German and prior to Soviet occupation in 1944.

Table VI

**Citizenship of the elites parents today  
(percentage)**

**Citizenship** Local elites Parliamentary

Russian	65	
Estonian	21,6	50
Ukranian	1,6	

Finnish	1,6	
Bulgarian	1,6	
dead	8,3	50
total	100	100

*Compiled by the author.*

Article 3 of citizenship law on avoidance of multiple citizenship states that any person who by birth in addition to Estonian citizenship acquires the citizenship of another state must within three years after attaining the age of 18 years renounce either Estonian citizenship or the citizenship of another state. However, article 5 section 3 states that no person may be deprived of Estonian citizenship acquired by birth. There is no legal mechanism to deprive native multiple citizens of Estonian citizenship. Therefore, Estonia uses moderate *ius sanguinis* with a recently introduced complementary *ius soli* in the case of children born in Estonia<sup>41</sup>.

Among Baltic states Estonia has a bit more liberal approach than Latvia since the state allows residents, who have permanent residence permits — lived for five or more years to vote in local elections, but they do not have the right to be elected (only EU citizens have). In Latvia, the non-citizen population is not allowed to participate in politics at either the national or local level, which is problematic for democracy, considering the large number of persons who remain stateless and the fact the naturalization rate is steadily declining<sup>42</sup>. In Estonia citizenship is crucial when individuals are running as candidates in local elections or pursue high social positions in state apparatus. Lithuania has also used a different approach compared to Estonia and Latvia when it comes to the issue of citizenship and the right to take part in local elections. All residents in Lithuania are allowed to vote and run in elections to local councils. In Latvia every citizen of the country or every citizen of any European Union country living in Latvia can take part in the elections to municipality councils and also run as a candidate. Today quick naturalization of non-citizens and aliens living in the

country is one of the priorities of Estonian integrational program.

However, as the current research findings indicate many individuals (63%) still argue in favor of more concessions in citizenship policy towards Russian-speaking minorities. In favor of more liberalization of naturalization requirements of citizenship policy argued all ethnic representatives of parliamentary elites.

After regime change citizenship should have been given to all inhabitants, who were born in Estonia regardless of their year of birth, 91,7 % of elites argued in favour of giving citizenship automatically. Historical arguments enhanced the convincingness of the elites point.

*„Estonia lost considerably by denying citizenship for those people who have been born and lived in Estonia their entire life. In 1918 all the inhabitants living in Estonia received citizenship. After 1991 many of those people, who considered themselves aliens, left the country. Most people, who stayed, have proved themselves being loyal to Estonian state, its hardly imaginable that Estonia would have received independence without the support of these people.“ (interviews)*

Many Russian speaking people have acquired citizenship to feel social protection of the state. However, empirical data shows that today the wish to receive Estonian citizenship is in serious decline. Whereas in 2005 the amount of people wishing to obtain Estonian citizenship was 74%, the figure dropped in 2010 to 34% (see app. VII). This could also be explained by general citizenship policy of Estonian state as well as by purely practical reasons — opening up visa free traveling with EU countries. Estonia became member of Schengen area in 2007 enabling stateless persons to travel freely all over EU. Elites recognized that Russian citizenship policy and visa regime has reduced incentives for non-citizens to naturalize<sup>43</sup>. Low trust of state institutions indicated above affects naturally the low interest of obtaining Estonian citizenship. It seems that similarly to Latvia over-

all underrepresentation of minority groups in top executive power as well as in state apparatus discourages non-Estonians to naturalize and to take an active part in political decision making.

Since Estonia has more than 100 000 Russian citizens and aliens (stateless persons) living in the country, who comprise all together aprox. 20% of the grown up population of Estonia, the question was asked „Why some of the Russian speakers choose Russian citizenship and what kind of steps should the state undertake in order to get rid from so called „stateless (non-citizenship) problem?“

Parliamentary elites emphasized that the state should impone more in explaining citizenship policy. Both elite groups argued that Russian citizenship simplifies the travel to abroad, many minority representatives have relatives cross the border.

*„Economically it's beneficial to travel since many goods in Russia are much cheaper than in Estonia. It is easier to visit relatives, since visa applying takes time. On the other hand passing exams in Estonian language is a tough challenge and time consuming. Russian side is not setting up any naturalization requirements, except to write an application for citizenship and wait. Russia's attitudes towards their citizens are more friendly than in Estonia. Therefore persons always choose more convenient and more simple option. If Estonia would have had more democratic state, then the amount of Russian citizens living in Estonia would have had considerably decreased specially among younger generation.“ (interviews)*


Indeed, the current interethnic situation in long run does not serve the security interests of Estonia but rather vice versus. Big percentage of Russian citizens as well as stateless persons living in the country do not enhance internal nor external security. In crisis situation with Russia some members of the big Russian-speaking community might be used as a „trump card“ against Estonia. Conventional wisdom forecasts further interethnic cleavages if the state is not capable to re-

duce considerably first of all stateless persons and increase Estonian citizenry. Fortunately the number of former category has steadily decreased.

The vast majority of local leaders (90%) argued in favor of giving citizenship automatically to those, who have lived in the country twenty five or more years and to all kids of the parents, who live permanently in Estonia, even without knowing Estonian language and the main law, only 7% percent denied such state option (see chart II).

Chart II

**What about these kids, who have been born in Estonia and whose parents had Russian or Soviet citizenship — is there necessity to give to this category Estonian citizenship automatically (percentage)?**



Different age categories did not affect the case.

*„People feel him/herself more secure, protected while having citizenship. Many feel like „suffering“ in uncertain situation without feeling any state protection. If the state is not pushing individuals aside, there,s no need to turn backs to the state.“ (interviews)*

In other words strong willingness is to achieve citizenship without knowing the language or to deal with much more simplified language exam procedure Majority of both elite groups denied any risks the state faces in this respect emphasized the benefits-more people are eligible for citizenship.

*„More citizens — less tensions, broader their political rights to elect parliament and to run as a candidates in local elections. In turn*

*this particular step increases trust towards each other.“ (interviews)*


Indeed, integration policy needs more flexibility. The state should derive its policy from the needs of individuals by taking into account the age of an individual. The minority elites emphasized that „one cannot be sure how interested the elder people are in obtaining the citizenship“.

*It's problematic to require the state language knowing from those people, whose age is 55 and more years. The people, who have continuous health problems, should be dispensed from exams. There is no point of „torturing“ pensioners. They have already finalized their career and work. If they don't receive citizenship automatically, this again is to emphasize the alien status of personality which in turn does not enhance patriotism, affection and loyalty to the state.“ (see chart III, interviews)*

Chart III

**Should elder people acquire citizenship without passing exams?  
(Percentage)**

Note: under elder people is meant the age 55 and more



However, both elite groups argued that some of the risks do exist:

*„The state is receiving quite a lot of aged people who have old Soviet way of thinking and who do not understand the essence and logic of free market economy. The officials is obviously having greater problems in dealing with this category of people and spend more time in explaining things compared to young or middle-aged generation.“ (interviews)*

### Conclusions

Political stability in democracies rests on a minimum level of normative integration among the elite. First, national unity, where vast majority of the citizens have no mental reservations as to which political community they belong, is of great importance both in multiethnic as well as in a nation state. Secondly, in Robert Dahl's understanding „Basic Agreement“ among elites and in society in general is vital precondition for democratic stability. Lack of understanding and consent, in fact, erodes state capacity, which is essential for sustaining coherence. It seems that the formation of competent leadership and tolerant political stratum is a precondition to viable internal consensus. Geraint Parry is certainly right by stressing the idea that in certain conditions the elite may share similar values that nationality can be even more important factor than social background in influencing attitudes<sup>44</sup>. On the other hand ethnicity itself cannot be basis of a democratic state. Moderation in claims, as well as in responses, negotiation and common identification of solutions are the keys to dealings with differences in a society.

After regaining independence Estonia as well as other Baltic states have shown remarkable success of socio-economic and political reforms. Joining the Western security alliances such as NATO and EU contributed to the revision of Estonian relatively ethnocentric perceptions of nationhood towards more civic side of interethnic relations. The Baltic membership in EU, NATO, OSCE do prove the lasting trends in democratic development. However, assessing whether or not EU membership has impacted minority integration in the post-accession period also requires examining the degree to which international minority standards are internalized by elites. The vast majority of Estonian elites are not familiar with the various European Conventions on minority rights and could not describe what „minority rights norms“ in Europe are<sup>45</sup>. Even today it appears that many intellectu-

als and policy-makers in Estonia and elsewhere in the Baltics and Eastern Europe have no clear idea of the principles underlying western standards. They are told that respect for minorities is an essential part of democratization, but are not told why minority rights are linked to democracy or how these rights relate to principles of justice and freedom<sup>46</sup>. Ethnicity itself cannot be basis of a democratic state. Moderation in claims, as well as in responses, negotiation and common identification of solutions are the keys to dealings with differences in a society.

In order to understand Estonian democracy one should take into account the legacies of the past. Historical legacy of Estonia and perceptions of most national elites do not allow to introduce consociational solutions of interethnic relations. Statehood was understood in ethnic rather than liberal civic terms. After regime change the term „liberal“ simply meant anti-communist nature of elites, but not necessarily those defending liberal-democratic values. The presence of a huge and dominating neighboring Russia, combined with large Russian-speaking minority inside Estonia, has been so far inducive to national elite cohesion.

Despite differences in population, a certain state loyalty must exist. Although Estonia is ostensibly multiethnic state, Russians do not identify with the state and its symbols.

Political parties tend to be ethnically divided, which make adequate democratic relations difficult. In order to reduce the potential for ethnic conflict in a democracy is the need to avoid complete exclusion from political power for minority groups. All groups must be given some stake in the system. The low number of minority representatives among political elites condition the majority's perceptions of this group. Few non-indigenous people are taking part in top executive, legislative and judicial power.

Widely spread notion is that the decisions of the representative institutions are



heavily influenced by characteristics and perspectives of its members. Current ethnic elites are middle-aged and highly educated. Most of them have been born, educated and raised up in Estonia, thus mastering well the state language.

Usually the new elites are coming from earlier high positions. This is not the case with ethnic elites, particularly local ones, where majority of them had earlier low social positions. The tendency of elitist recruitment is not valid, rather one could follow more upward mobility. Generational status continuity was characteristic to only 16%, whereas most of the local actors are relatively recently recruited to their positions, without remarkable social and political experience. When it comes to parliamentary elites many of them had high social positions even in Soviet time, whereas among Russian-speaking local elites high reproduction and status continuity is relatively undeveloped. Vice versus, majority of them are newcomers. Thus the vertical mobility of ethnic elites seems to be high. This could be seen as „inflow“ of elites, the trend vitally important for circulation in democracies and multiethnic societies.

In contrast to widely spread notion of non-citizenship among the Russian community, the Russian speaking elite do have Estonian citizenship. Both elite groups emphasized the necessity to give Estonian citizenship automatically to those, who have been born in Estonia. From this and previous empirical data we know that the minorities complain about the tough naturalization requirements: citizenship exam incl. language fluency etc. The elites see the most important purpose of the integration policy in guaranteeing equal rights both to natives and minorities. Therefore, the ethnic elites orientations give credit to more liberalization of citizenship policy, which is regarded to contribute to general improvement of interethnic relations in Estonia. The state should carry on with the reforms to impose even more towards interethnic relations.

The analyzed empirical data helps to understand that integration in multiethnic societies can only take place on reciprocal basis, if “both sides” equally take actions (two-ways traffic). An integrated society is one in which there is mutual respect and trust on both personal and a group level. Majority of ethnic elites assessed trust and feelings of cooperation between two ethnic communities being the same or even worse as the result of current integration policy proving rather well it’s relatively poor efficiency. Anti-bronze soldier riots and demonstrations in 2007 clearly diminished it’s importance. Therefore, the desintegration of society and elites in general must be source for further concern in the society. The low level of trust is reflecting divided (conflicting) elites, who are bound together not so much with pragmatic considerations but rather national elite consensus.

Current research findings indicate, despite the general heterogeneity of elites, the recruitment patterns, perceptions and orientations of both ethnic elite groups are relatively similar, they have pretty common understanding of the problems, similar orientations towards integrational and citizenship issues. Hence Estonian ethnic elites tend to be more unified, whereas the overall political elite seems to be divided. Ideologically the cleavage line lies still between nation-state centered and inclusive (liberal) understanding of interethnic relations. The insufficiency of the main prerequisites of consensus democracy hinders the consolidation of Estonian society. The most stable development is expected to come from restructuring the elites by recruiting Russian-speakers more into influential (top) elite persons. Otherwise conventional wisdom will predict instability (not excluding confrontations) between ethnic communities when non-Estonians are not represented proportionally (or close to) to their size in decision-making. The research findings once again demonstrated the existence of two parallel communities, with relatively scant underexposure in between.

**Socio-demographic data of Riigikogu minority legislative elites, elected in 2007,2011**

	Place of birth	Time of birth	Gender	Education	Place of obtaining education	Parliamentary experience	Party affiliation	Local municipality experience
Muravjova, Tatjana	Est.	1949	F	H	Leningrad	10, 11 Riigikogu	Center party	+
Efendijev Eldar	Est	1954	M	H	Leningrad	10, 11, 12 Riigikogu	Center party	+
Velmann, Vladimir	Est	1945	M	H	Tallinn	8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Riigikogu	Center party	+
Sõtnik, Olga	Est	1980	F	H	Tallinn	11, 12 Riigikogu	Center party	+
Privalova, Nelli	Est	1945	F	H	Leningrad	10, 11 RK	Center party	+
Lotman, Aleksei	Lenin-grad	1960	M	H	Tartu	11 RK	Green party	+
Korb, Valeri	Est	1954	M	H	Leningrad	11 RK	Center party	+
Vassiljev, Viktor	Est.	1953	M	H	Tartu	12 RK	Center party	+
Borodits, D.	Est.	1979	M	H	Tallinn	12 RK	Center party	+
Stalnuhhin, M.	Est.	1961	M	H	Tallinn	9,10,12 RK	Center party	+
Ossinovski, Jevgeni	Est.	1986	M	H	Tartu	12 RK	Social-democratic party	-

**Parliamentary Representation of Ethnic Minorities Cross Different Electoral Terms 1992–2011**

**Figures Parties**

7. Riigikogu 1992–1995	0	0
8. Riigikogu 1995–1999	6	Russian parliamentary fraction
9. Riigikogu 1999–2003	8	2 members of Centre party, 6 members of United People party fraction
10. Riigikogu 2003–2007	7	5 members of Centre party fraction, 2 members Reform party
11. Riigikogu 2007–2011	7	6 members of Centre party fraction, 1 members Greens party
12. Riigikogu 2011–2015	6	5 members of Centre party fraction, 1 members social-democratic party

*Note: The size of Estonian Riigikogu is 101 members.*

App. III

**Members of ethnic elites in Estonian governments after regaining independence**  
**Governments titular nation ethnic minorities total**

1990 E. Savisaar	24	2	26
1992 T. Vahi	24	1	25
1992 M. Laar	27	0	27
1994 I. Tarand	15	0	15
1995 T. Vahi	16	0	16
1997 M. Siimann	18	0	18
1999 Mart Laar II	17	0	17
2002 S. Kallas	15	1	16
2003 J. Parts	19	0	19
2005 A. Ansip	16	0	16
2007 A. Ansip	13	0	13
2011 A. Ansip	13	0	13

*Compiled by the author*

App. IV

**Estonians do not see non-Estonians in the leading position (percentage)**  
**Parliament Government**

	<b>Estonians</b>	<b>Other ethnicity</b>	<b>Estonians</b>	<b>Other ethnicity</b>
Should not be related to the number of non-Estonians	24	23	23	28
20–30%	10	59	6	57
10% or less	34	4	27	3
None	18	0	30	0
Hard to say	14	12	14	12

**Source:** Vetik, R. (2009), “Ten years of Integration policies and processes in Estonia“, in *National Integration and Formation of Multi-Ethnic Society: Experiences in Estonia and Latvia after EU enlargement* by Nobuya Hashimoto, Hiromi Komori (eds)

Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan

**What do you think, to what extent non-Estonians have to be represented in local municipalities in Estonia? (percentage, %)**

**Estonians Russians**

	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>
One third or more	4	3	48	43
One fourth	8	4	9	17
One tenth or less	28	24	3	9
No representation at all	23	25	1	1

Repres. should not be dependent from non-Estonians number	28	28	31	24
Can't say	9	16	8	6
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: *Monitooring ( 2005) research findings, Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University*

App. V

**Political inclusion of core nation and minoritis in Ida-Virumaa,  
those, who have participated at least in one political activity during the last three years  
(2005 survey data, percentage)  
Estonians non-Estonians**


Non-inclusion, no participation	23	57
Minimal inclusion, at least in one political activity	64	33
Active inclusion, more than one political activity	13	10

Under political activity is meant: voting in elections, participation in political meetings, signature gathering, joint statements to press, participation in demonstrations, strikes. Source. *Monitooring 2005 (research findings), Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University*

App. VI

Trust index value	Estonians	Estonian citizens of other ethnicity	Stateless	Russian citizen
<i>Not too trusting (0-1)</i>	18	54	53	48
<i>Somewhat trusting (2-4)</i>	33	31	35	35
<i>Mostly trusting (5-7)</i>	31	9	7	10
<i>Very trusting (8-9)</i>	17	6	4	7

Source: *Vetik, R. (2009), "Ten years of Integration policies and processes in Estonia", in National Integration and Formation of Multi-Ethnic Society: Experiences in Estonia and Latvia after EU enlargement, p. 16 by Nobuya Hashimoto, Hiromi Komori (eds) Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan*



*Monitooring 2010,  
Institute of International and Social studies*

App. VII

	(percentage)		
	2005	2008	2010
<b>Ethnic minorities, who would like to obtain Estonian citizenship</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>34</b>

*Source: Monitooring 2010, <http://www.slideshare.net/kultuuriministeerium/limumiskava-monitooring>*

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